

BOOK REVIEWS

INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY THROUGH GRAY GLASSES

MANES SPERBER. *Alfred Adler: oder Das Elend der Psychologie*. Vienna, Munich, Zurich: Molden, 1970. Pp. 300. DM 26.00.

This biographical-critical work which appeared appropriately during the year of the 100th anniversary of Alfred Adler's birthday is quite different from the earlier biographies of other authors: Hertha Orgler's, *Alfred Adler, the Man and His Work*, and the minutely faithful historical presentation of Phyllis Bottome. Sperber is too solid a writer and essayist to lapse into an obituary style; he is too critical, and himself too rich in thought, to be satisfied with a mere enumeration of facts.

If we don't shy away from the somewhat pat play upon words, which probably is not new with me, we might say the author is related to his topic as the sparrow hawk to the eagle [the first being the translation of *Sperber*, the second of *Adler*]. This would certainly not be a depreciative characterization, because, aside from difference in size, they have in common a steady pursuit of their aim and a sharp eye for the essential.

The emphasis in Sperber's book is not on the biographical material; this represents principally the framework and has more anecdotal than strictly historical qualities. The first two chapters are devoted to it, and the last, among ten. Between these, the author presents Individual Psychology as he has experienced and understood it, and also attempts a critical discussion of modern psychology in general. Let us say right away: a brilliant essay. It is written by one who understands how to detect the zeitgeist and who does not hesitate to reflect upon what he has detected. History, however, is not an end in itself of this presentation, but the background. The origin of so-called depth psychology on the soil of the decaying Danube Monarchy is an example of this relationship. One reads—as so often before but newly stirred by the style of the author—about the decadence of the Hapsburg Empire glossed over as it was by grandeur. One understands the militant impetus of a Freud—Sperber calls him a conquistador—and the thereby necessarily created antagonism of the academic psychiatrists, and Adler's arriving at an enlarged view of man, less restrained by natural science, which draws from the philosophies of Socrates and Plato as well as of Nietzsche and Marx.

Sperber's presentation of the body of ideas of Individual Psychology is self-willed but by no means incorrect. It is necessary as a counterweight to the all-too orthodox summaries; it is full of points of reference to general sociological phenomena. Perhaps it does not render enough what has become of the teachings of Adler today, and how much these have proven themselves capable of further development. But this is no reproach, considering that Sperber is mainly concerned with an appreciation of the work of Adler at the time of its origin.

The critical discussion of modern psychology in general is based on the discouraging yet not completely convincing statistics of Eysenck, according to which the probability of the cure of a neurotic does not essentially depend on

whether psychotherapy, another form of treatment, or no treatment at all is applied.

Here at the latest the reader realizes that the author while seeing unusually clearly and critically does so through glasses that make many things look gray which could also be seen as more colorful. One senses here a great deal of resigned skepticism—pessimism would be saying too much. One is also reminded of the title of the book, *Alfred Adler or the Misery of Psychology*. The biographical series in which Sperber's book appears is called "The Splendor and Misery of the Masters." Sperber omits the "splendor." Perhaps out of critical modesty? Not wanting to be sensational? Or perhaps thinking that Individual Psychology never experienced a proper period of splendor? Be that as it may, the arbitrary alteration of the subtitle creates misunderstandings and an unhappy mood to start with in the presumptive reader. It is, to be sure, quite correct that Individual Psychology could really not achieve splendor in its beginning beside the turbulence created by Freud's psychoanalysis, because in contrast to Freud's, and later also to Jung's orientation it seemed to lack fascination. But should not this very trait have been designated as splendor, a relatively faintly glimmering splendor, but one of longer duration? In any case, Individual Psychology did not fall so much into misery as the title would make one believe, not more than everything humanistic in the Third Reich.

One also comes across the part in which Sperber points out that the basic thoughts of Individual Psychology started from the negative: the somatic inferiority of the neonate who thereby is sentenced to a parasitical existence; the inferiority of the organs of which no organism is supposed to be free; the hurdles in the formation of consciousness of the self; the difficulty in the relationship between the child and his surroundings due to the inconstancy of such relationships. Well, such procedure is nothing unusual. Let us remember that neurophysiology has gained its most essential insights by studying the pathological; that it had to induce from the pathological absence of functions their existence and nature, an approach today unavoidable in experimentation. Adler did no differently and thus the negative starting point does not count as much as the important prospects in the goal of fulfillment in being human, which is certainly mentioned in Sperber's book, though somewhat mutedly. Adler was permeated to a high degree by the compensation theory which he had posited; he lived it in his life and in his work.

The gray-toned apperception of the author does not entitle the reader to use diagnoses as weapons, as was done in the early arguments between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, to depreciate thoughts which deviated from the established line, which Sperber rightfully denounces. This is the less necessary since the author attempts in a confessionlike intermezzo to characterize himself and to make the gray-toned apperception understandable to the reader. Here the motif of loneliness comes through and develops into a moving elegy. Thereupon, one not only understands the author but cannot deny him sympathy. From here on it is up to the reader to follow the author emotionally, or to transpose the mood of the book into one "different and more joyful."

In the chapter before the last Sperber arrives at a prospect of a future psychology. This prospect also is critical and cautious; it is not Adler's uncon-

ditional belief in evolution which speaks here. There is no mention of the surprising support which today behavior research gives to Individual Psychology. Sperber is quite depreciative of the present-day comparisons between animal and man, and here misunderstandings would be very possible. I do not believe that Sperber opposes modern ethology but only—probably justly so—its occasionally careless and too anthropomorphical parallels. It should perhaps be added that this young branch of science seems to support especially Adler, and almost only him, which most ethologists have not yet noticed. For Sperber this area is probably too naturalistic; his orientation is too philosophical-sociological; he knows and respects his limits here.

These reservations about Sperber's book are by no means weighty and are amply outweighed by the wealth of ideas, points of reference, and love of Adler and his work which one feels despite all criticism, and, not least, by the stirring style and the brilliant formulations of a skillful writer. If one succeeds in recognizing through the gray tones also the colors in the presentation, reading the book will offer not only stimulating information but also great enjoyment—provided, however, that one has previously been somewhat concerned with Individual Psychology and the intellectual trends at the beginning of the era of depth psychology.

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INTENTIONALITY AND CARE

ROLLO MAY. *Love and Will*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1969. Pp. 352. \$6.95.

Rollo May is uniquely qualified to describe what ails humans here and now and perhaps even more importantly to point out the potentials which suggest directions and expansion for the existence which our human nature affords us. He combines the fruits of scholarship, the insights of an ongoing psychotherapeutic practice, and the distillation of intense experiences in his own life—with clarity in writing. This goes a long way toward explaining how, in spite of its serious tone, May's latest book, *Love and Will*, has achieved, in addition to high acclaim, such wide popularity.

The author offers an explanation for the banalization of love, and delineates love in its most meaningful forms. He shows that exaggerated will is manipulation, its opposite apathy, and its true function the exercise of choice together with the conscious assertion *against* something and *for* something else. These are well-presented contributions which merit the widest influence, and they have already been acclaimed by others.

The present review will be particularly concerned with a certain aspect which we believe is still another factor responsible for this book's popularity, namely, that the general public is now receptive to just the balance which May represents between rejecting and retaining basic Freudian concepts—and the idealized Freudian image. It is a position which allows one the enjoyment both of a new-found independence and an old loyalty, or security. We shall deal with the retentive aspect first.

May's continuing attachment to Freud seems based in a deep affinity, but, be this as it may, such homage risks a negative response when it becomes

apologetic. In numerous instances, when May supports a viewpoint opposite to that generally expressed by Freud, he will cite some obscure evidence to the contrary, explaining this as "the bold inconsistency of genius" (p. 86). "As any thinker with such richness of mind, we find Freud boldly ambiguous in employing these terms, cheerfully changing their meaning from stage to stage in the development of his thought" (p. 82). At other times May pleads Freud's case by stating he was "wiser than he seemed to be aware of" (p. 117); or, where he took a stand, now generally rejected, May claims Freud did so "without full justice to his own discoveries" (p. 201). May exhorts us not to be daunted by these "marks of his [Freud's] greatness" (p. 08). Indeed, May is himself undaunted. For example, he asserts that the "'meaning' element is certainly present in Freud's concept of wish and is one of his central contributions, *even though* he speaks, *contradictorily*, as though wish were *only blind force*" (p. 209, italics added).

Though there is value in being reminded that great minds are also human, this does not alter the fact that contradictions make for confusion. So do prejudicial inferences, as is illustrated in the following example. May states that Freud attended lectures, as did Husserl, by the philosopher Franz Brentano, who introduced the concept of intentionality. Though May admits that Freud never mentions Brentano (and we assume, he never mentions "intentionality"), May nevertheless maintains: "It is clear that he was more than just an anonymous auditor of Brentano's lectures" (p. 226). The possible harm from such a slanted innuendo was, as it happened, very soon realized. Reviewing *Love and Will* for the *New York Times* (December 25, 1969), John Leonard picked it up and embroidered on it somewhat himself. He wrote: "Note that Freud and Husserl were both *students* of Brentano. *Conclude* that 'intentionality' gives meaningful contents to *consciousness*" (italics added). We shall refer to this reference to Brentano again, below.

In much of this book May is preoccupied with the daimonic, which he defines as "the urge in every being to affirm itself, perpetuate and increase itself" (p. 123). This does not really sound too different from other definitions of basic strivings—such as Adler's "striving upward from below," or the biochemist Szent-Györgyi's "innate drive in living matter to perfect itself." Yet, in spite of this general definition, May harks back to demons and spirits which he is loathe to leave behind (pp. 125-126). Of the daimonic he says, "it has the power to take over the whole person" (p. 123). "It pushes us toward blind assertion of ourselves" (p. 126). We must ask, is it necessary to posit such partialized forces? May says, "in the daimonic lies our vitality" (p. 126). Is the acceptance of our "vitality" or any unitary motivational power not enough, since May admits that the daimonic needs to be directed and channeled (p. 126)? Does calling an act daimonic really explain it, as May proposes with regard to Hitler (p. 131), or does it not merely introduce another term? Are we not left with the same questions, of why and how? Certainly it is more parsimonious to do without daimonic assumptions. Without them May's Freudian balance would be significantly altered. He did break from Freud by admitting pulls, "the goals and ideals which attract and pull . . . [human beings] to the future" (p. 93). He might come to prefer these to pushes from the past, rather than dividing determinism equally between them.

Among the departures from Freud which we do see in May, we find what would seem the greatest contribution of this book: the way in which he develops the concept of intentionality. He begins with one of his illuminating etymological excursions.

A word itself embodies a cumulative, creative wisdom in that it is the product of centuries of molding, forming, and re-forming on the part of an infinite number of people who are trying to communicate something important to themselves and to the fellow members of their culture . . . All these terms [intentionality, intend, and intention] come from the Latin stem *intendere* . . . in plus *tendere*, *tensum* . . . meaning "to stretch," and from which we get our word "tension." This tells us immediately that intention is a "stretching" toward something. Now a fact which may be surprising . . . is that the first meaning given for "intend" in Webster's . . . is "to mean, signify." Only secondly does Webster give . . . "to have in mind a purpose or a design." . . . The little word "tend" . . . is a perpetual reminder that . . . in both [our meanings and our acts] we are moving toward something. And *mirabile dictu*, the word also means . . . "to take care of" (pp. 228-229).

Thus intentionality means that cognition, or knowing, and conation, or willing, go together; memory and perception are functions of it; it involves response to the world (p. 233)—in other words, even though May intends to follow the psychoanalytic direction and push this concept toward a "deeper, organic dimension" (p. 233), we can welcome it as a basic holistic, attitudinal, view of man-relating-to-the-world-outside, a significant humanistic expression. But it is surprising and wholly incorrect to claim, as May does, that "intentionality has been left out of consideration in psychological studies (p. 237). On the contrary, it permeates many branches of contemporary psychology. One need only think of Adler's "biased apperception"; studies in attitudes, set, expectancy, perception, projective techniques; even explications of *existere*, and many other ways in which intentionality has been dealt with.

The most memorable concept in the book, for us, is *care*. Although it is given relatively little space, May designates it as *the* "mythos," and it alone, "which enables us to stand against the cynicism and apathy which are the psychological illnesses of our day" (p. 306). "It is a state composed of the recognition of another, a fellow human being like one's self; of identification of one's self with the pain or joy of the other; of guilt, pity, and the awareness that we all stand on the base of a common humanity from which we all stem" (p. 289). This is a fine statement. Anyone familiar with Adler will be taken aback by its similarity of thought, terminology, and implications for mental health with the concept of social feeling. Yet there is no mention of Adler in this connection.

We read further, that the fact of the therapist's caring is the important aspect of therapy: "that you and I can trust and communicate with each other; . . . my belief that he [the patient] can change and that his behavior has meaning" (p. 301). The absence of Adler's name reminds us, in a remarkably reflexive way, of May's explanation of Freud's relation to Brentano, which we cited above: "It would seem to me that the intentionality implicit in Freud's views is one of the not-too-rare cases of the influence of one man on another in such a germane way that they become part and parcel of the second man's thought and may seem to have always been his" (p. 226). The relation here may indeed

be similar to that of Adler to May—especially since May, too, was a student of Adler.

May's affinity to Freud notwithstanding, he could not have read in all of Freud's writings anything approaching the passages describing care and the effective elements in psychotherapy, just quoted. One is therefore led to assume that the presence of these expressions of dis-interested fellow-manship—formulated by Adler so long ago—indicate a trend which, without benefit of identification, is now slowly but steadily emerging in many different quarters by the sheer force of its incontrovertible logic and its psychotherapeutic efficacy in meeting the requirements of our human situation. May's book will stand on merits of its own, some of which we have enumerated, but is also to be welcomed as a sign of this trend, which May terms "a new morality of authenticity in relationship" (p. 306).

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THE TWO VIEWS OF MAN AMONG HISTORIANS

MERLE CURTI. *Human Nature in American Historical Thought*. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1968. Pp. ix + 117. \$2.50.

The author, a notable historian, develops the thesis that American historians have more or less explicitly held one of two basic beliefs about human nature, which influenced their interpretations, stressing the limitations or the potentialities of man.

The first kind assumes man's immutability, proneness to sin with consequent need for repression, and innate racial inferiorities—the pessimistic view. This is shown most clearly from the writings of the Puritan William Bradford (1590-1657). Similar conceptions continue today through scientific determinism by "blind forces." Thus, Perry Miller is referred to as noting that Puritan literature, while outdated regarding its explanatory principle of original sin, remains valuable through "the accuracy of its observations" (p. 33): "We are terribly aware once more, thanks to the revelation of psychologists and the events of recent political history, that . . . the Puritan description of men . . . is closer to what we have witnessed than the description given in Jeffersonian democracy or in transcendentalism" (pp. 32-33). Miller does not seem to realize that psychologists are far from unanimous on this point, nor does the author comment on this.

The second type of assumptions is the one just mentioned, of Jefferson and transcendentalism, of the Enlightenment—the optimistic view. According to Jefferson man is imbued with an impulse toward power and greed, but also with reason and an innate moral sense which "can find its fullest expression in a favorable environment" (p. 43). In modern times leaders in this tradition have been James Harvey Robinson, Charles A. Beard, Carl Becker, and Harry Elmer Barnes. They were informed by the functional psychology of William James, James Angell, and John Dewey, their pragmatism and instrumentalism (pp. 61-63). Especially Beard emphasized "the creative character of intelligent thinking—the capacity of men and women not only to think logically but to manipulate physical environment and to live decently and helpfully together"

(p. 68). "If the gate . . . could be kept open, there was nothing in the past . . . that provided . . . proof that man could not find his way through" (p. 72).

The psychologist will note at this point that these two types of assumptions are still very evident also in his field, Adler's Individual Psychology and the subsequent "third force," humanistic and existentialistic theories belonging to the second type. And indeed, Ellenberger in his recent history of dynamic psychiatry describes Adler as an epigone of the Enlightenment, while Freud is seen as an epigone of Romanticism, which in Ellenberger's designation includes the pessimistic view of man (*The Discovery of the Unconscious*, Basic Books, 1970, p. 648).

In a third chapter Curti "indicates a trend toward the use of scientific concepts and tools" that present-day historians have considered relevant. To the extent that this meant a physicalistic determinism the outcome regarding the concept of man was not very different from that of other determinisms, namely pessimism. Curti shows this through the work of Henry Adams (1838-1918) whom he discusses at length. With his emphasis on objectivity and mechanistic-materialistic determinism, Adams saw man as "merely a pawn in the cosmic chess game" (p. 78). "Moral sentiments had no place in historical writing" (p. 82), reminding Curti of similarities with William Graham Sumner "who always insisted that men could make society worse but could never make it better" (p. 91).

From here on the presentation loses in clarity for us. Marx is introduced, but without pointing out that he opposed pessimistic mechanistic materialism in favor of a quite optimistic dialectic materialism which enables the present-day Marxist governments to stress individual responsibility while remaining in line with their doctrine. In discussing "psychoanalytic concepts" Curti fails to realize that Freud, Jung and Adler have not offered one new approach, of questionable scientific validity (p. 97), but that their concepts of man differ widely—along the very same lines which Curti has found among historians.

In our time, Curti believes an increasing number of historians "to be amoral [in their assumptions], in giving little or no support either to an emphasis on man's limitations or on his potentialities. . . . [Yet] these recent positions nevertheless suggest that knowledge of a precise and verifiable sort also has its own moral and ethical implications" (p. vi).

The value of this small book to the psychologist is the vivid demonstration that the issue of the concept of man, so important in his own discipline, is basic to other disciplines as well, and that the answers, across the disciplines, fall into similar groups and similar practical outcomes.

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THE INTERPERSONAL CHARACTER OF MEANING

ALFRED SCHUTZ. *The Phenomenology of the Social World*. Translated by G. Walsh and F. Lehnert. Introduction by G. Walsh. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1967. Pp. xxxvi + 255. \$9.00.

This book which appeared first in 1932 is the magnum opus of the late Austrian phenomenologist who articulated the taken-for-granted realm of every-

day living. His aim is to provide a foundation for understanding the following three "structures": meaning—philosophy, intersubjectivity—psychology, and group behavior—sociology. Schutz is thorough in his laborious detailing of phenomenological distinctions; it takes him 60 pages before he deals with meaning in a definitive way.

Of special relevance to Individual Psychology is the similarity of Schutz's definition of meaning with that of his contemporary, Adler. According to Schutz: "It is misleading to say that experiences *have* meaning. Meaning does not lie in the experience . . . The meaning is the *way* in which the Ego regards its experience" (pp. 68-70). Adler made a similar point on the first page of *What Life Should Mean To You* (1931): "Human beings live in the realm of meanings. We do not experience pure circumstances: we always experience circumstances in their significance for men . . . We experience reality always through the meaning we give it; not in itself, but as something interpreted" (p. 3).

Both Schutz and Adler indicate that events do not determine man's behavior, but offer possibilities of action based upon interpretation. However, in my opinion, Adler grasped the interpersonal character of meaning to a greater degree, in terms of it being a dialectical process. According to Adler: "A private meaning is in fact no meaning at all. Meaning is only possible in communication: a word which meant something to one person only would really be meaningless. It is the same with our aims and actions; their only meaning is their meaning for others" (p. 8).

Schutz does not distinguish between meaning and meaninglessness, but only between public and personal meaning. He believes that reflection itself, even if it be autistic, is meaningful. Our question is, "to whom?" Nonetheless, Schutz has implicated the interpersonal dimension in all of his writings, particularly through his notion of the "realm of the self" (reflection on our stream of thought as past), and of the "sphere of the We" (experience the acts of others in the vivid present). Schutz even reminds us that our reflections upon our past are interpersonally conditioned through language and cultural meanings. The book represents a philosophers' approach to a problem central to Adler's psychology.

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SUMMERHILL IN DIFFERENT LIGHTS

Summerhill: For and Against. New York: Hart Publishing Co., 1970. Pp. 263. \$7.50; \$1.95 paper.

In reading the opinions of these "outstanding writers in education, sociology, and psychology," I found that I did not have to change my own evaluation of this educational system, expressed in a review of the book, *Summerhill*, by A. S. Neil (this *Journal*, 1962, 18, 194-196). I held then that children need to learn at their own pace, but should be encouraged to learn; that creativity should not be without discipline; and that love is not enough if the child does not learn the rules of cooperation and develop social interest. To my mind the effectiveness of the Summerhill experiment, initiated thirty years ago, still remains in

question. The fact that it has recently become popular in this country does not answer the objection to the method when applied indiscriminately to disturbed children.

The most appreciative evaluation of this method comes from Bruno Bettelheim who, himself, is head of a boarding school for severely disturbed children. Nathan W. Ackerman, who of the 15 contributors is the most experienced in family therapy, privately and in the community, sees in Neill's approach a "poetic vision," presenting the problem without providing the answer. He emphasizes that Neill "gives up on parents," and ignores the community. Erich Fromm, Ashley Montagu, and others try to harmonize their own philosophies of education with the Summerhill concept, but their evaluation arises from theorizing rather than from actual experience in similar institutions. Ernst Papanek's evaluation is the most rewarding for us in that he has applied with great success some of Summerhill's features together with Adlerian principles, emphasizing the importance of the children's acceptance of the consequences of their antisocial behavior.

The range of viewpoints from enthusiasm to complete rejection gives an overall picture of present-day thinking on education.

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DANICA DEUTSCH

BOOK NOTES

ABELSON, R. P., ARONSON, E., MCGUIRE, W. J., NEWCOMB, T. M., ROSENBERG, M. J., & TANNENBAUM, P. H. (Eds.) *Theories of cognitive consistency: a sourcebook*. Chicago: Rand, McNally, 1968. Pp. xvii + 901. \$17.50.—The 835 pages by 54 distinguished contributors are a staggering production to have stemmed from a handful of theories, appearing over a decade ago. They had in common "the notion that a person behaves in a way that maximizes the internal consistency of his cognitive system; and by extension, that groups maximize the internal consistency of their interpersonal relations" (p. xv). One can well believe that dissonance theory, beginning in one sense with Heider in '46, and in another, with Festinger in '57, "generated more research . . . than any other theory" between '63 and '66. This fact alone would spur one's interest in this volume. To encourage one further, its material is carefully organized, with all its divisions "editorially sandwiched" between introductions and summary discussions.

ADLER, M. J. *The time of our lives: the ethics of common sense*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970. Pp. xiii + 356. \$7.95.—Excursions of psychologists into philosophy are rewarding for nuggets of wisdom they can pick up, for the stimulation of a wholly different approach to problems, and the example of thoroughness in dealing with them. Mortimer Adler is well-