

BOOK REVIEWS

TEXTBOOK FOR A NEW PROFESSIONAL GENERATION

ARTHUR G. NIKELLY (Ed.) *Techniques for Behavior Change: Applications of Adlerian Theory*. Springfield, Ill.: C. C. Thomas, 1971. Pp. xv + 224. \$10.50.

From the viewpoint of a psychotherapist, this is a beautiful book. It is written in a simple, unpretentious manner that apparently was characteristic of Alfred Adler himself, and that hence is most fitting for a volume devoted to applications of Adlerian theory. When Dr. Nikelly is described as the compiler and editor, this does not tell the whole story. Actually, out of the book's thirty concise chapters, he is the author of six and co-author of eight.

Together with his collaborators, the compiler-editor-author makes crystal clear Adler's treatment philosophy, and then the techniques for assessing and changing behavior which logically flow out of it. Individual and group treatment are included, plus methods for use by parents at home, teachers in school, and professionals in front of audiences.

Divided into six parts, the book is very well organized, making it possible to find any subject easily and quickly. It should be welcomed for its combination of brevity and comprehensiveness. This is probably the first treatment-oriented work which brings together in a single volume: (a) Adler's basic theoretical concepts, (b) the important assessment techniques developed by Individual Psychology, and (c) ways to utilize these in the usual settings where treatment and guidance are practiced.

Part 1, Introduction to Theory and Practice, contains four chapters. (a) Under basic concepts, O. Hobart Mowrer discusses Adler's concepts of neurotic ambition and social interest, making the point that good adjustment is a function of social interest—the true compensation for natural weaknesses and feelings of inferiority. (b) Edward A. Dreyfus and Nikelly propose that the approach to therapy closest to Adler's is existential-humanism, which consider as primary man's own existence, his own way of experiencing the world, and his relationship with his environment—wholly the "third force" position which seeks to understand human behavior as a cognitive phenomenon embedded in a social context. (c) Nikelly makes a distinction between counseling and psychotherapy which merits both respect and debate. (d) Nikelly also discusses the way Dreikurs has systematized Adler's therapeutic technique into four consecutive but overlapping stages.

Part 2, has seven chapters, dealing with family constellation, family atmosphere, birth order, early recollections, private logic, goal recognition, and life-style. The authors and co-authors are respectively, Bernard H. Shulman, Edith A. Dewey, Floy C. Pepper, Don Verger, the editor himself, Raymond N. Lowe, and Harold H. Mosak. Here, in short chapters crammed with ideas and insights, are presented the key areas which should be explored by the therapist to further his and the patient's understanding of the latter's basic patterns. The meaning of the data that are discovered is clearly explained. Especially valuable are Dewey's classification of types of family atmosphere, Pepper's interpretations of

children in various birth order positions, and Mosak's correlations of probable behaviors with 14 different life styles.

Part 3, *Basic Therapeutic Techniques*, consists of four chapters, all by the editor, three in collaboration with others and one alone. Actual techniques are spelled out, and even the experienced therapist will find some fresh approaches in these pages. Nikelly carefully explains six ways for developing social interest in the patient. With Don Dinkmeyer he discusses methods of encouragement, and with John A. Bostrom the use of the therapeutic process for reorienting the patient. The importance of activity by the patient is examined in the chapter with Walter E. O'Connell, while throughout this section the purpose of treatment and the function of the therapist are kept in mind. The flavour and feeling of the Adlerian approach come through loud and clear.

In Part 4, *Group Techniques*, the five chapters are by Raymond J. Corsini, Bina Rosenberg, Wilmer L. and Miriam L. Pew, the editor alone, and in collaboration with Adaline Starr, covering group psychotherapy, family counseling, marital therapy, multiple therapy, and psychodrama. Like the rest of the book, this section is characterized by clean, pithy writing, as the following example from Corsini:

There is no specific Adlerian method of group psychotherapy. What is generally held in common comes out of Adlerian theory, including such notions that behavior serves goals, that personality is formed by interpretations of perceptions and by generalized successes in dealing with problems, that personality malfunctions are often due to basic errors, such as overemphasis on success in life, too great a need to be first, unwillingness to share, and so forth (pp. 111-112).

Again, much in this group of chapters is innovative, and the authors trace how some of these less familiar approaches have their roots in Adler's own work. Among the many interesting techniques discussed are marital therapy with two therapists who are married to each other (the Pews), and family counseling conducted in the presence of an audience of parents and teachers (Bina Rosenberg).

Part 5, *Special Syndrome Techniques*, discusses psychotherapy with patients who present selected special problems: pampered life style, self-bound life style, the protesting student, drug addiction, delinquency, and suicidal impulses, with Leo Rattner, Esther P. Spitzer, the editor, David Laskowitz, Ernst Papanek, and the editor with Bertram P. Karon as authors. Here the general lucidity of style may be illustrated through Rattner:

Psychotherapy is an efficient and rational instrument for dealing with the pampered life style. Adlerian therapy can be especially effective in treating the syndrome of pampering, provided the therapist recognizes and avoids the pitfalls of a pampering relationship with the client. But therapy reaches relatively few people and cannot cope with the underlying social problems. It cannot ameliorate the social conditions that foster and reinforce the pampered life style (p. 149).

Nikelly, in his chapter on the protesting student, does an excellent job of recommending specific techniques for working with young rebels, and Laskowitz does the same in his chapter in regard to the drug addict.

Part 6, *Educational Techniques*, shows the application of Adler's ideas in the classroom with the intent of making the school a strong force in the prevention of adult maladjustment. Mabelle H. Brooks, Vicki Soltz, Genevieve Painter, and the

late Paul Brodsky contributed four chapters on the cultivation of responsibility and self-discipline, the application of democratic principles in the classroom, joint counseling with parents and teens, and mental health prophylaxis, respectively. These chapters again make detailed and concrete suggestions. Brodsky concludes the book with a call for mental health preventive services within the schools.

It is not possible to point out all the other fine contributions to theory and practice which can be found within the covers of this volume. However, we can mention the central themes which run through it: (a) Goals as part of the life style shape behavior. Drives and emotions are controlled or released to serve a goal. Even children can understand this concept and can be asked what the purpose of their conduct is. (b) The psychotherapist must learn to respond to the patient's motivations, which he largely infers from his actions. (c) Individual Psychology is a cognitive approach. It regards thinking as primary. Emotions and behavior have their source in thinking.

Techniques for Behavior Change has great potential as a teaching text. Because of this, it is necessary to point out some shortcomings. There are several omissions. Lacking are detailed discussions about the Adlerian approach to depression, phobias, and anxiety. The concept of certain behaviors as conditioned responses which may be unconditioned and reconditioned is not considered. Neurosis is mentioned many times but never fully defined. There is much reference to the fact that people can be unconscious of their goals, but no attempt to present and formulate Adler's various statements about a substantive unconscious into some sort of final conclusion.

As in other schools of thought, there is occasional insistence on the universality of certain formulations. This insistence on universality is too rigid, as, for example, in the matter of claiming that all failures in adjustment are due to lack of social interest. On the contrary, many people with altruistic attitudes have problems in living, and not all troubled people have mistaken goals. This type of rigidity should be discouraged.

Finally, in the matter of bibliographical references, the listings at the end of each chapter are much too ingrown. Most of the references by the authors are to their own works, to each other, and to a small number of standard works by Adler and Adlerians which are referred to over and over. It would be helpful to direct the reader to non-Adlerians who are also part of the "third force" and whose contributions are very compatible with Adlerian ideas: William Glasser, Bernard Robbins, Richard Gordon, Leon Salzman, Albert Ellis, and existential therapists, to mention just a few.

Techniques for Behavior Change can serve as a textbook for helping to train a new generation of Adlerian therapists. It should also be brought to the attention of all the graduate schools of social work. Social work schools are currently in a state of uncertainty concerning the role of the social worker as psychotherapist, largely, as this reviewer sees it, because of their previous orientation to Freudian theory. This book, with its simplicity, clarity, and optimistic outlook, can help to restore confidence in the clinical role of the social worker.

*Morris County Guidance Center,
Morristown, New Jersey*

HAROLD D. WERNER, A.C.S.W.

A NON-FREUDIAN READER

HAROLD D. WERNER (Ed.) *New Understandings of Human Behavior: Non-Freudian Readings from Professional Journals, 1960-1968*. New York: Association Press, 1970. Pp. 286. \$7.95.

Werner has created in this book a valuable source of views which he forthrightly labels non-Freudian, and which should immediately appeal to the legion of professionals who are seeking an alternative to the Freudian model of man—a model which does not invoke the unconscious, respects man's individual creativity, and sees his "behavior as consequences of his perceptions of reality or of his entrenched habits" (p. 261).

The book consists of carefully chosen articles dealing with physical, cultural, and interpersonal influences as well as conscious processes. Werner's own significant contributions to this volume, amounting to some 50 pages, are an opening and a concluding chapter, and commentaries preceding each of the readings. The latter incidentally, are in most instances relatively brief, selected portions from the previously printed papers.

Werner's first book, *A Rational Approach to Social Casework* (reviewed in this Journal, 1966, 22, 248-249), was written to "introduce a two-party system" into the psychological aspects of social work, i.e., a second party besides the Freudian. While at that time the author did not mention Adler, he gives him now first place among his sources. Furthermore, nine of the 25 selections are from the *Journal of Individual Psychology*.

In his opening chapter, "The Nature of Man," Werner skillfully condenses the central issues of the views of Adler, the "original non-Freudian," Van Kaam's existentialism, Rank and the human will, the behaviorists and behavior therapy techniques, contributions by Albert Ellis, reality therapy, and his own rational approach.

The organization of the readings, with their authors, is as follows: Consciousness, the Unconscious, and Repression—Ichheiser, Papageorgis, and Robbins; Courses of Emotional Difficulties—Salzman, LaBarba, Markowitz, Gordon, Singer and Gordon, Leifer, Beck, and K. A. Adler; Anxiety—Thorne, Krauss, and Sarbin; Aggression—Ansbacher, Sicher and Mosak, Easson and Steinhilber, Blackman, Weiss and Lamberti, Mark, and Robinson; Alternatives to Other Freudian Interpretations—Barber, Ullman, Chodoff, and Atkins.

It is hard to single out any one paper over the others, but two in particular were of interest to me. One was H. L. Ansbacher's article on "Ego Psychology and Alfred Adler," because it so concisely states Adler's basic concepts and was written for my own professional journal, *Social Casework*. The other was Kurt A. Adler's "Depression in the Light of Individual Psychology," in which he sees the depressed person as a manipulator who uses his depression to exploit and control others, to avoid failing, to alleviate feelings of inferiority, and to excuse his withdrawal from the responsibilities of life.

The final chapter, again by Werner, "Practical Application of our New Understanding," is most valuable in that it gives just what its title promises for each of the approaches covered in the book as well as his own counseling technique. Werner writes clearly, gets to the major points quickly, and gives you something to take hold of and use.

I see the volume as a must for psychotherapists and counselors whose practice has led them to reject Freud's pessimistic model of man and has left them groping for a rational and meaningful alternative. For those who have already been introduced to Adler's Individual Psychology and are looking for help in applying it this book is a godsend.

St. Louis Park, Minnesota

ROBERT G. BARTHOLOW, M.S.W.

CREATIVE IMAGINATION IN PERSONALITY THEORY

JOSEPH F. RYCHLAK. *A Philosophy of Science for Personality Theory*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1968. Pp. xix + 508. \$8.50.

Psychologists with even an elementary appreciation of philosophy of science are familiar with Reichenbach's distinction between "the context of discovery," appropriate to the creative act of hypothesis generation and theory construction, and "the context of justification" in which methods of validation of hypotheses are employed. What many of these people don't recognize is the degree to which concepts and analytical methods appropriate to the latter context have come to dominate the former. One accomplishment of Rychlak's thoughtful and clearly written book is to re-establish the importance of this distinction. Framing his discussion in terms of the contrast between "demonstrative," justificatory, and "dialectical," creative thinking (p. 346), Rychlak contends that "Psychology has been especially one-sided in its talk about what constitutes scientific activity" by proceeding exclusively in terms of demonstrative thought. However, "this narrow view need no longer be held to. . . . There *is* a distinguished, completely defensible alternative to the kind of science which seems to trip us up in our attempts to catch the image of man we all carry within us" (p. 3). The remainder of his closely reasoned and carefully documented inquiry is an attempt to demonstrate that: (a) dialectical thinking is essential to theory construction; and (b) the model of man reflected in a proper personality theory must take account of the dialectical elements in human thought.

Several specific features of the book are noteworthy. For example, as chapters 2 through 6 indicate, Rychlak has a highly sophisticated understanding of the process of theory construction; few readers will fail to profit from his lucid presentation and analysis of the fundamental dimensions and multiple functions of theories. Rychlak's distinction between "lawfulness" as a demonstrated fact and "lawfulness" as a theoretical assumption lays bare an important source of confusion in much psychological writing (pp. 96-101). J. P. Guilford's famous dictum that, in the state of nature, all correlations are either 0 or 1.0 is a confused case in point.

The manner in which psychologists have ignored the problem of explanation verges on an intellectual scandal. Appreciating the problem, Rychlak takes the Aristotelian categories of causation as a guide, and presents an effective case for considering plans, purposes, and intentions as explanatory variables. The discussion of a related theme, "ethico-religious interpretations of abnormal behavior" (pp. 428 ff), is also excellent. After noting that Adler, through viewing men in terms of their life goals, "took a more stringent, moral tone in analyzing and treating his cases than Freud" (p. 428), Rychlak concludes that much important

information about human nature may be found in "those classical areas of human concern we know as ethics and religion" (p. 434).

The longest and perhaps the most valuable chapter in the book traces the traditions of dialectical and demonstrative reasoning in Western thought (pp. 255-308). The central question is, of course, how does the scientific investigator derive his initial or major premises? This question is central because once a premise is specified, subsequent scientific activity follows a well-established course. Demonstrative thinkers from Aristotle to Clark Hull feel major premises come from controlled experience: scientific hypotheses are not contaminated by human imagination; rather they reflect reality more or less directly. As Rychlak quotes Sir Francis Bacon: "Our method of discovering the sciences is such as to leave little to the acuteness and strength of wit, and indeed rather to level wit and intellect" (p. 271). In contrast, dialectical thinkers from Socrates to Piaget consider major premises to be intellectual in origin: scientific hypotheses are the products of human imagination and as such never reflect reality in a simple way. However, the most impressive feature of the book, and the point should be stressed, is its balance. There are no heroes; Rychlak plays no favorites; he argues for the importance of *both* demonstrative and dialectical reasoning. His hidden agenda is a simple plea for intellectual tolerance.

Concerning the book's weak points, I may mention two. It is a bit too long; a chapter section on "The Motives to Psychotherapy" (pp. 171-191) in particular is unrelated to Rychlak's major thesis. The discussion of procedural evidence (pp. 74-77) concerns a very important topic—the coherence theory of truth—and is not handled well, so that the naive reader will have trouble following that part of the discussion.

Professor Rychlak has written a fine, scholarly, but in a way oddly conventional, book. He is very respectful of academic psychology, and he seeks to reform that institution from within, using the standard tools of the intellectual trade, i.e., rational argument and appeals to evidence. However, it seems abundantly clear that the progress of science, and academic psychology, has rarely depended on logic and the rules of evidence. As I observed elsewhere, one can only hope the book will receive the attention it deserves from thoughtful students of personality theory.

John Hopkins University

ROBERT HOGAN

VALUE PHILOSOPHY FOR COUNSELORS

JAMES ALLAN PETERSON. *Counseling and Values: A Philosophical Examination*. Scranton, Pa.: International Textbook Co., 1970. Pp. xiv + 272. \$4.95 paper.

"Guidance, like Topsy," says the author, "just 'growed' with little concern for making explicit any of the value questions" (p. 6). A similar negative assessment cannot be made with regard to *Counseling and Values*. There is nothing casual or careless about this book, either philosophically or structurally. It is thoughtfully organized, in eight chapters, and its style is admirably concise and clear.

Peterson uses a four-pronged approach: (a) an historical perspective of the

relationship of value theory to the psychotherapeutic fields, (b) a penetrating analysis of the cultural climate in which today's counselor and client encounter one another, (c) description of the ways in which the counselor's philosophy affects his counseling, and (d) a summary of "vital considerations for counselors."

The author shows his awareness of the practicing counselor's value considerations with separate chapters on "The Counselor and Religious Issues" and "Freedom: a Valuational Base for Counseling." In a final chapter in particular he gives close attention to the contemporary counseling problems of identity, absolute vs. relative values, freedom for the client to choose, and counselor influence upon client whether explicit or implicit. Peterson is vividly contemporary. His last two quotations are from Viktor Frankl and John Gardner.

The title of Peterson's second chapter, "Values: A Realm of Complexity," is misleading, for in his able hands this cloudy realm is rendered clear, including clarification of the relationship of values to needs, goals, beliefs, attitudes and preferences. In a particularly useful section of this chapter values are defined in terms of three common principles as: hypothetical constructs, the criteria by which choice is justified, and motivational forces (pp. 51-53).

Throughout the book Peterson, operating from a phenomenological base, attacks either-or dualisms such as individual vs. society, or freedom vs. responsibility. "Because man exists in relation to a world, freedom must always include social responsibility, for freedom is limited by this world. It is a dialectic process—not man *over* the world but man *in* and affected by his world" (p. 153). The affinity to Adlerian psychology is notable.

When discussing the varying degrees to which therapists strive to influence the client's values, Peterson places Dreikurs, representing the Adlerians, among the "active approaches" although perhaps less so than Glasser, Ellis and others. The author himself espouses a "synthesis approach" in which the counselor functions as a Socratic "mid-wife" and role model. "Being an 'occasion' for another's achievement of values is likely to involve the counselor as a role model . . . both in the kind of person he is as well as his own philosophy of life" (p. 235).

While Peterson states that he did not intend "to come up with a list of absolutes to which the counselor can turn and say, 'Here is the answer'" (p. 226), he provides what appears to be one in the following statement: "The belief in the worth and dignity of the individual and in his right to free choice must be uppermost in the counselor's hierarchy of values" (p. 233). The reviewers agree that this might be the one absolute permitted.

Early in the book the author referred to Ralph Barton Perry's assertion that a person can ascertain what field a man works in by noting the words which he uses carefully. James Allan Peterson uses all of his words carefully whether in philosophy, history, sociology or psychology. The book is a scholar's delight, with careful documentation, frequent footnote references, an 18-page bibliography carefully divided into book and periodical sections and heavily post-1960 in time, a very complete subject index with more than 1,000 entries, and a name index with at least 250 entries. The names with ten or more references are Gordon Allport, Theodore Brameld, Charlotte Bühler, Abraham Edel, John Gardner, Clyde Kluckhohn, Abraham Maslow, Cecil Patterson and Carl Rogers. This group could be characterized as developmental, sociological, and existential in emphasis.

Peterson would apparently see himself as in harmony with these emphases, although he is very modest, sometimes too modest, about his own point of view. On the whole, however, his liberal use of the thoughts of others does not blur the image of the writer as is too often the case. Peterson emerges as the opposite of a professional technician. He is a scholar in a liberating arts sense. Although there is not a single reference to a writing of his own this book alone will establish his reputation. He will need no other reference.

Arizona State University

C. GILBERT WRENN
AND LYNN LEONARD

CHARACTER EDUCATION—RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN STYLES

URIE BRONFENBRENNER. *Two Worlds of Childhood: U. S. and U. S. S. R.* With assistance of John C. Condry, Jr. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970. Pp. x + 190. \$7.95.

In this superbly written, well-documented book, Bronfenbrenner tells us in a bold yet systematic way why we are in constant turmoil, and why our families are disintegrating. He does not put the finger on parents alone, but on all of us who live and enjoy the comforts of industrialization. He points out that there is a price to pay for our materialism—and he also points out that the Soviets pay a price for their collectivization.

The commune involves children in a sensitive way; they are not both indulged and abandoned, as they are here. The Soviets care for their offspring, for they care for the future of their country. We ignore our young. They are not part of our lives, yet our guilt forces us to buy them off with all kinds of abundant materialistic bribes. Where we really show our indifference is the way we react to and act with infants. We are not sensuous with them. Why are we so intent on being aloof, and with our own children, too? According to Bronfenbrenner a number of reasons all come down to one fact. It is that parents no longer raise their children, and that this is done by peers and television. In the Soviet Union parents are still parents (though this may change as the country intensifies its industrial pace). Discipline, respect, love, authority, are still lodged in the parent, yet concomitantly children are felt wanted. They are treated with dignity. Self-responsibility, and social responsibility are instilled through collectivity. The children do, however, pay the price, for they are conforming, rather than creative or autonomous.

We abandon our young, collectively and individually. Our lives have become impersonal as we are immersed into long and tedious business schedules. We cannot stop to be involved with the many associates or colleagues we see daily. The extended family no longer exists. Both children and parents are confused. They do not know their roles, nor what to do. We have been raised for independence, yet we are badly hobbled. Bronfenbrenner ascribes this to premature independence; we have a long childhood, yet paradoxically we have lost our childhood. There are no longer playful times, but deadly competitive years. At home where the child *could* pitch in, he is bathed in television and leisure time, but does not play, nor help.

"The most important difference between Soviet and American schools is the

emphasis placed in the former not only on subject matter, but equally on *vospitanie* . . . [which] might best be translated as 'upbringing' or 'character education' " (p. 26). School and home thus complement each other as they raise the children to be helpful, responsible, obedient and respectful, and to give all to the collective enterprise. "Soviet children will continue to be more conforming than our own. But this also means that they will be less anti-adult, rebellious, aggressive, and delinquent" (p. 90).

When Bronfenbrenner turns to the United States, he is equally objective, but he finds more to worry about. Whereas in Russia the peer group complements the adult values, having learned to behave individually and collectively according to specific adult codes, here the peer group floats on its own code of ethics. Bronfenbrenner has studied other nations, and he finds, "The only country which exceeds the United States in the willingness of children to engage in antisocial behavior is the nation closest to us in our Anglo-Saxon traditions of individualism . . . England . . . England is also the only country in our sample which shows a level of parental involvement lower than our own" (p. 116).

If Bronfenbrenner has a weak spot, it is where he has tried valiantly to recommend constructive solutions. Here his emphasis is on the child rather than on parents and the society that create the problem. His suggestion for a Commission on Children is sheer nonsense, as no commission ever resolved such critical social problems. Nor will schools do the job. We need to evaluate our goals as a society. And then we need to act and act. Bronfenbrenner has shown us much that should be done differently.

Hunter College, New York

BERNARD MACKLER

PSYCHOTHERAPY—TEMPTATION BACK INTO LIFE

ARTHUR BURTON. *Modern Humanistic Psychotherapy*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1967. Pp. xvi + 171. \$6.95.

Arthur Burton is one of the West Coast psychologists who call themselves humanistic psychologists. This group has been much influenced by existential philosophies and are part of the last decade's movement in American psychology and psychiatry toward an understanding of man based upon a holistic, organismic, and phenomenological point of view. Burton describes this point of view in his introduction. He uses Freud as his starting point and mentions Sullivan, Rogers, and Binswanger. Yet even though he uses the phrase "style of life" in his very first paragraph, he conspicuously omits Adler in his discussion. Thus, Burton becomes another in a long line who are "rediscovering" what is already known to the readers of this Journal.

The book is composed largely of papers previously published (1959-1966) now somewhat revised. Some papers read very well, others seem a little dated, with early papers showing Burton's previous psychoanalytic orientation.

Burton uses schizophrenia as a take-off for discussing humanistic psychotherapy, and he does this well, although he seems more interested in a well-phrased statement than in a precise one. In the middle of some of his fine arguments one comes across exaggerations such as: "Should a schizophrenic patient laugh at jokes one knows it is time to consider the termination of treatment"

(p. 7). He is making a point about laughter in the schizophrenic but the statement itself is just not so. When the patient becomes well enough to laugh, he is not necessarily "well." There are, however, other statements which are most enjoyable to this reviewer, such as, "Therapy amounts to tempting the patient back into Being" (p. 3), although I would prefer to say, back into *Life*.

Three chapters discuss phenomenological aspects of schizophrenia. Except for occasional remarks such as that a psychosexual disturbance is at the root of schizophrenia, these chapters make pleasant reading. Burton tends to a mystic point of view, leavened with poetic phrases. He has been influenced by Camus and Sartre but also offers his own ideas.

Six chapters discuss treatment techniques and issues: transference, therapeutic interruption, acting-out behavior, art in psychotherapy, touching the patient, and fear of death as countertransference. Sometimes Burton criticizes ideas that have been generally discarded. Essentially he describes his *own* style of psychotherapy, and really does not seem to be aware of the most modern methods of therapy. Group techniques are not even mentioned by him. The two case reports are the weakest part of the book. While interesting to read, they leave the reader wondering what really happened.

I have been critical of many statements in the book, but there was much that I liked. I suspect Burton relates very well to the schizophrenic patient in a one-to-one situation, but his psychodynamic explanations remind me of the way Medard Boss combines Freudian dynamics and Heideggerian philosophy—a hybrid never found in Binswanger, for example, who is a rigorous enough thinker not to confuse his categories. Frankly, I think Burton can write a better book, although this one is highly readable if not always precise.

Chicago, Illinois

BERNARD H. SHULMAN, M.D.

A MODEL OF "HELPING"

ROBERT R. CARKHUFF. *Helping and Human Relations: A Primer for Lay and Professional Helpers*. Vol. 2. *Practice and Research*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969. Pp. xvii + 343. \$7.95.

Carkhuff chooses the term "helping" rather than "counseling," "psychotherapy," or the like, because he believes, and convincingly demonstrates, that the same core conditions characterize all effective "therapeutic" processes. Hence, his efforts, to this reviewer, cut across theoretical points of view.

In effect, we have with Carkhuff, a model of helping which places the helper at the center of the process. Through a high level of accurate empathy, regard for others, genuineness in expression, and clarity in communicating, he facilitates the opening up of the helpee. This process does not rely on a documented system of understanding or conjecture, but on the capacity to hear and understand the helpee, and to communicate honestly and clearly to him what the helper is experiencing of him. As the helpee begins to understand himself, the helper must systematically induce action alternatives which will enable change in helpee living. Theoretical understandings enter at the point at which the helper can prescribe procedures for change. Without understanding, there is no basis for effecting constructive change, and without at least minimal levels of helper-offered core conditions, helpees can be harmed.

Carkhuff's research-based findings are remarkably parallel with the Adlerian view of the helping process. Adler's notion is that treatment proceeds from the therapist's understanding of the patient's life style, to an explanation of the patient to himself, and thence through the therapeutic relationship to encouragement and development of the patient's social interest and responsibility. Carkhuff's stages proceed from helper understanding of the helpee's world, to helper facilitation of helpee self-exploration and self-understanding, to helpee action on the basis self-understanding.

Carkhuff, however, goes beyond describing the dimensions of effective helping. He indicates how they are taught to both helpers and helpees. The reviewer knows of no other source of information which sets forth such specific criteria for effective functioning, which are objectively observable and measurable, and which are directly related to outcome. This book, as its sister volume [reviewed in this Journal, 1970, 26, 90-91], tells the core of effective helping and how to achieve it.

The difficulty for the reader/user is to learn the language (and background) of Carkhuff's concepts which are repeated insistently, and then to apply them. A little more than average effort is necessary to assess the relevance and potency of this work.

The findings of Carkhuff and his colleagues deserve more than a hearing. They should be used in our practice and particularly our teaching. They do not claim to have wrapped up the entire interpersonal helping package, but they do give us a clear set of constructs based on the notion that effective helping is directly contingent on effective helpers. Carkhuff addresses himself angrily to those who would refuse to consider that there are clear-cut criteria for competence in interpersonal helping: "It has been the absence of criteria of competence that has influenced the choice of many persons to become helpers. Those who have been attracted by the lack of criteria of competence are not going to help to develop such criteria. Such individuals support a cause only to defeat it" (p. 281).

I do not interpret this remark as one of paradoxical intent to force a "positive" response to the book, but rather as a challenge to everyone in the "helping" professions to advance efforts to assess his own effectiveness. As I include myself in this category, I have been challenged by reading this book and in particular by reviewing it.

University of Vermont

RICHARD B. DOES

PARENT MODIFICATION

ROGER W. McINTIRE. *For Love of Children: Behavioral Psychology for Parents*. Illustrated by Gerrie Blake. Del Mar, Cal.: CRM Books, 1970. Pp. xi + 208. \$6.95.

The author tells us clearly and frankly in his preface: "One rather simple explanation of why children do what they do is that it gets them what they want. It is a simple answer when broadly stated, but when it is applied to figuring out what a child wants in a particular situation it can be complicated" (p. vii). And for all its simple basic observations, this book does get pretty complicated at times. Even so, it is well worth the parents' while, and a "must" for professionals.

McIntire has performed a fine service in making known to the general public some valuable lessons we can learn from behavior modification. Some of these lessons are not entirely new—which is all to the good. But being expressed in behavioral parallels puts them in a new light and opens up new ways of making them effective.

Perhaps the deepest impression to be derived from this book is its particular reaffirmation of the responsibilities of parenthood, specifically by clarifying the awesome, inescapable influence which parents wield through the attention they give their children, be it positive or negative—or absent. “Selecting the behaviors to be rewarded or ignored is the main business of being a parent” (p. 22), and the all-important “question is whether the child’s parents will have time and love enough to plan these consequences that will help him learn to grow up properly” (p. viii).

Time and love, of course, are important. But understanding and observation seem almost equally so. Parents must understand the varied role of *consequences*. Consequences are the other side of the coin, referred to generally as goals or purposes: in the behavioral approach, the event that immediately follows the behavior is the consequence that must be observed; the “Why?” must be taken to mean “What happened next” (p. 30)? This form of questioning seems to be a specifically useful contribution, in that in many instances it would serve more effectively than asking a child, or even a parent, to state his reason for, or the consequence of his behavior, in the process of helping him change his ways.

Careful observation and its necessary complement of record-keeping are another aspect which could well be adopted from the behavior modifier—to whatever extent seems feasible. “*Describing* outside behavior is important, because it tends to make parents think in useful and concrete ways. It allows them to agree about what their children do. . . . [to] pinpoint what worries them . . . [to know] when they should consistently apply some encouragement.” Keeping a tally of rewards, or of how often and at what times undesirable behavior or good behavior occurs, or keeping a chart of improvement is enlightening and encouraging as well as validating.

Altogether, the emphasis on preciseness is salutary. Rules should be planned and agreed upon by the parents, then stated concretely and in detail with their reasons to the child who will be happier because the situation is clear, honest, and fair (p. 27). Similarly, assigned jobs should be well defined, preferably with a checklist of the details they comprise. Furthermore, careful observation and planning can be preventive by structuring situations which make certain forms of bad behavior impossible.

It is good to find an emphasis on the positive. It is not enough to withdraw attention from disturbing behavior; one must instead give attention as “a result of designated good behavior” (p. 34)—and one must be sure that an opportunity for such is provided (p. 78). McIntire also emphasizes the beneficence of encouragement. Punishment is eliminated except in rare special cases, and the punishing attitude is decried as making for general unpleasantness, discouragement, and constraints upon children’s spontaneity.

We are particularly interested in the behavioral interpretations of several familiar concepts. McIntire adds an interesting observation to the concept of the

pampered style of life which Adler pointed out is not necessarily the result of actual pampering: "A spoiled child is spoiled not because of *how much* he gets from his parents but because of *how* he gets it. Many children from poor families are spoiled, and many children from rich families are not" (p. 132). To a certain extent the behavioral understanding of emotion also coincides with Adler's. In his brief treatment of fear McIntire says: "Adults forget that fears are also behaviors. They are a result of experience, they are followed by consequences, and they are observed in others. . . . The first question to ask is, 'Did he learn the fear from me, and do I continue to be his example?' A second question . . . is the now familiar 'What happens next? Does he go to sleep with you...?'" (p. 138). To take one more example, McIntire's resolution of a punitive hassle between parent and child is much like Dreikurs' resolution of a power struggle. "Someone whose experience and thoughtfulness allow him to see that the punishing contest will not contribute to long-range goals . . . will have to start looking for something to reward rather than for something to punish, and it is the parent who must take this fresh start. If they do not, there is little chance that their child will" (p. 88). It should also be noted that some of the suggested "strategy sessions" are held as family-group sessions.

Some ideas are interesting—but leave us uncommitted. One such is the view of family life as "an economy in which there is an exchange of activities on the part of the members and a compensation for these activities" (p. 186) on which much of the system of tokens and money rewards is based.

Ultimate goals of behavior change, or the kinds of reward which maturity may substitute for attention, are beyond the scope of this work. They probably are in any event matters of individual decision. But the observations which strike us as valid, and the techniques which are ingenious are a significant contribution to child rearing and counseling. The illustrations are a pleasant, meaningful addition to the book.

Burlington, Vermont

ROWENA R. ANSBAACHER

A NEW ESSAY ON SELF-RELIANCE

MARGUERITE BEECHER and WILLARD BEECHER. *The Mark of Cain: An Anatomy of Jealousy*. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. Pp. x + 193. \$5.95.

The Beechers have done it again, with a book that reads like a novel and makes its psychological points inescapably. Again they have dedicated their work "to our teacher, the late Alfred Adler," and it is a fine tribute to him. The Beechers' distinctive contribution, in addition to the tremendous amount of practical work they have carried on for over 30 years, is probably to express many of Adler's insights in sparkling, up-to-the-minute prose. In this book they also relate some of these—just as convincingly—to biblical lore. Always they illustrate their points concretely.

As in their previous books, *Beyond Success and Failure* (1966) and *Parents on the Run* (1955), the Beechers see the basic disability in all character disorders in what they term "persistent infantilism." For this the only cure is simply to become an independent, self-sufficient, responsible adult. The mature person has little need to make jealous comparisons, to tear down persons around him. The

immature person exploits these around him to make up for his own inadequacies. Inferiority feelings and humiliations lead to many forms of jealous comparisons and competition, of wanting to be favored, to be the center of attention. Such strivings set us "at cross-purposes to everyone around us so that we have no feeling of belonging in the world" (p. 121). In many ways this book is a new essay on "Self-Reliance." Sooner or later most readers will find their souls pierced by the Beechers' clear gaze for many erring ways are identified with the mark of Cain. Jealousy is described as "comprehensive alteration of the whole way one sees and acts," which catches one in "a bind that distorts all that he is doing, making spontaneous, happy living impossible" (p. 1).

There is no easy way out—but to see oneself as the source of one's own painful situation. When letting go of comparisons, one is restored to one's own initiative, and proceeds to mind one's own business as well as one can. The Beechers take a no-nonsense approach. They do not even feel sorry for Job (p. 119)! They will patiently confront you with the errors of your ways, for instance point out that you could work more efficiently if you kept your attention wholly on what you were doing rather than concerning yourself with what others would think of it, or what they were doing. But from then on, it's up to you. The Beechers are convinced that once "a person fully understands something, he can invent his own way to deal with it — if he chooses to be rid of it" (p. 6).

The following few examples will convey the flavor of the Beechers' pungent thoughts and phrases.

Hypersensitivity is a thin skin that barely covers a hostile demand for special favors and attention from others (p. 75). — Each alcoholic wants to be the favored child. . . . When his feelings get hurt, he pours alcohol on them (p. 89). — An addiction is a kind of consolation prize that an addict awards himself at the *expense of others* (p. 105). — Hypochondria might be called a form of partial suicide. . . . We may not win, but it slows others down to sit at our bedside (p. 117)! While we are chained to feelings of competitive jealousy, we measure everyone as either superior or inferior to ourselves. With such a measuring rod we never find equals. And when we find no equals we do indeed live as aliens in our native land" (p. 137).

In addition to individual cases, the authors give striking accounts of how they worked with classroom problems—making self-reliance the target of the group, so that no matter where a pupil stood in academic achievement, he could equal others in independence; and with job discontents—pointing out the equality of all workers, despite different skills and rewards, in as much as each is needed to complete the finished product. Especially significant is the appendix with its suggestions for acquainting the child with his world: the need for participating and cooperating, the needs of the individual, the tasks of living together, the function of schools and of laws, male and female relations, etc. The Beechers have brought these subjects up and discussed them with groups of children most effectively. They say, "Nothing will put old heads on young shoulders, but it pays to furnish a synopsis of the play for those who come in after the plot has started" (p. 188). No matter how long we have been at the play, each of us can profit from the splendid synopsis the Beechers have furnished.

Burlington, Vermont

ROWENA R. ANSBACHER