BOOK REVIEWS

From Fear to Freedom and Solidarity

Walter Kaufmann. *Without Guilt and Justice: From Decidophobia to Autonomy*. New York: Peter H. Wyden, 1973. Pp. vii + 274. $7.95.

This new book by Walter Kaufmann, professor of philosophy at Princeton University, Nietzsche scholar, and author of numerous significant books, is concerned with meeting the need for "a new, autonomous morality" (p. vii), and thereby with the quest for a better life. The problem is posed in the subtitle—"From Decidophobia to Autonomy," the first term meaning "fear of making fateful decisions" (p. 2).

The first chapter develops the thesis that man has the freedom of making decisions, in fact is, with Sartre, "condemned to be free" (p. 5). But people are inclined to be afraid to take the responsibility for this freedom, which is what Sartre means by *mauvaise foi*, Kaufmann, by self-deception. Ten strategies of decidophobia are presented, of which seven are methods of avoidance; two of "card stacking," that is, "to make one alternative clearly right and remove all risk"; and the tenth is simply to "decline responsibility" (p. 30). Taking the responsibility for making fateful decisions requires courage.

The next three chapters attack formal justice as blocking the road to autonomy. This, however, "does not entail any demand for the abolition of punishment. Punishments are needed, invocations of justice are not" (p. 60). The notion of justice depends "on some authority" (p. 106), usually divine authority. "What has happened to justice and desert in our time is similar to what has happened to God" (p. 105).

The fifth chapter takes a stand against guilt feelings. Referring to Camus, the hero in *The Fall* always "needed to feel above," always wanted "to look down on others," and his guilt feelings served exactly this purpose. Useless guilt feelings should be replaced with *humbition*. This is a new term created by Kaufmann by combining humility and ambition, and involving "a sense of one's limitations, accompanied not by resignation but by the aspiration to rise to a higher level of being" (p. 118). It is a cardinal virtue along with courage, love and honesty, and as such a habit that can be cultivated (p. 117). Along with guilt, go remorse, contrition, self-accusation, wallowing—all *past-oriented* and useless. What needs to be cultivated are responsibility (fault), regret, humbition, self-criticism, planning—all *future-oriented* and compatible "with a resolve to change" (p. 123). "Raising children on these virtues and teaching pupils the habit of self-criticism, high standards of honesty, and fellow feeling for other human beings would make for a better society than does the traditional emphasis on guilt feelings" (pp. 127-128). The solution is "to find a project that will benefit humanity, in line with your limited talents, and to make the most of your situation" (p. 131).

In Chapter 6, Kaufmann argues that "alienation is the price of autonomy" (pp. 156, 163), by which is meant that a certain distance from the crowd, a certain "alienation from one's fellow men and society . . . and a critical attitude toward

oneself" (p. 156) are necessary for one to be truly creative. He mentions fourteen most interesting and influential philosophers who are each "a triumph over an almost unbearable sense of alienation" (p. 161). These are the cases of "fruitful alienation" (p. 166).

Chapter 7 develops the thought that the new "whole of morality," or integrity, is no longer linked to justice, but to "concern for others," "social value," and "social utility" (pp. 188-189).

Chapter 8, the last, is devoted to the question of happiness. Happiness is conceived as a "life of service . . . in conjunction with the creative life" (pp. 228-229). "What is needed is some sense of solidarity with others—not necessarily or even usually all others, but some" (p. 231). ". . . some *feeling* for the less fortunate" (p. 233). Yet such compassion must not be considered Christian, for in Christian morality, guilt and fear have always been central.

As the reader has undoubtedly noted we have here far-reaching parallels with Adler: Kaufmann as the philosopher writing about the general condition of man and the way to a better future, whereas Adler, as psychotherapist, wrote primarily about the neurotic and his improvement. Afraid of facing his important problems, the neurotic develops strategies of distance behavior (pp. 273-276),[1] one of which is the "secondary field of action where the neurotic expends all his energies instead of devoting them to solving his primary problems. Like a veritable Don Quixote, he fights windmills" (pp. 305-306). Kaufmann's equivalent is "immersion in microscopic decisions . . . avoiding fateful decisions" (p. 3).

From his fear of failure the "neurotic demands categorically that if he fails, it should be through someone else's fault and that he should be freed from personal responsibility" (p. 270). Kaufmann likewise observes the tendency to escape responsibility and to make oneself appear the victim of fate.

Acceptance of responsibility requires courage, which is in Adler's view a function of social interest plus activity (p. 166). Kaufmann's examples of courage, Eleanore Roosevelt and Solzhenitsyn (the book is dedicated to the latter), are certainly outstanding also for their social interest.

The agreement extends to the understanding of guilt feelings as an expression of being superior to other men, and of self-righteousness. The same can be found in Adler who saw no gain from guilt and contrition (p. 273). The important thing is to recognize one's mistakes and to be able to correct them. "We attempt to undo the great errors, to substitute small errors, and to reduce these until they are no longer harmful" (p. 187).

Adler's social interest like Kaufmann's solidarity is also such that it does not mean one feels at home in any situation. "A philosopher must from time to time exile himself from society to think and write his books" writes Adler. "Solitary occupation in children . . . should be encouraged, provided it permits a prospect of later enrichment of society" (p. 141). These are but a few of the numerous similarities.

In his fine review in the *New York Times*, April 7, 1973, Anatole Broyard feared that the book "will probably be misunderstood by those who need it most." There will be no misunderstanding from Adlerian quarters; we can only welcome it in its own right and as providing reassuring consensual cross-validation. We

---

[1]All page references to Adler are to *The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler*.

also venture to see here the common influence of Nietzsche. Adler in his most formative years paid the highest tribute to Nietzsche, leading one to conclude that he studied him well and learned from him. Kaufmann's intimate knowledge of Nietzsche would inevitably influence his own thinking on psychological problems. The book is a welcome addition to the literature of a new humanism and value system that are both so badly needed today, written in Kaufmann's scholarly and precise way which also includes a refreshing newness of approach.

University of Vermont Heinz L. Ansbacher

Toward a Humanistic Behaviorism

Leonard Krasner and Leonard P. Ullmann. *Behavior Influence and Personality: The Social Matrix of Human Action.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973. Pp. xiv + 560. $11.00.

In his influential *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Thomas Kuhn argues that science is not cumulative but suffers periodic collapses followed by renewed bursts of progress. Paradigm is the concept that Kuhn employs to characterize those grand models according to which each new scientific age conducts its day-to-day business. Sixty years have passed since Watson set out on a search-and-destroy mission among the structuralists under the banner of a behaviorist system—a system that he hoped would become the paradigm for all of psychology. That behaviorist psychology is alive and well after six decades is unquestionable. That it is paradigmatic for all psychology depends, of course, on the psychologist's point of view. Krasner and Ullmann believe that it is, or soon may be.

The Krasner-Ullmann behaviorism remains true to the Watson-Skinner tradition of search and destroy, this time in the area of personality. Personality as a holistic entity, as traits, cognitive structures, a self, as enduring attitudes and dispositions, or as special states of anxiety, neuroses or psychoses comes under closely reasoned attack. These descriptions are held to be ideational constructs, or fictions, developed by psychologists to describe behavior and then reified and given a life all their own.

In Part 1 of the book the authors devote several chapters to a critical survey of the historical development of models of the human personality, beginning with the social philosophies of the 1600s and ending with behavior influence models of the 1970s, showing that all are products of the particular point of view of their originators and the zeitgeist in which they were developed. All traditional modelists (instinct, trait, type, attitudinal, and the like) and their associated measuring instruments are faulted for their assumptions about personality or its components as intervening variables within the organism that are hypothesized to account for behavior. These intervening variables are all too often validated only by reference back to the behavior from which they were named. And so descriptive metaphors become reified explanations.

Krasner and Ullmann as leading behavior therapists favor a behavior influence model of personality. This model seeks to define behavior as a function of operationally definable and replicable variables. In Parts 2 and 3 of their book the authors first present a summary of recent research on behavior therapy, and second an analysis of the influence of the broader contexts of situational variables

to be found in politics, economics, ecology, and social institutions. There are surprises here for the reader who is accustomed to the traditional personality texts which survey the Great Theories of the twenties, thirties and forties. There is a chapter on collective behavior, an analysis of architectural influence on behavior, a section on propaganda and persuasion, and a not always kindly treatment of encounter groups and the human potential movement in general. Finally, in Part 4, the possibilities of utopias and the ethical problems raised by behavior modification are discussed.

As George Miller pointed out in his 1969 presidential address to the American Psychological Association, psychology as a scientific discipline can play a role in influencing popular conceptions of human nature. The radical behaviorism of the first half of the twentieth century tended to envision men as machines to be programmed. This view had potential appeal to authoritarians and was not calculated to inspire the imagination, creativity, and optimism so sorely needed for resolving contemporary social problems. Krasner and Ullmann are to be congratulated for presenting a rigorous behaviorism which avoids radical extremes. The authors find it possible to include the self as an influencer. One is not only influenced by external stimuli; one influences others and oneself. Most importantly, man can arrange his own contingencies of reinforcement. Consequently, behavioral influence does not inevitably raise the specter of a *1984* where men are puppets controlled by social engineers, as Skinner's critics have claimed. Man, it seems, has his own second signal system, to borrow Pavlov's often overlooked concept.

This is a work characterized by a fine sense of history, excellence of scholarship, some good-natured polemics, and an unusually broad perspective. It is not suitable as a conventional textbook for sophomore courses labeled Personality. Rather, it is a challenging presentation of a paradigmatic analysis of personality from the behavior influence point of view for advanced students and professional psychologists. It deserves careful reading not only by those with a behaviorist orientation who are certain to find reinforcement for their convictions, but also by humanists as well. Many will come away a bit more kindly disposed toward behaviorism, without feeling that humanism has been dealt a fatal blow. This is a significant step toward a humanistic behaviorism.

St. Michael's College, Winooski, Vermont JAMES P. CHAPLIN

A CYBERNETIC MODEL OF MAN

GREGORY BATESON. *Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology*. San Francisco: Chandler, 1972. Pp. xxvii + 545. $12.50; New York: Ballantine, 1973. $1.95.

The essays constituting this book are by an eminent British anthropologist and were written over the course of 35 years. Bateson's arguments are consistently and increasingly in support of a cybernetic interpretation of existence (assuming feedback loops by which various systems can maintain themselves) which turns out, unfortunately, to be as arid and deterministic as epistemologies grounded in the assumptions of classical physics. Bateson gives examples of such systems on all levels of existence, but especially porpoises and men.

To cite an extreme case of his manner of thinking, Bateson suggests that when a woodsman chops a tree, the "tree-eyes-brain-muscles-axe-stroke-tree" form a "total system" of self-corrective feedback in which no part of the cycle can be seen as initial. What happens in such interpretations to the idea of agency? Is there such a thing as "cause" or "decision" in such a model?

Apparently not, for at a later point Bateson argues that "purposeful thinking" is an "error"—indeed an illusion—which simply generates further problems for men. The author has redefined the concept of mind to be the undifferentiated perception of the universe within each individual. "If I am right the whole of our thinking about what we are and what other people are has got to be restructured" (p. 468). And at this point, in what begins as "steps to an ecology of mind," mind is lost and ecology becomes everything.

The book is engagingly written and a challenge to all of the more accepted schools of social science and psychiatric thinking. But we are hardly farther along in our understanding of man by wholeheartedly substituting a cybernetic model for a matter-energy model of man, for neither, by itself, recognizes the uniquely moral dimension of human existence.

State University of New York, Albany H. WILLIAM BATT

A BIOSOCIAL, NONPHENOMENOLOGICAL VIEW OF MAN

G. M. GILBERT. *Personality Dynamics: A Biosocial Approach.* With assistance of Gardner Murphy. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. Pp. vii + 365. $7.95.

Many aspects make this a unique and valuable work, and it is its unique aspects which recommend it as a most suitable reference on personality for those studying Adlerian psychology. This is not to say that Gilbert has no differences with Individual Psychology, or that he treats of Adler. Actually, in two of the three very brief mentions of Adler, Gilbert misquotes him. Nonetheless, this book's fine presentation of the biosocial approach in several ways furnishes support for Adlerian rationale.

What other text on personality starts with prehuman beginnings and evolutionary advance? And what better way to identify basic human nature—when the intent is not to explain today's man by reducing him to prehuman levels—but to identify the essential strengths which have made his evolution possible? Gilbert's account of the factors "making for man's inherent predisposition to behave as a socially cohesive and culture-making animal" (p. 15) is fascinating and required reading. It includes among other functions the development of speech, as "the expression of meaning, feeling, and intention, and all the abstract thinking that goes with it . . . shared values and reciprocal feelings . . . as mechanisms of social cohesion" (pp. 17-18). Of particular interest is a remarkable quotation from Darwin, pointing out that the primeval tribe which "included a greater number of courageous, sympathetic, and faithful members, who were always ready to warn each other of danger, to aid and defend each other . . . would conquer other[s] . . . And thus the social and moral qualities would tend slowly to advance . . ."(p. 57).

As must already be apparent, Gilbert takes the stand for a humanistic behavioral science, involving "human values . . . along with all other subjective

reactions of this complex organism, as part of the *subject matter itself*" (p. 27). And beyond this he holds that we can *evaluate values* (p. 28). Interestingly, this position still needs to be defended, though not to the same extent as when Adler presented a very similar view over 50 years ago.

Many of Gilbert's statements validate the Adlerian viewpoint. Gilbert agrees that aggression is not necessarily destructive, as the innate aggression hypothesis holds. Further, he claims, "Its opposite—namely, cooperation—is also demonstrably normal, inborn, and necessary—only more so for human survival!" (p. 63). Gilbert speaks of "*efficacy*—the constitutionally based motive that assures the struggle for competence of adaptation and for the development of the organism's capacities through interaction with the environment" (p. 81). Such an inherent, constitutionally given force corresponds impressively with the quality of *activity* which (along with social interest) is one of Adler's two basic personality determinants. Again, Gilbert observes, "All cognitive, affective, and motor development becomes integrated with psychosocial development" (p. 85). This includes everything from walking and talking to increased memory span and perceptual discrimination. Adler, too, maintained that the acquisition of all of the child's habits and skills is a function of the degree to which he cooperates with his environment.

Gilbert makes interesting use of roles in his understanding of adolescent and early adult development. We would see roles as referring to some envisaged standard much like a goal toward which behavior is modeled. Early in the book Gilbert writes, "The human organism does not respond mechanically to stimuli, but is constantly striving toward goals and creating its own self-stimulation, while seeking out the stimulation of others" (p. 29). The maturing of the individual is nicely described as "jointly defined by biology and culture" (p. 104). However, Gilbert views the cultural as well as the biological in terms of "needs." "Social ego needs drive [one] to seek fulfillment in an appropriate and socially approved role" (p. 105).

Again, on the other hand, Gilbert points out, "Sexual and emotional maturity is delayed in the human until intellectual development has achieved the capacity for abstraction that is necessary for full acculturation of the individual" (p. 117). He conceives of the adult social role as "the behavioral integration of all that a person is and *strives* for . . . as a member of the society which he and his fellow human beings have *created* and continually *recreate*" (p. 157, italics added). But again he claims that individuals fill such roles because of "the satisfaction of social ego needs that make culture possible in the first place" (p. 160). Lest the differentiation between needs and goals appear as quibbling, we shall point out the further, related differences this distinction entails.

From his broad background in applied psychology, Gilbert reports two personality case studies, one of the Nazi, Ribbentrop, and one of a desperate young criminal. Though of much interest and of considerable length, these accounts seemed to us to fall short of explaining the individuals' behavior. We hazard the guess that this failure is related to the crucial difference we find between Gilbert's personality theory and ours. He seems not to appreciate that which Adler emphasized above all other factors: the *creative power* of the individual, his apperception and interpretation of the facts of his existence in his own unique way—a way which at times may stand in a "strange relation to reality." Though highly per-

ceptive regarding factors which influence the personality, Gilbert leaves no room for the individual's decision to react to these in one way *or another.* Invariably he describes the formation of personality in the *passive* voice. Personality is "a continuous *product* of previous experiences and motives" (p. 67). He speaks of processes "by which personalities *become differentiated*" (p. 135). "Basic drives *are channeled* and ego needs *adjusted* to reality" (p. 190, all italics added). There is lack of appreciation for the *active* self as a self-determining force, for the creative, erring, unpredictable, choosing subject. In Gilbert's own words, his aim with regard to case histories is "to do justice to the dynamic flux and interplay of motivational adjustments and the course of behavioral adaptations . . . defenses operating conjunctively and in continuity with the course of a life history" (p. 211). But *where*, among these busy, animated *abstractions*, is the *person* as agent, and especially, where is the subjective, phenomenological world of the person?

Having identified this chief point of difference, our final point will be one of agreement. It is with Gilbert's final thesis that "individuals may affect social change as well as being affected by it" (p. 323). This is a surprising stand in view of his aforementioned lack of recognition of the individual's spontaneity. Gilbert's explanation of change seems to be that "in *homo sapiens socialis* a sense of responsibility is the hallmark of mature adulthood" (p. 323), and it is in keeping with this virtue "to have the courage of one's convictions' to determine limits of obedience and conformity" (p. 340). Thus Gilbert's view is definitively in line with Adler's concept of social interest as *not* implying conformity but freely working toward further evolution. This regard for forward movement in the individual, society, and the species is a concern throughout Gilbert's book, and this, in spite of the several criticisms we have made, constitutes sufficient reason for recommending it to our readers.

Burlington, Vermont ROWENA R. ANSBACHER

PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

J. H. VAN DEN BERG. *A Different Existence: Principles of Phenomenological Psychopathology.* Duquesne University Press, 1972. Pp. 141. $6.25.

While reading this book my thoughts kept slipping back to Dr. van den Berg's lectures which I attended in 1966 while a doctoral student in psychology at Duquesne University. My brief discussions with him concerning Alfred Adler's contributions to phenomenological thought led nowhere. It seemed that this very warm and knowledgeable professor did not interpret Adler as I had, and so concluded one discussion with a shrug of his shoulders. I remembered this incident vividly once I now read the following acknowledgement. In discussing how the emotions are conditioned by one's life context rather than solely by glands, Dr. van den Berg adds in a footnote, "As far as I know, Alfred Adler was the first to make such a statement. . . . On other aspects, too, Adler developed original reasonings that are only now fully appreciated" (p. 43). This acknowledgment did not appear in his prototypical text, *The Phenomenological Approach to Psychiatry*, 1955, indicating Adler's growing importance for modern-day psychiatry and psychology.

The present book achieves its purpose: to present the phenomenological approach by being phenomenological, i.e., giving priority to appearances rather than to theories, to descriptions rather than to explanations, to comprehensive insights rather than to analytic reconstructions. Problems belong to the dimension of living, the prereflective; whereas questions and answers belong to the realm of thinking, the reflective. Once we give priority to living, our questions must flow from the problem itself and the existential givens that we are embodied beings participating with others in time and space, i.e., being-in-the-world-with-others, to use existential shorthand. In this unity of body-other-time-space the givens implicate each other in a phenomenological approach. The Adlerian equivalent to this unity is the integration of organ inferiorities (body), degree of social feeling (other), early recollections and life goal (time), and life tasks (space) according to the notion of life style.

The traditional explanatory concepts of psychiatry no longer make any sense to a person giving priority to lived experience instead of to analogous abstraction, e.g., equating perception with the functioning of a movie projector. Van den Berg further declares that traditional psychiatry represents "a fourfold denial of the truth of the patient's reality . . . Projection denies the patient's observations. Conversion denies the existence of the patient's bodily sensations. Transference denies what the patient can find in others. Memory distortion denies what the patient remembers" (p. 104).

Dr. van den Berg's brilliant analysis of time corresponds to the Adlerian insight concerning early recollections and how they often change in quality during therapy. For instance, Dr. van den Berg states that "the patient changes his past, and in so doing, gives his future (from which the past presents itself to him) a new countenance" (p. 99). He also clearly sees that memory is purposive, another Adlerian insight: "Simple recollection is not given to us. Our recollections have a motive. It is this motive that decides the nature of the recollection: nice, delicious, pleasant, disappointing or worry" (p. 83).

Again, Adler's notion that "being a fellowman" to the patient sets the cure in motion is echoed in the words of our phenomenological friend: "The therapist plays a part in the cure. Disease and cure are taking place *together with other people*" (p. 100). Clearly, both theorists see the healing nature of the "being-with" mode of relating which is characterized by openness toward and the stilling of abstract and judgmental chatter with respect to the other.

Let me pause here, in my excitement about the similarity of these two psychiatrists, so that I may see how they also differ. It is such differences which add spice and excitement to life anyway. Dr. van den Berg makes it very clear, the phenomenologists do not rely upon the hypothetical deductive approach: "The phenomenologist never needs hypotheses. Hypotheses emerge where description of reality has been discontinued too soon" (p. 124). Hypotheses do emerge as possibilities of a liar to deceive and of scientist to explain. But, we ask, does description—even a phenomenological one—exhaust reality? Does it attain closure of life? And does it totalize our understanding of man in our lifetime? I think not.

I also dispute with van den Berg on a matter of emphasis. I believe that by not giving priority to the social dimension of man, he fails to implicate fully himself and the social aspects of his phenomenology. He does not share the Adlerian

belief that the other, i.e., family, neighbors, community, country, and civilization, coconstitute the human experience of time, of space, of body, and of others. It is as if he never read Straus' phenomenology of "Upright Posture" (1966) in which time and space are shown to be humanly constituted. Like Heidegger, who alots a few pages only to the social dimension of man in his magnum opus (*Sein und Zeit*, 1927), van den Berg also gives but lip service to the encounter experience and its many social implications.

I believe van den Berg's phenomenology suffers from "pomposity" and a "loss of nerve," to pursue the personal and societal implications of his description of lived experience. Such a pursuit requires a full revelation of the phenomenologist as experiencer within a cultural context. It is easy to be mistaken as to a writer's life style from the mere reading of his book. Nonetheless, being a phenomenologist, I stand upon my experience of the book as being reflective of the author's life style along dimensions to which I am sensitive for reasons of my own life style.

To end, let me acknowledge that van den Berg does display considerable courage in stating that "loneliness is the nucleus of psychiatry" (p. 105). After all he is an academic psychiatrist, and a European one at that, and such a statement may alienate some of his colleagues. Perhaps it is the threat of loneliness which prevents him from going further with the implications of this statement. Isn't he taking a step toward handing over psychiatry to the vernacular, to the people? That is, loneliness is understandable; intro-psychic process is not. Adler and Dreikurs did make the leap fully and did suffer professionally for making it. In this respect these three psychiatrists have made it a new "ball game": a human psychiatry. Psychology (including psychiatry) is the science of living (Adler); psychotherapy is the development of a new technology of human relationships (Dreikurs); and psychopathology is the science of loneliness (van den Berg).

I recommend van den Berg's book to all. It is a book to read again and again for it is phenomenology clearly presented.

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania James F. Brennan

Integration of Experimental and Clinical Psychology

Erasmus L. Hoch. *Experimental Contributions to Clinical Psychology*. Belmont, California: Brooks/Cole, 1971. Pp. viii + 389. $9.50.

Erasmus Hoch has given us a thoughtful and stimulating book that is both informative and enjoyable reading. Notable are his statements on scientific inquiry and the means by which inferences can be validly drawn from data. In many instances the author presents two sides to a theoretical controversy, leaving the reader free to draw his own conclusions.

The topics range widely, from the traditional areas in clinical psychology to such diverse content as social-psychological processes involved in institutionalization, conditioning, aggression, and research dealing with biofeedback and physiological processes.

The spirit of the book is "integration." The author holds that psychology has an identity of its own which transcends the specialties within the field, and

that the methods and wisdoms from both experimental and clinical psychology are needed. This plea for generalism and unity is indeed welcome. To quote two passages:

I hope that, in reading this book, the student with predominantly clinical interests will gain a healthy respect both for the clinician as a behavioral scientist and for the non-clinician as a contributor to the clinical enterprise (p. v).—My thesis, then, is that the more a clinical psychologist knows about what is going on in the rest of psychology, the better a clinical psychologist he is. Conversely, the more a physiological, experimental, social, or other kind of psychologist knows about significant developments in clinical psychology, the more consummate a psychologist he is (p. 9).

Hoch does not take extremist positions, and a flavor reminiscent of homespun wisdom pervades the book. He suggests that some of the deviant behaviors of hospitalized schizophrenics may be due largely to their institutionalization. Researchers as well as clinicians must realize that often one finds evidence that fits one's own bias, and that "experimenter bias" effects cannot be ignored. He shows, by describing several experiments, that performance by black subjects can be altered not only by the race of the experimenter but also the nature of the task. In another instance he elaborates on studies that have shed light on creative thinking. Other points that are well handled are the role of social processes in aggression, the way learning to be helpless affects subsequent performance under stress, and the kinds of methodological problems that are involved in the study of schizophrenia.

Points that the author makes are well documented, and interestingly presented, in a style that is informal and conversational rather than pedantic and highly technical. As a textbook it should give the student a wide view of clinical problems and processes in a readily digestible form. As a treatise, advancing a sensible and sensitive approach to the study of clinical problems, it goes far in encouraging a social-rational view of clinical processes specifically and psychological processes generally. Adlerians will find much in the book that is of interest, and a considerable amount which they can find congruent with Adlerian ideas.

Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville EVA D. FERGUSON

PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT, ACTUARIAL APPROACH

RICHARD I. LANYON and LEONARD D. GOODSTEIN. *Personality Assessment.* New York: John Wiley, 1971. Pp. xii + 267. $8.95.

For the task they have set themselves the authors have succeeded admirably. They set out to explore the theoretical issues underlying the assessment process. In doing so they avoid the often-published textbook formats which center about description or give instruction on "how to do it." Jargon is forsaken in favor of explanation. Perhaps the only term which an undergraduate will not have previously encountered will be "ipsative," and that is adequately defined. The "statistics" found in similar textbooks, which have frightened generations of students, are transformed into non-mathematical language. Even complex operations like factor analysis are stripped of their mathematical stress potential. The only area which might still stimulate students' mathematical inferiority com-

plexes ("I never was good in math!") is that on base rates, a concept which receives much of the authors' interest.

Many would, however, consider the title of the book a misnomer since the book deals almost exclusively with psychological testing as the most important vehicle for obtaining assessment information. Observation, the interview, and the case study are minimized at least in the number of pages devoted to these topics. One almost has the impression that psychiatrists and social workers are not or ought not to be engaged in assessment since their educational and professional experience does ordinarily not include the use of tests. By comparison Sundberg and Tyler's *Clinical Psychology*, for example, provides a much broader view of the assessment process.

Curiously Lanyon and Goodstein, in summarizing studies of comparisons of sources of assessment information, conclude, "For one thing the studies rather consistently demonstrate that, as sources of data for psychological prediction or description, personality tests do not fare as well as case history data" (p. 173)—and then ignore the case study.

For the Adlerian who uses the life-style interview rather than tests in assessing personality, the above statement should be encouraging, but he should heed the cautions in the chapters on "Problems of Application" and "Criticisms of Personality Assessment." Even the experienced clinician can profit from reading these two chapters.

The actuarial bias of the authors will rankle in readers who prefer to believe that their own inferences are superior to those which can be arrived at by a computer, that the goals of assessment are not merely prediction but include global descriptions, and that predictions for groups may give the actuarial clinician a good "batting average" but may not assist him in understanding the individual under assessment or to make predictions about him. The evidence for both points of view is not yet all in. The clinical-approach clinician will find much of the discussion of the actuarial approach raising questions and stimulating his thinking even if he does not accept the authors' biases. The actuarial-approach clinician will find the book to his taste, the issues well presented and thought out, and a point of departure for further research.

Chicago, Illinois HAROLD H. MOSAK

TEACHING THE PSYCHIATRIST-PATIENT RELATIONHIP

DANIEL B. SCHUSTER, JOHN J. SANDT, and OTTO F. THALER. *Clinical Supervision of the Psychiatric Resident.* New York: Brunner/Mazel, 1972. pp. xv + 334. $10.00.

Three psychiatrists from the University of Rochester have reviewed the history and philosophy of clinical supervision of the psychiatric resident and have described their own methods as well as the problems common to this teaching task. The authors state that modern psychiatric training includes many diverse therapeutic methods, but they stress teaching the resident to examine and understand behavioral dynamics and to do an effective diagnostic and therapeutic interview.

Their goal is a worthy one, and they often achieve it. But they have a limited idea of clinical supervision, tending to ignore situations other then resident-patient

and resident-supervisor relationship. They pay little attention to how the resident functions in a therapy group, prescribes medication, designs nursing approaches on an inpatient unit, or applies behavior modification. Multiple interviews, suggested many years ago by Hadden as a way of teaching residents, is not mentioned. It would be better to call this a book in teaching the resident how to have a one-to-one relationship with his patient. Withal, it is a pleasant book, even though the taped transcripts become boring. Mainly, it provoked me to think that the best way to teach the beginning resident is to let him watch the supervisor interview and *then* let them discuss the case together.

St. Joseph Hospital, Chicago BERNARD H. SHULMAN, M.D.

THE "MYTH OF MENTAL DEFICIENCY"

DOROTHEA D. BRAGINSKY and BENJAMIN M. BRAGINSKY. *Hansels and Gretels: Studies of Children in Institutions for the Mentally Retarded.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. Pp. xi + 212. $3.95 paper.

This is a significant book, unusual because written both in the indicative and imperative modes. The authors state their position, report their research to substantiate it, and then plead for the indicated reform.

The Braginskys cite others who have pointed to the error in applying the category of mental *defective* to the case of educable, non-organically impaired retardates. Their contribution is to submit original data from 177 retardates, in two training schools, to check their claim that these were "rootless and rejected, rather than defective, children" (p. 36). With ingenious tests they ascertained that their subjects did exercise the art of "impression management" (manipulation of the staff); could appear "dumber" or "brighter" at will; have differing styles of adapting to the highly controlling training school (e.g., in terms of spending the greater part of their time on the ward, at work, or socializing); and that these styles of adaptation are correlated with respective attitudes.

A questionnaire on beliefs and attitudes administered to the retardates and, with negligible modifications, to the staff, yielded meaningful findings regarding the retardates, and also showed three different worlds: that of the retardate, of the professional staff, and of the staff closest to the retardates, namely, the matrons and attendants. The authors conclude from this:

> Regardless of the reasons, the retardate is faced with living in the institution the way he personally desires while confronted with the frequently conflicting desires of the professionals and subprofessionals. . . . The personal styles of adaptation the retardates evolve are hard-won victories, requiring the weapons of cleverness, resourcefulness, and interpersonal skill (p. 135).

The authors' next step is to inquire into what brought the retardates to the training school in the first place. For a balanced answer, they asked the inmates themselves (of whom 93% did not believe they were retarded), and turned to the professional records on file for the respective cases. The data from these two sources were remarkably similar.

> While the metaphor of mental retardation focuses upon assumed inner defects, this research showed the most obvious, potent condition for bringing a child to the training school is that the child be unloved and unwanted by the family or its

surrogates . . . More often than not, the chasm between the parents and the children is paralleled by that between both parents . . . [But] rejection alone is not sufficient to warrant the title of retardation. Society's contribution is to finalize the transaction, by turning the unwanted child into the mentally defective child (pp. 160-161).

Almost all institutionalized members of our society come from the lower class, the poor and "negatively visible," by which the authors mean, people who in some way violate, threaten, or disrupt the values and propriety of the mainstream of society.

The labeling of a child, then, exonerates the parents (except perhaps genetically) and society for putting these children away in warehouses for human debris: If the costs of having and maintaining a child greatly exceed the rewards, the probability that the child will be abused, rejected, and ultimately discarded will be high—as is the case with the authors' Hansels and Gretels (p. 162).

But the authors make a convincing case for the probability that under similar circumstances, anyone would behave the same way.

At this point the authors explicitly "enter the sociopolitical arena—as humanists concerned with the needs of man. . . . rather than dwelling primarily in the molecular realm of the intrapsychic" (pp. 176-177). We find their psychological points well taken, and endorse their drawing the sociopolitical consequences. This leads them to seek a center for children whose parents cannot care for them, a cooperative retreat model which is not a "treatment" facility, but "an experiment in living where persons would have the opportunity, even for a short while, to be members of a small, stable, and democratic community . . . with no labels attached" (p. 180) and "with the opportunity to do more than merely survive" (p. 181).

Burlington, Vermont ROWENA R. ANSBACHER

A PRESENT-DAY PSYCHOANALYTIC THERAPY

LEON J. SAUL. *Psychodynamically Based Psychotherapy*. New York: Science House, 1972. Pp. 842. $20.00.

This book by an early student at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, is well written and gives one a good working understanding of the form of psychoanalysis originated by Franz Alexander. The author asserts that it abandons most of Freud's metapsychology (p. 10), i.e., the topography (id, ego, superego), the instinct theory, and the pleasure principle and repetition compulsion. "Those who stress metapsychology tend to describe patients [in] such generalities . . . that very little idea is given of the patient as a human being" (p. 11). Saul cites the case of a patient who suffered from guilt. In two years of treatment with one psychoanalyst no further interpretation was reached than that the guilt "was from masturbating as a child" (p. 11). A new psychoanalyst applying the new approach "quickly revealed that the patient's guilt stemmed from hostility . . . derived from . . . (a) feelings of inferiority . . . because he had been . . . consistently overprotected . . . and (b) protest against all the responsibility which he now carried in his adult life" (pp. 11-12). This is of course a great approximation toward Adler.

But enormous differences still remain. Although the patient's problem is carried into the present, and the future is considered, the orientation is still largely causalistic. Symptomatic for this are analogies with physics and medicine, e.g., "Psychodynamics studies the essential nature of man much as physics explores the nature of matter" (p. 9), and, "Well-executed psychoanalysis is probably one of the most delicate types of surgical procedure" (p. 29). And as to metapsychology, more remains than the author would seem to indicate by his initial statement, e.g., "Sex normally contains a certain amount of hostility" (p. 441).

Part 1, some 90 pages, deals with the general approach. Part 2, 300 pages, is concerned with specific techniques, including the first interview, free association, dreams, making interpretations, dynamics of the couch, transference, sample difficulties. Part 3, 370 pages, on clinical material, gives verbatim dialogues with patients and the author's comments, as well as selected protocols from 189 treatment hours of one patient. An appendix of over 50 pages presents "A Review of Research Evidence," prepared in collaboration with Solveig Wenar.

Altogether, we consider this book an excellent presentation of its subject matter, providing a full working knowledge of one form of present-day psychoanalysis.

University of Vermont HEINZ L. ANSBACHER

A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LOGOTHERAPY

JAMES C. CRUMBAUGH. *Everything to Gain: A Guide to Self-Fulfillment through Logoanalysis.* Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1973. Pp. x + 254. $7.95.

This is a splendidly useful book, delivering both an ideal message and some very practical suggestions for its realization. The combination is recognizably what Frankl offers in his logotherapy. As Crumbaugh puts it: "You have just two ways to go: either accept the situation as meaningless and hopeless, or accept it as an opportunity to fulfill the true meaning of your life. In either case you must accept it. But the attitude you choose makes all of the difference in the outcome" (p. 32). This may not be an easy precept, but it is compellingly logical. Crumbaugh encourages the reader to apply it by giving feasible ways of finding such meaning in life, exercises for practicing it, and citing cases in which it has been successful. One is impressed with his conviction and the extent of his experience both with clients and in his own living.

Like Frankl, Crumbaugh believes in a Higher Power, and suggests ways for finding such a belief through meditation. But he does not deny the possibility of the good life to nonbelievers. The principle involved is the same for all: "As Lincoln said, 'I am not bound to win, but I am bound to live up to what light I have.' When we can accept this, we can accept ourselves; and when we can accept ourselves, we can feel accepted . . . and can live usefully and therefore meaningfully; we can deal effectively with whatever befalls us" (p. 135).

It is of course not surprising that, in espousing Frankl, Crumbaugh comes close to Adler in many ways. His opening sentence reads: "Everyone wants to be Somebody" (p. ix). This, in my view, translates accurately into: "Everyone is striving for significance," one of Adler's phrases to describe the universal movement of human life. Crumbaugh develops his basic concept as "finding the mean-

ing and purpose of your own life . . . in terms of a job to do, a goal to achieve, a role to fulfill . . . which will identify you as Somebody in the total scheme of things" (p. 55). This has an obvious correspondence with Adler's task-centered and goal-oriented view of life. Further, Crumbaugh writes, "The first thing to remember about emotional problems is that they always refer to a breakdown of adequate relationships with other people" (p. 94)—again a parallel with Adler's sine-qua-non, cooperation.

Crumbaugh's second axiom of logotherapy (p. 232), that man is free to make his own choices, now shared by all humanistic psychologies, is particularly Adlerian. In fact, Adler's break from Freud's determinism constituted the first teleological alternative in modern psychotherapy. Although Adler described a number of predisposing circumstances, he emphasized that no one was "obligated" to respond to them in a predetermined manner, but that one would always do so in accordance with one's own apperceptions and goals.

As we welcome the points shared with Crumbaugh, we also appreciate what we find unique in his work. One innovative practice is striking, partly because it grew out of an old favorite, Vaihinger's "as if." But Crumbaugh uses the concept very concretely, in "*acting* as if." The technique is to imagine the kind of person one would want to be, then doing at least one thing such a person would do, for a short time each day. "The more we act this way, the more we feel the part; and the more we feel it, the easier it is to act it. Soon it becomes ingrained in us, and we are no longer acting" (p. 74). This last formal exercise alone, one might say, in the words of the book's title, assures a "gain" to be gotten from this "guide to self-fulfillment."

Burlington, Vermont ROWENA R. ANSBACHER

OF TIME AND THERAPY

HARVEY BARTEN and SYBIL S. BARTEN. (Eds.) *Children and Their Parents in Brief Therapy*. New York: Behavioral Publications, 1973. Pp. xi + 323. $9.95.

Our culture is particularly aware that "time is money," yet psychotherapy has not been motivated toward brevity until relatively recently. The psychoanalytic approach, first practiced with those who had both time and money, for many years held univocal sway in the social work agencies, as well as with psychiatrists and counseling psychologists. This was particularly disadvantageous for children whose formative years are relatively short, and for crisis situations which are prevalent in families in all socioeconomic brackets.

It is fascinating to see how this pressure of time has lead practitioners to a variety of forms of brief therapy, 20 of which the Bartens have brought together in previously printed accounts. They have grouped them into those dealing with early intervention, school problems, group and family approaches, behavior modification, and pharmacotherapy. Subtopics such as parents of prematures, drug abuse, and disturbed delinquents indicate the wide and diversified field covered, bringing out a variety of advantages specific to brief therapy.

One significant aspect of the book is the light it sheds on the change from the distant search for the causes of problems far into the past, into depths within, or

even to the parents for the cause of the child's difficulties, referred to by Thomas, Stella Chess, and Birch as "treating the wrong patient" (p. 106). While there is still evidence of earlier approaches, and reluctance to break with them, the focus is on speedier dealing with observable realities of the problem-persons-in-their-present-contexts. In turn this has brought out the therapeutic facets in time itself: "The structured use of time [has become] an important treatment variable" (Elizabeth Kerns, p. 81). The time limitation, together with the family's participation and responsibility, constitutes a "therapeutic pressure" (Rosenthal and Levine, p. 43).

The Bartens summarize their own views and the contents of each of their selections. They emphasize that brief therapy is a problem-solving approach, that it is health-oriented, delineating strengths of the clients, and encouraging them to seek their own solutions. Every paper in this volume makes its contribution, but space allows mentioning only a few points which interested me especially.

The earliest paper, by E. L. Phillips and Margaret S. H. Johnson (1954), is also the most comprehensive, a "classic." It defines the kind of problem appropriate for short-term therapy; describes the nature of the therapy as related to patterns of interaction rather than to repressed materials; presents a rationale for parent behavior in conjoint family counseling as well as for the basic nature of family disharmony; affirms the self-healing process in children and parents; and states, "*Change the system and you change the child*" (p. 29). It is also one of the two papers which include control data.

The "collaborative character" (Rosenthal and Levine) of brief therapy was brought out by many therapists. Kelleher presents the following original view from the intervening side. The therapist is traditionally the detached expert. "But if one adopts a primarily existential stance of 'this-person-a-parent-here-with-me-the-expert-now,' he sees himself, an imperfect expert in solving problems, . . . a part of 'the problem' . . . of how to move toward more effective patterns of interaction" (p. 154).

It was good to see Epstein's advice not to abandon basic education and advice-giving to parents. His experience shows that learning basic coping techniques when combined with a more realistic level of mutual expectation and the diminution of anxiety result in improved family functioning (p. 213).

Two chapters on school phobias held excellent suggestions in their specific field (Waldfogel, Tessman and Hahn; and Kennedy), as did one on teaching learning skills to disturbed, delinquent children (Minuchin, Chamberlain, and Graubard). One technique in this was to assign the children alternate roles as participant and observer in similar situations. In some way this switching of roles is related to the finding of Argles and Mackenzie that by listening, the therapist can influence family members to listen to one another; they come to feel, "I am attended to, therefore I can afford to attend" (p. 234). A further well-taken point is made by them with regard to work with multi-problem families: Having set goals and commitments within the families' capacities, and with their participation, it is best to "let them be" when they believe these are attained, until they develop a sense of wanting further help. They must feel that help is a means of increasing their autonomy and not a further acknowledgement of their inadequacies (pp. 237-238).

The two papers on behavior modification are excellent. Wherry and Wollerstein present a complete syllabus of principles and practices which is most useful, and Wagner gives a clear explanation of operant conditioning for parents, which claims convincingly that "for maximum effectiveness it is necessary for us to put therapy where the problem is—in the home" (p. 295).

To attempt some generalizations regarding the actual duration of these brief therapies, most sessions were weekly, up to 10 in number. Sometimes the length is on a contract basis. As Kerns expresses it, client and worker reach a mutual agreement to work together toward a specific goal within a given number of sessions. During the last session the decision to terminate or renegotiate is made on the basis of an evaluation of what has been accomplished in relation to the goal (p. 81). Sometimes therapy was concluded when a crisis was resolved. Generally the assurance of further therapy, should it be wanted, was considered integral to the short-term agreement.

It will have become clear that this volume offers much of practical value, and food for thought as well. It is especially interesting to speculate on the influences in the development of brief therapy, and encouraging to see how many independently effective approaches can be included in it. At any rate, the practice today is most promising.

Burlington, Vermont ROWENA R. ANSBACHER

LARGE-SCALE GROUP THERAPY AND ADLERIAN THEORY

JOSEF RATTNER. *Psychotherapie als Menschlichkeit.* (Psychotherapy as Humaneness.) Freiburg i/B.: Walter-Verlag, 1972. Pp. 207. DM22.00.

Following upon his book on large-scale group psychotherapy (*Gruppentherapie*, Bergisch Gladbach: Gustav Lübbe, 1972) this new volume by Josef Rattner informs the reader of the theoretical context of his therapeutic work. The first part of the book is based on courses on theory offered by the author to participants in his group therapy. It gives a brief introduction to the fundamentals of psychoanalysis,[1] its history, topics, and methods. Adler's holistic approach and optimistic concept of man are brought out, and his influence on the neo-psychoanalytic schools is valued highly by the author. As seen by him, appeal of Adler's psychology points to the true task of psychotherapy in our society, that is its preventative and sociopsychological function.

The second part of the book, entitled "Liberation for Humaneness," deals with: the cultural situation of our time in its relevance to the statement, "In this culture, the healthy person is the exceptional case"; the image of an emancipated, humanized mankind living in solidarity; and the possible contributions to this by psychotherapy. Referring to Arno Plack's cultural analysis, Rattner is convinced of social determination and therefore of the possibility of change for the better in

[1]The author and the reviewer use the term psychoanalysis in the broad sense as is still frequently done, interchangeably with psychotherapy. In this scheme the Freudian school becomes "orthodox psychoanalysis," while the others are designated as "neo-psychoanalytic." To prevent confusion we have substituted in several instances psychotherapy for psychoanalysis.—Ed. note.

the hatred, fear, and social disability which are so prevalent. Psychotherapy, as the author understands it, in the tradition of the enlightenment, relying on the essential natural goodness of man, is a cultural task. In accordance with the goal of all political, social, and economic strivings, namely, the solidarity and freedom of mankind, psychotherapy makes its contribution through encouragement and education of free, human personalities who will be able to cope with the tasks of society.

Psychotherapy and preventive mental hygiene of the masses are therefore needed. To cope with this enormous task, large-scale group therapy as practiced by the Zurich-Berlin school of Liebling and Rattner seems to be the therapeutic method of the future. They attained positive results in groups of up to 180 persons with different degrees of neurotic disturbance. New techniques of a cooparative style of therapy are being worked on, the means and goal of which are to train every group member "to become in part a therapist himself."

Results, theories, opinions and facts are, unfortunately presented in a rather unsystematic medley. But aside from this the book attests a strong commitment for the further development of a new social psychology in the context of which the name and contributions of Alfred Adler are gaining new significance in Germany.

Delmenhorst, Germany BARBARA MEYER-DETTUM

NEW THERAPEUTIC TRENDS IN SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE

JOEL FISCHER (Ed.) *Interpersonal Helping: Emerging Approaches for Social Work Practice.* Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1973. pp. xxxv + 668. $16.95 ($9.95 paper).

Joel Fischer is currently the most prolific writer in the social work field, with several books and articles to his credit. In the present volume he, as editor, brings all the themes with which he has been consistently concerned together, through 39 articles by others and 2 articles as well as introductory comments by himself. Most of the articles are from psychological and psychiatric journals, so that this is really a book for all psychotherapists and counselors, with only a few articles devoted to problems specific to social work.

Dr. Fischer's special interests are validation of treatment techniques, interview conditions associated with effective treatment, behavior modification, and techniques for intervention with low-income clients. The book deals mainly with these themes, but from many different viewpoints.

The editor stresses that the best research done on clinical casework, that is, counseling and treatment by social workers, offers no proof whatsoever that it has been effective. Although it is stated in the text, more than once, that such casework was Freudian-oriented, Fischer concludes that *no* type of verbal psychotherapy has proved its effectiveness. He contends, therefore, that we must abandon verbal psychotherapy.

On the other hand, Fischer believes that behavior modification has given proof of its effectiveness and that we should concentrate on these techniques. We should also develop techniques for use with low-income clients, with whom therapeutic intervention is different from that with middle-class clients.

The reader obtains from the selections a sense of many of the new trends in the mental health field: scientific training of mental health professionals, recognition of moral issues in the therapeutic relationship, application of behavior modification techniques in various settings, crisis intervention, short-term treatment, eclecticism in treatment methods, consultation in the schools, improving delivery of mental health services in the ghettos, and evaluation of clients by behavioral analysis instead of diagnostic classification.

This reviewer likes Fischer's emphasis on treatment techniques and methods of intervention in his selections, with the thrust of all the papers being away from the psychoanalytic approach. E.g., Jay Haley is represented by his devastating satirical article on "The Art of Being a Failure as a Therapist"—which advises, to fail, simply follow the "traditional" practices.

Especially valuable is the huge number of references. Also very important is the reminder that social workers (and all mental health professionals) must serve as advocates of the poor and engage in social action. Finally, one can only give the fullest support to the call on psychotherapists to be open to every possible new intervention technique.

But one is disappointed that on this last point Fischer does not follow his own admonition. The book ends up being narrow despite its size and wide scope. There is not one word about any of the cognitive or reality-oriented therapies, no indication that Adler, Rank, Glasser, Albert Ellis, Abraham Maslow, or many other non-Freudians ever existed. This omission is particularly glaring in the section on "Intervention with the Poor," where stress is placed on understanding the life style, directing intervention toward practical goals, and not regarding as illness what are really problems in coping with destructive environments—all basic premises of the Adlerian and other rational therapies.

Morristown, New Jersey HAROLD D. WERNER

ADVICE AND SUCCESS

MILDRED NEWMAN, BERNARD BERKOWITZ, and JEAN OWEN. *How to Be Your Own Best Friend.* New York: Lark Publishing Co., 1971. Pp. 59. $4.95.

Jean Owen is the questioner in this "conversation," and presents the position of Everyman very well. Mildred Newman and Bernard Berkowitz, married to each other, are the "psychoanalysts" who respond in non-technical terms, wisely, convincingly and quite unpsychoanalytically. They have made the wisdom of the ages their own, expressing it simply and well— as they modestly tell their questioner at the end, "You knew them [these secrets] all the time." They quote few sources, and perhaps it is their individual experience which has revealed these truths, as well as validated them. At any rate they express well, in today's langguage, such thoughts as Hillel's, "If I am not for myself, who will be?" (p. 19); Goethe's advice to treat a person as if he were what he could become (p. 23); Heschel's, "Life is what man does with God's time" (p. 38); Adler's insight that a person's behavior confirms his theory about what he expects from others (p. 29). In turn the authors provide their own quotable expressions: "People say they want to 'let go.' What they really need to do is take hold" (p. 55). "Love is an

affirmation of the living, growing being in all of us. If you don't have it, you can't give it" (p. 19). "Self-denial is one of the worst kinds of self-indulgence" (p. 20).

The authors are encouraging, urging one to build on one's strengths (with the assurance that we all have some). But they do not promise change without changing yourself. "You can choose to do the things that make you feel good about yourself" (p. 12). Their general emphasis is on choosing and doing. While I regret that in spite of their wholly non-Freudian belief in the ability of each individual to become master in his own house, the authors label themselves "psychoanalysts," I take pleasure, in seeing that Dr. Berkowitz attended the Alfred Adler Institute in New York.

It is not often that a book by unknown authors, with but 56 slight pages, becomes Number 2 on the general best seller list (as of this writing, in the *New York Times*), and I sincerely salute the authors. I am haunted by the impossible question—as they must be—how to know the extent and nature of this book's influence on the lives of its innumerable readers.

Burlington, Vermont ROWENA R. ANSBACHER

MAKING MARRIAGE WORKABLE

WILLIAM J. LEDERER and DON D. JACKSON. *The Mirages of Marriage*. New York: Norton, 1968. Pp. 473. $10.00.

From the mass media one might get the impression that young people today are well tuned into "reality" and have no need to be told that the old romantic myths their parents believed in are mostly nonsense. Not so. As a college teacher of the sociology of the family, I am astounded anew every year by this. Many of these young people are modern only in their sexual behavior (times *have* changed there) and in their very tentative beginning awarenesses of sex-role issues. Despite the best efforts of women's liberationists, the students are for the most part still imbued with the romantic myths that were current in pre-Friedan days. The margins of their papers will soon be marked with: "Better take a look at Lederer and Jackson's *Mirages of Marriage!*"

Four main purposes of the book are listed by the authors:

To diagnose the maladies of modern marriage, to show readers how to diagnose their own problems, or how to seek outside diagnostic help when they cannot identify their own marital ailments; to suggest methods of bringing sick marriages back to health; and—if the marriage is in the grave—to show how to recognize that it is a corpse so that it can be buried with grace and maturity, and to do so within the framework of current laws and religious beliefs (p. 16).

Written in direct and uncompromising style, using everyday English and a multitude of anecdotes and thumbnail case histories, the authors also manage to incorporate findings from empirical research without becoming ponderous or over-scholarly in tone. (An exception is Chapter 22, an interesting but complex, well-diagrammed analysis of autonomous vs. symbiotic relationships, which is somewhat technical.)

The book begins with a lively, tell-it-like-it-is debunking of common myths or false assumptions about love and marriage, the mirages from which the volume takes its name. The reader will find no vague generalities here about the "perfect union," the "ideal marriage," or even the "happy" one—instead, the authors

focus on the sober concept of the *workable* marriage: "A marriage is regarded as 'workable' when it is sustained without great personal loss of mental or physical health by either spouse" (p. 159).

The title of the book, while it catches the attention, may do a disservice to its contents, which go far beyond the debunking of marital myths, useful though that is. The book has valuable contributions to make to all stages of the marital process, from initial mate selection to dissolution of the marriage by divorce. A chapter on "How to Select A Spouse" is accompanied by three interpersonal comparison tests designed to be taken by mates or potential mates as a basis for assessing their differences and similarities and predicting the likelihood of the union becoming a workable one. Professionals who do premarital counseling should find these instruments especially helpful in moving a couple towards confronting, discussing, and making decisions on issues which are often overlooked or suppressed until they become sore spots and eventually destructive factors in the relationship.

The major portion of the book is designed for those who are already married, a self-help banquet table at which they may feast. As part of the smorgasbord, there are chapters on checking up on the marriage, establishing communication (the exercises designed to increase awareness of nonverbal messages allow each partner to visualize how powerful this method of transmitting messages can be), and learning to bargain, as well as pithy chapters on "How to Drive Your Spouse Crazy," which depict eight common destructive techniques used by most couples. And, for those who succeed in the latter aim, there is even a chapter on "How to Choose a Therapist."

Several chapters deal with the authors' own intriguing typology of marital relationships (I must admit to a personal bias against the use of clever type names, such as the Heavenly Twins, Gruesome Twosome, Paranoid Predators, etc.). The capsule case-history descriptions in the marital spectrum proposed by Lederer and Jackson are stunningly recognizable and do serve the purpose intended, that of helping couples to discern the trends of their own marriages, in order that they may halt destructive ones and stimulate and nourish those which are functional and satisfying.

An important chapter on trust keynotes the authors' philosophy of marriage with its controversial insistence on total honesty, "even at the risk of painful scenes of possible violence" (p. 108), *if* either spouse wishes the relationship to grow. Trust is the core of the problem, a central necessity which takes mutual conscious effort to develop. A sizable portion of the book is devoted to techniques for developing trust via working out a conscious *quid pro quo* (genuine give-and-take) to replace the largely unconscious, destructive, and vengeful forms of a *quid pro quo* (tit for tat, or action/reaction behavior) which characterize all marriages to some extent. There are exercises to help spouses break entrenched hostile ways of relating, and training is given in specific procedures for learning how to negotiate a successful *quid pro quo.*

Lederer and Jackson strongly advocate abandoning the stereotyped roles in favor of working out agreements based on what is most suitable to the couple involved. Indeed, they insist that "To approach equality, each spouse should perform the roles for which he is best suited *regardless* of *custom or tradition*" (p. 18). The emphasis on equality in the relationship constitutes their strongest

tie with the Adlerian position, and one major contribution is the help in achieving such marital equality in practice. The *quid pro quo* training provides an excellent groundwork for learning to function collaboratively in a family-council framework.

This is a valuable book. Many couples will be able to use it profitably on their own as bibliotherapy, as Karl Menninger suggests in the Introduction. In addition to keeping a copy on hand as an extremely useful adjunct to help their clients help themselves, marital counselors may wish to bring some of the exercises and procedures into their own clinical settings.

Roosevelt University, Chicago, Illinois JO-ANNE M. HAHN

COMBINING ADLERIAN PARENT EDUCATION WITH OTHER TECHNIQUES

DON DINKMEYER and GARY D. MCKAY. *Raising a Responsible Child: Practical Steps to Successful Family Relationships.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973. Pp. 256. $6.95.

Raising a Responsible Child, a "parenting" manual, differs from the numerous other current books of this genre in that it does not adhere almost exclusively to the psychological school of its authors. Dinkmeyer and McKay combine their Adlerian view with several other techniques and methods, making documented acknowledgements to Thomas Gordon, Albert Ellis, and Robert Blume. Also, concepts of "human potential actualization," "emotional growth," and "feeling awareness" are frequently used. Chapter 4, on communications, offers techniques strongly related to the Rogerian "reflective listening" and the "creative dialogue" approaches of Ginott and Gordon. Chapter 8, "Games Children Play," is partially reminiscent of Eric Berne and Thomas Harris. Also, of course, amply evident in every chapter are the concepts and techniques of Adler and Dreikurs.

How useful, one must ask, can this "mix" be in accomplishing the book's parent-training purpose? In this reviewer's opinion, although it will hardly enhance the theoretical understanding of the layman and may even confuse it, the more eclectic variety of practical techniques will be of definite advantage to him. Those who have begun their studies with *Children: The Challenge* (Dreikurs with Vicki Soltz) will find the present book an excellent follow-up text. For them the "reflective listening" and "creative dialogue" sections (pp. 65-80) can make a strong new contribution, especially if used, with a thorough understanding of "goal recognition."

Among the further merits of the book are that it includes in nearly every chapter, in addition to a presentation of theory, a correction of common faults, and a note of encouragement. Also an explicitly outlined plan for a 15-week study-group course is provided which appears useful and realistic. The authors advise that for such groups a professional leader is desirable though not essential.

What encourages and enables most people to make improvements in their methods is to be shown a conducive plan of action which permits them to proceed step by step through a series of manageable techniques. *Raising a Responsible Child* can well be recommended as a book which provides such a plan and offers parents practical things to do, so that they may turn their behavior around for the better.

Wilmington, Delaware EMILY THORN

A PRIMER ON DISCIPLINE

LOREN GREY. *Discipline Without Tyranny: Child Training During the First Five Years.* New York: Hawthorn, 1972. Pp. xv + 192. $4.95.

In this book the author is essentially redeveloping a theme set forth in the earlier works of which he was coauthor with Rudolf Dreikurs. What distinguishes the present effort is its greater concentration on the problems of early childhood. Starting with the premise that parents can raise responsible children if they understand their behavior, and guide their energies in a positive direction, the author discusses the personality development of the child from earliest infancy, and interprets the various behaviors displayed by children this age. Along the way, he advises parents of the steps they can take to foster cooperation, and offers practical techniques for coping with a variety of behavior problems. Great emphasis is placed on giving the child a choice and using "logical consequences" in teaching responsibility.

By way of criticism, I find his discussion of the development of the child less satisfactory. While digressing among marginal topics such as the value of mother's milk versus cow's milk, and ESP in young children, the author merely mentions in passing such matters as the importance of intellectual stimulation, affection, and good nutrition. In judging the merits of this book, however, it seems fair to say the author has succeeded in presenting a consistent and rational approach to child-training, and has done so in a simple manner which should find favor with the average reader.

Burlington, Vermont ALICE M DANIELS

BOOK NOTES

ABBEY, M. R. *Communication in pulpit and parish.* Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973. P. 237. $7.50.—Observing that research in communications has made rapid advances, e.g., "The medium is the message," the author felt vital preaching needed new grounding in communication as a process, and set out to do so. "Meanings are functions of persons, not properties of messages" (p. 115). Here the Adlerian concept of behavior expressive of the life style is being documented again. This book applies to preaching many of the things Adler emphasized.—H. KIRACOFFE, *Family & Children's Serv., Fort Wayne, Indiana.*

ABRAHAMSON, D. *The murdering mind.* New York: Harper & Row, 1973. Pp. 245. $6.95.—A Freudian psychoanalyst well-known for his books and courtroom testimony on the psychology of murderers deals with their predominant characteristics—loneliness, distrustfulness, blurred self-image, and suicidal tendencies— as resulting from traumatic childhood experiences and the failure of constructive compensatory behavior. Special attention is given to presidential assassins. Regarding murder victims in general, the author believes they tend to expose themselves to danger and violence through their