

## BOOK REVIEWS

### THE ILLUSIONS OF DEPTH AND OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

LEON H. LEVY. *Psychological Interpretation*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963. P. xii + 368. \$6.50.

This is a difficult book to read, although it is well written and well organized with summaries at the end of each important step. The difficulty arises from the subject matter: something most of us take more or less for granted, the process of psychological interpretation, is subjected here to a most careful and logical analysis. But no psychologist can fail to gain from this interpretation of interpretation greater "insight" into the "depth" of his own "unconscious" while engaged in making interpretations—the rejection of all three terms, incidentally, being one of the tenets of this book (p. 29).

Depth and the unconscious are considered illusions which originate from psychoanalysis. These illusions derive from the failure of psychoanalysis to distinguish between observation and inference. Rather both are taken for facts, the first as "surface" facts, the second as "deep" facts. Operationally, however, the "deep" facts are but inferences of the psychologist (p. 20).

Operationally, psychological interpretation does not "uncover" any new "facts" which up to this point were hidden in the unconscious. "It consists of bringing an alternate frame of reference, or language system, to bear upon a set of observations or behaviors, with the end in view of making them more amenable to manipulation" (p. 7). While the patient's frame of reference led him to an impasse, the therapist endeavors to convey to him a more workable frame of reference.

This is exactly the position Adler took in discussions during his last two years. "Nothing is in the unconscious. E.g., all the meaning of a dream is invented by the interpreter . . . new interpretations are given to old notions . . . The inferiority complex is only an idea given by us to the patient. He behaves 'as if' he had an inferiority complex. After we tell him that, he has a new concept to work with" (Lecture notes, March 20, 1936). One similar statement also appeared in print. "I, myself, as the inventor of the 'inferiority complex' have never thought of it as of a spirit, knowing that it has never been in the consciousness or unconsciousness of the patient but only in my own consciousness, and have used it rather for illumination so that the patient could see his attitude in the right coherence" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1937, 42, 773-780). In logical consistency Adler also rejected the concept of depth. He considered his psychology "far removed from any theory of shallow 'depth psychology'" (Preface to *Studie ueber Minderwertigkeit von Organen*. Munich: Bergmann, 1927).

While Adler only spoke the opening sentence, so to say, Levy explores and examines this conception in all its ramifications, drawing in his discussion on the various recent advances in cognitive theory and the philosophy of science. The topics covered are: the nature of psychological interpretation, logic and assumptions, the semantic stage of interpretation, the propositional aspect, schematic summary, interpretation in diagnosis, tests, and psychotherapy.

To mention a few of the conclusions at which Levy arrives: One of the criteria for evaluating interpretations is "their effectiveness in bringing about the change desired" (p. 29). Unless psychodiagnostic procedures permit prediction, they are sheer ritual (p. 157). The distinction between projective and objective tests is but a tenuous one (p. 239). The author eventually develops a theory of interpretation in psychotherapy which begins with the axioms, "All behavior is controlled by the individual's images, plans, and interpretations," and, "Events and behavior are multidimensional and hence are subject to alternative interpretations" (p. 280).

The author being a clear thinker, we are not surprised that he rejects an eclectic approach to interpretation over a systematic one. "Ultimately psychology must have a single comprehensive system for the understanding of behavior, and the current form eclecticism has taken in psychological interpretation is very likely to impede its development" (p. 136). What we have in this book is an example of methodological operationalism combined with cognitive, phenomenological theory, applied to the problem of psychological interpretation. The author acknowledges his intellectual debt primarily to his teachers George A. Kelly and Julian B. Rotter. The book attests to the fruitfulness of their teaching no less than to the author's astuteness and originality.

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#### DREAM INTERPRETATION WITHOUT THE UNCONSCIOUS

WALTER BONIME. *The Clinical Use of Dreams*. Foreword by Montague Ullman. New York: Basic Books, 1962. Pp. xxvii + 343. \$8.50.

The practicing psychotherapist will find Dr. Bonime's book a most stimulating and rewarding experience. Practice and theory of dream interpretation are dealt with in a particularly felicitous manner. No book on dreams and the dreamer, in fact, since Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* has in such a well-organized way, so clearly and so definitively outlined the therapeutic use of dreams.

Dr. Bonime departs from orthodox psychoanalytic theories in a lucid and convincing manner, and his interpersonal-relationship point of view is ably demonstrated as more realistic for the interpretation and use of dreams. The cliches from the psychoanalytic vernacular are largely avoided; where they are used or mentioned, their real significance is explained, while vague and mystic inferences are discarded.

Thus sexual attitudes, for instance, are considered partial expressions of the total personality rather than basic or instinctual, and dream symbolisms are considered unique to the individual and his experiences rather than universally valid. The unity of the personality in sleep and waking states is always stressed, and the construct of "the Unconscious" is replaced by "degrees of awareness." Perhaps most important, in the therapeutic relationship the cooperation between the patient and the therapist is emphasized as the royal road to success, rather than any of the vague connotations of "transference."

By stressing in therapy the positive and healthy aspects of the patient's personality, Dr. Bonime is able to avoid much of the initial discouragement in patients, so frequently generated in orthodox psychoanalysis.

Each of the eleven chapters in the book covers, vividly and in a most absorbing way, important aspects of treatment in general and of dreams in particular,

such as feeling, resistance, anxiety, and sexuality in dreams, and finally, terminal dreams. Over one hundred different dreams, code-named and referred to in the various chapters, are supplied with associations to the dreams by patients and therapist, together with short sketches of the dynamics of the patients' problems and significant parts of the therapeutic processes. In the closing chapter, Dr. Bonime describes in greater detail his methods of working with one patient through a six-months period of treatment, with the various uses of dreams in the course of this work.

The book is bound to stimulate the practicing therapist to more searching and more intelligent uses of the dream material presented by patients. Above that, however, it extends far beyond the limits of pure dream interpretation, by pointing the way to a more rational and effective approach to the total treatment of the patient.

Dr. Bonime acknowledges his debt only to Bernard S. Robbins and Karen Horney, apart from Freud. Yet it seems clear, as Ullman points out in his foreword, that the way to Bonime's exposition was paved by Jung and particularly Alfred Adler, and Horney herself followed in the tradition of Adler in dream interpretation. But, while I deplore the omission of any direct reference to Adler, this does not detract from my opinion of the value and importance of this most timely book and that it is a "must" for serious practitioners of dream interpretation.

*New York, N. Y.*

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#### PERCEIVED PHENOMENA VERSUS THE UNDEMONSTRABLE UNCONSCIOUS

MEDARD BOSS. *Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis*. Trans. Ludwig B. Lefebvre. New York: Basic Books, 1963. Pp. viii + 295. \$8.50.

This is a fascinating and rewarding book. It conveys a very real impression of the author as an exceedingly understanding and dedicated therapist, as well as presenting his adroit handling of his thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, much of it on the basis of case material. Boss's schema is to show what he rejects from psychoanalysis, and what he retains and combines with Martin Heidegger's Daseinsanalysis.

The basis for the rejection of the Freudian thesis is that Daseinsanalysis cannot accept the natural-science approach to an understanding of man. Freud said, "the trends we merely *infer* are more prominent than the phenomena we *perceive*" (p. 30). But Daseinsanalytic statements at all times refer only to phenomena perceived and can, as such, "neither be derived from something else or 'proved' in some way" (p. 31). In psychoanalysis an "undemonstrable unconscious" and "repressed strivings and ideas are assumed to be responsible for symptoms. Daseinsanalysis is able to see these phenomena in terms of the given world-relations of neurotic patients. Daseinsanalysis thus stays close to the reality of the phenomena involved . . . we renounce the natural-science urge to explain and try to rely, instead, on our immediate observations . . ." (pp. 97-98).

Boss thus very consistently rejects in psychoanalysis all reductionism; all divisions "of the whole indivisible human existence;" all reifications (e.g., we do not *have* an emotion, we *are* an emotional state); all devaluations of present relationships by seeing them as something else, such as transference or symbolism

(including those based on mythology, which are Freud's and not the patient's); all "causes" in the physical sense, which bring about a pattern of behavior and which can be rendered ineffectual by simply being made "conscious" again; in short—all those "wholly superfluous conceptual constructs" (p. 128) which "have never been observed and never will be" (p. 122).

Taking Daseinsanalysis as Boss's antithesis, what does it offer instead? The meaning of *Dasein* is made clear through its literal translation, *being there*; "in a perception one is consumed immediately toward what is perceived . . . man is fundamentally 'out in the world' and *with* the things he encounters" (pp. 33-34). He is to be regarded in every situation as the total of all his past, present, and future possibilities of relating to his world. His "pitch" will determine the kind of perceptions to which he will be open. The healthy state is enjoyed when one has the freedom to be open to the world in all the ways available (p. 143); neurotic symptoms result when one has given up this freedom.

The difficulty in understanding Boss comes when, in spite of throwing psychoanalytic explanations overboard as "superfluous baggage," he presents Daseinsanalytic alternatives, seemingly explanations none the less. He claims, "All we need to do is talk of the concrete, meaning-disclosing object relations in which, and as which, our *Dasein* exists at a given moment" (p. 96), but he speaks of intrapersonal blocking, and a relationship to one's own possibilities. Does this not go beyond the phenomena themselves? Is there really an advantage in speaking of lesser "authenticity," rather than a weak ego to which Boss objects? Boss's account of the birth of an hallucination is far from clear (p. 225), and his statement that mankind's ethics becomes "self-evident" on the basis of "Daseinsanalytic understanding of man's essence" seems a cavalier understanding indeed.

It does not, however, require specifically Daseinsanalytic theoretical support for us to accept many of Boss's therapeutic practices and generalizations which differ from those of psychoanalysis. A few of these are as follows. "Much more crucial than anything the analyst says is his actual human openness to every realm of life belonging to the patient's existence" (p. 149). "No pathological symptom will ever be fully . . . understood unless it is conceived of as a disturbance in the texture of the social relationships of which a given human existence fundamentally consists; . . . all psychiatric diagnoses are basically only social statements" (p. 56). "The primary requirement is not some conceptual recognition of their [the patients'] acting-out, but rather the opportunity to live and to experience over and over again, immediately and unreflectingly, their new ways of behavior within the safe relationship to the analyst" (p. 244). And, "imperturbably, loving devotion on the part of the analyst arouses an equally imperturbable trust in the analysand . . . the phenomenon which supports the possibility of genuine cure" (p. 252).

But if these statements, like Daseinsanalysis' phenomena, speak for themselves, one must add that many other voices have been raised to speak for them, too. Here and in his criticism of psychoanalysis Boss is unusually disinterested in the similar thinking of many authoritative others. Perhaps one is not justified in expecting a practicing and creative clinician to be familiar with the literature. But to carry such unawareness as far as Boss does, suggests isolation in what should be a common enterprise. Except for Freud and Heidegger, one may say no other source is cited; even Binswanger's name is mentioned but twice, parenthetically, and Husserl not once!

In concluding, we must comment on the synthesis which Boss attempts of his own and Heidegger's insights with those of Freud. Boss finds it possible both to accept and reject from psychoanalysis by seeing in it two entirely separate ways of understanding man — a medical treatment and a psychological theory, so different that they sometimes contradict each other, especially in their most important features (p. 58)! It is the former, the therapy, which is based on a *tacit* understanding which is intrinsically in harmony with Heidegger's articulated formulations, and contains "Freud's actual, immediate, concrete, and most brilliant observations" (p. 59). An example of Boss's argument is that Freud would never have been able to create his fundamental therapeutic rule that the patient must be absolutely honest with himself and the therapist "if he had not secretly shared the Daseinsanalytic insight into man's existence as being of the nature of a primordial openness and lucidity" (p. 62). "If Freud had not had this [referring to another] Daseinsanalytic insight into human beings when actually treating his patients (regardless of whether he put it into words or not, and regardless of his theoretical formulations) he could not have gone beyond Breuer and Janet to become the father of modern psychotherapy" (p. 67).

Though we cannot agree with Boss's assumptions here, and object to his apologetic approach, we acknowledge the merit in pointing to the fact of a necessarily common denominator at the basis of effective therapy. In one case he speaks of recovery "not by any of the unwarranted interpretations of psychoanalytic theory but, above all, the psychoanalyst's unshakable caring for the patient" (p. 207). Boss's views strengthen the denial that an effective therapy proves the validity of the therapist's theory. Though it may not have been the author's intent, the challenge of this book might well be that the phenomena of therapy must continue to be observed with accuracy and disciplined naivete—and then be allowed to speak for themselves.

The extreme care and skill of the translator has obviously contributed much to this work.

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ROWENA R. ANSBACHER

#### CONTEMPORARY PERSONALITY CONCEPTS AT CHICAGO

JOSEPH M. WEPMAN and RALPH W. HEINE (Eds.) *Concepts of Personality*. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1963. Pp. xxix + 514. \$8.95.

This symposium is in part the product of a series of lectures sponsored by the Interdepartmental Committee on Clinical and Counseling Psychology at the University of Chicago. Of the 21 contributors, 17 are located in Chicago or elsewhere in Illinois, with 11 from the University of Chicago.

The four main parts of the book deal with basic processes (development, learning, perception, motivation theory), theories of personality, social process and personality, and methods of personality assessment.

Under personality theories seven systems are presented. Of these, five belong to the cognitive, holistic humanistic cluster. They are: Lewin's field theory, presented by J. S. Kounin; the humanistic psychologies of Allport and of Murray, by S. R. Maddi; Kelly's personal constructs theory, by Lee Sechrest; Adler's Individual Psychology, by Rudolf Dreikurs; and phenomenology, by J. M. Shlien. The remaining two are psychoanalysis, presented by Kohut and Seitz, and the behaviorist approach to personality theory, by Lundin.

The discussion of Adler's system is very adequate as we would expect from Dreikurs, who makes two particularly noteworthy observations. He points out, "In a sense, Adlerians are reviving the American pragmatism of Pierce and James, according to which every action gets its meaning from its consequences" (p. 241). He also stresses for mental health the concept of equality, as counterpart to both feelings of inferiority and of superiority over others (p. 244).

The contribution by Sechrest is, to our knowledge, the first full description of Kelly's theory by another writer. According to psychology of personal constructs, "We need not be the passive victims of our own biographies" (p. 209). Rather, we are more determined by our own personal constructs, "the interpretations we place on events" (p. 211), to which alternatives are always possible. Kelly's theory "may be construed" as rational, cognitive, phenomenological, interpersonal; it is experimental and tends to be ahistorical in its approach to understanding of behavior (p. 229). It shows considerable similarities to the theories of Adler, Albert Ellis, Sullivan and Rogers (pp. 230-231). Since Kelly's theory is meeting with increasing interest, this convenient introduction, which also includes a few welcome biographical statements about Kelly, is especially useful.

Discussing the theories of Allport and of Murray, Maddi observes that they have both been critical of radical behaviorism and classical Freudianism (p. 165). Their common convictions about man are that he is proactive, psychologically organized, complex, and unique, functions rationally, and is future-oriented. This comparison and synthesis by Maddi is another valuable "first" of this volume.

The chapter on motivation by J. M. Butler and Laura N. Rice deals with "Adience, self-actualization, and drive theory," and concludes, "The individual is to a large extent his own environment. Therefore, the human is autonomous" (p. 106).

According to the editors, the contributors represent "a cross-section of what is accepted in psychology today" (p. viii). If this is so, this volume can well serve to demonstrate what Maddi calls "the present accelerating trend toward emphasizing humanistic qualities" (p. 203), what Maslow has called a gathering "third force" (Shlien, p. 302), showing who some of the important standard bearers of this trend are, what they have to say, and what they have in common.

Unfortunately the volume is marred by carelessness in the final editing, quite in contrast to the otherwise very fine production.

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#### TRIBUTE TO HENRY A. MURRAY

ROBERT W. WHITE (Ed.) *The Study of Lives: Essays in Personality in Honor of Henry A. Murray*. New York: Atherton Press, Division of Prentice-Hall, 1963. Pp. xxi + 442. \$9.50.

This is a collection of 18 essays by as many authors, dedicated to Murray on his 70th birthday, May 13, 1963, "by students and colleagues past and present who will always remember with excitement and gratitude their sojourn in the high invigorating climate created by his infectious zest, wide-ranging awareness, bountiful powers of creation, and staunch fidelity to the increase of human understanding." The authors are Frank Barron, Leopold Bellak, Anthony Davids,

E. H. Erikson, R. R. Holt, Kenneth Keniston, T. C. Kroeber, D. W. MacKinnon, D. C. McClelland, G. S. Nelson, Nevitt Sanford, E. S. Shneidman, M. B. Smith, M. I. Stein, Silvan Tomkins, R. W. White, R. N. Wilson, and Frederick Wyatt.

In the preface, the editor describes Murray's influence in contemporary American psychology as having been "against the prevailing orthodoxy of positivistic behaviorism" and likens him to G. W. Allport in having "brought to psychology a humanistic interest" (p. xiv). "He set out to create an adequate psychology of the ego — years before this became popular among more orthodox analysts. In work with Jung and in Jung's writings he found 'a hive of great suggestiveness'" (p. xv). Murray stresses his relation to organismic and field theories (p. xvi).

The essays are arranged into four sections dealing with growth and change in personality, procedures and variables for studying personality, creativity, and values. Each section is preceded by a comprehensive overview by the editor.

We can mention here only a few of the contributions which appear most interesting to us. Kroeber starts from ten defense mechanisms and shows how, in mental health, they may manifest themselves as coping devices. Shneidman presents a very detailed and original analysis of orientations toward death, from the premise that "dying behaviors . . . are an intergral part of the life style of the individual" (p. 206). Wyatt concludes his paper on the reconstruction of the individual and of the collective past with the sentence: "The past not only makes *us*, but we, literally, make *it* by putting it together in thoughtful reflection" (p. 320). Wilson, comparing Albert Camus and Murray, points out that although both knew "the black recesses of personality . . . , they held to a sturdy secular faith in the individual will" (p. 363). Both stress the individual's capacity to act on his environment, stress growth, openness of experience, and come at the end to a profound optimism.

If we may add our own tribute to Murray, we only wish to do so by restating some of the signs of psychological disorder and health from one of his descriptions of the Thematic Apperception Test: In mental disorder the TAT hero is egotistical, marked by exorbitant ambition, extreme self-centered isolation, weak and unsustainable interpersonal relations, absence of benevolent or of socially oriented action, and he is a misanthrope. In mental health the hero is socially oriented, with intense and lasting interpersonal relations; he participates in group action, responsible leadership, social reform, and in humanitarian and compassionate action. This is to us the simple essence of the greatest wisdom.

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#### AN ORGANISMIC INTRODUCTORY PSYCHOLOGY TEXTBOOK

PAUL SWARTZ. *Psychology: The Study of Behavior*. Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand, 1963. Pp. xix + 451. \$6.95.

The author wrote this introduction to psychology from the conviction that "Of all the courses in a student's career, the work he takes in psychology should be the most exciting and the most memorable" (p. ix), a conviction which we wholeheartedly share. With this intention of giving the students something memorable, it follows logically that the author could not write the encyclopedic type of textbook which simply bowls the student over with data, names and

references, and leaves him bewildered. It had to be a presentation in which there is intrinsic structure so that all parts hang meaningfully together.

This structure is provided by the organismic framework of the late A. Angyal which rejects any dualism and conceives of the life process as "encompassing the organism in indissoluble interrelationship with its environment" (p. 62). Such an orientation has implications not only for what will be included in the book but also how it will be presented. Thus, e.g., the scientific method is discussed not in the abstract but by the use of R. J. Corsini's humorous account of "The Blind Men and the Elephant," and of Semmelweis' discovery of the cause of childbed fever.

With emphasis on individual differences, the recent work of Roger Williams is stressed in the discussion of the role of biological factors in behavior. Such factors, however, do not determine behavior but provide possibilities or pre-conditions. Actual behavior "will depend upon how the individual organism realizes these possibilities through his opportunities for behavior experience" (p. 89).

In the area of motivation the organismic approach requires one unifying concept. From those available, the author chooses R. W. White's concept of competence, as "relevant to a broad enough segment of behaviors to provide a balanced perspective toward the subject in general" (p. 230).

The chapter of particular interest to us is that on personality. The author describes personality as being constituted of "the specific pattern of behavior organization that a given individual evolves" (p. 352). On this basis he develops his own biosocial approach to understanding the individual. In addition, he selects from the large number of personality theories three for consideration: those of Freud, Adler, and Allport. While he finds in Adler the concept of "creative power" unnecessary, the assumption of an everpresent inferiority feeling unjustified, and striving for competence preferable to striving for perfection, he shares Adler's stress on social factors and regards "the concept of social feeling . . . as an extremely important contribution" (p. 348). Allport is likened by Swartz to Adler in emphasizing the uniqueness of the individual and stressing the individuality of growth. He finds "Allport's emphasis on becoming and on the hierarchical organization of the psychological person highly refreshing" (p. 351).

In a brief concluding chapter the writings of Tillich, Sartre, Buber, and even Kierkegaard and Heidegger are recommended.

This book fulfills the requirements of an introductory college text and is probably the first which does this in a manner the instructor who is of organismic-holistic orientation will find very congenial. The student should find it stimulating, useful, and making a difference in his own life.

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HEINZ L. ANSBACHER

### THE THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY A CENTURY AGO

J. SANBOURNE BOCKOVEN. *Moral Treatment in American Psychiatry*. New York: Springer Publishing Company, Inc., 1963. Pp. ix + 116. \$3.00 paper.

This little book is a reprint with modifications and a new preface of the articles which the author first presented in the *Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases* in 1956.

Dr. Bockoven presents us with a succinct history of American psychiatry of the last 120 years. The essential theme is that the care of the mentally ill in large hospitals has followed an undulating wave of progress and regression. More than a century ago the progressive wave reached a peak which has scarcely been regained at the present time. This was the period of moral treatment, a thoroughly integrated and total program which utilized all available hospital facilities and was based on a positive and optimistic attitude toward patients by staff personnel. The communal life of both patients and hospital personnel was emphasized. Moral treatment may best be approximated today in the concept of the therapeutic community. Those familiar with Adlerian philosophy and principles of treatment will be aware of its parallels with moral treatment.

In tracing the evolution of moral treatment, Dr. Bockoven notes that hospital psychiatry is influenced by the social and political pressures of the times, which frequently have led to an abandonment of therapeutic principles. He also observes that the use of science for its own sake, i.e., without being viewed as a method in the service of therapeutic ends, must in some measure be held responsible for some of the regression in patient care. On the other hand, moral treatment without a social scientific orientation failed to establish guiding principles which could have assisted in the training of leaders and the furthering of programs.

Above everything else, Bockoven's book is valuable because it can teach humility by helping us to realize that many of today's so-called original ideas were first "discovered" by pioneers of the past.

On the other hand, the one minor criticism that could be made of this book is its lack of coverage of those contemporary rehabilitation programs which are in the spirit of moral treatment and are supported by a social psychiatric research orientation which the author frequently states to be of the first order of importance. That things are going on is hinted at by Dr. Bockoven in his new preface, but a concluding chapter demonstrating the emergence of a neo-moral treatment philosophy would be in order. This criticism, however, does not detract much from the book which, to this reviewer, has not only charm but is like a breath of fresh air in appealing to our humanity as one of the greatest forces in working with mental patients.

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### THE FAMILY OF MAN

NATHAN W. ACKERMAN, FRANCES L. BEATMAN, and SANFORD N. SHERMAN (Eds.)  
*Exploring the Base for Family Therapy: Papers from the M. Robert Gomberg Memorial Conference.* New York: Family Service Association of America, 1961. Pp. 159. \$4.00.

This volume presents contributions by representatives of anthropology, social work, psychiatry, and the social sciences on theoretical and practical developments in family diagnosis, treatment, and research. Three papers are of special interest.

Weston La Barre conceives of all therapy as "in a sense group therapy, involving always a reconstruction of relationships in that basic group, the family," within which we learn to be human.

Iago Galdston gives a critical evaluation of the different aspects of traditional psychiatric treatment. These include "the common fallacy of the unique traumatic event," and the "exclusive closeting of patient and doctor" which so frequently results in an alienation of the patient from his family. Galdston points out that while the other social disciplines have been preoccupied with the family, psychiatry has been a laggard, with the exceptions of Martin Grotjahn and Ackerman. Here he ignores Adler's emphasis on the family constellation.

The most courageous step away from the treatment of the isolated individual is made by Ackerman, in a paper which focuses on certain aspects of his basic theory described in *The Psychodynamics of Family Life*. In this earlier book he discussed his departure from Freudian personality theory, the importance of interpersonal relationships in the formation of intrapersonal processes, the social versus biological factors in intrapersonal problems, and the influences of other disciplines. As Adlerians we can only welcome Ackerman's discoveries. By seeing the family together, the personal distortions of happenings come to the fore and "reality testing" emerges in the group sessions. Whether the individual develops by emulating or contrasting himself to the other members, he is part of the total picture of the family where each part fits the other exactly like the part of a puzzle.

However, whereas Ackerman insists that the family be seen as a unit only, we feel that there are some family problems in which a change cannot be accomplished without at least occasional treatment of individual members, varying with the depth of the intrapersonal disturbances. There are interpersonal problems which involve "personal privacies" which, once disclosed in the family group, can do irreparable damage.

The specific techniques used in the treatment of the family group depend on the personality of the therapist. Dr. Ackerman's approach requires a great deal of experience and courage, and cannot be imitated. His theoretical orientation, however, especially with regard to greater awareness of interpersonal relations and the patient's changing in therapy from an egocentric to a sociocentric attitude has strikingly much in common with Adler. It is a coincidental parallel that Adler in 1931 and Ackerman in 1958 dedicated a book to "the human family" and to ". . . the family of man," respectively.

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### THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING ENCOURAGING

DON DINKMEYER and RUDOLF DREIKURS. *Encouraging Children to Learn: The Encouragement Process*. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963. Pp. ix + 162. \$5.25.

The authors, both adherents to the Adlerian frame of reference, believe that "All educators, teachers, and parents *can* learn how to encourage; doing so, they may find some of the most perplexing and difficult problems in their classrooms to be challenging and rewarding."

The authors are well qualified for the task at hand; Dinkmeyer is a leading psychologist in a college of education, Dreikurs is a teaching and practicing psychiatrist who has devoted many years to working with parents, teachers, and

children, and is both controversial and distinguished for his numerous publications and lectures.

The chapters vary greatly as to style, format, and content. Some are exciting (the Introduction and Chapters 2, 3, 8, and 10) while others are confusing (Chapters 1 and 4) and still others are virtually barren (Chapters 6 and 7).

The Introduction is a brief masterpiece setting forth some basic considerations which are subsequently unmatched. "Pressure from without rarely promotes desirable behavior. One can seldom 'make' a child behave, study, apply himself, if he chooses not to do so . . . So crucial is the factor of encouragement, that once its significance is recognized, it may actually revolutionize educational procedures in our families and in our schools . . . The result of any corrective act depends less on what the educator does than how the child perceives and responds to it" (pp. 2-4).

Chapters 2, "The Child's Development," 3, "Discouragement," and 8, "Encouragement in the Classroom Group," are most profound and stimulating. They provide an excellent foundation for understanding the "roots" of discouragement, something of its pervasive nature, and suggestions, in specific terms, as to how to deal with the problem. The reader will find a most helpful discussion of the nature of courage and how to distinguish it from recklessness. "The reckless person only appears courageous. Actually, he expects failure and brings it about by his performance which neglects the necessary caution" (p. 32). A highlight of the book is the section entitled "Psychodynamics of Discouragement." "Once we have a definite conviction, we create experiences to fortify our convictions, perceive only what accords with our assumptions, and ignore all that would contradict our concepts and beliefs" (p. 35).

Unfortunately, in Chapter 1, "The Development of Personality: Basic Assumptions," the material is so sketchily treated that it is confusing at best. On the other hand, Chapters 6 and 7, particularly, suffer from a profusion of examples. The illustration of horizontal vs. vertical movement is cited before the ideas inherent in the notion are adequately developed. Considerable strength may have been gained had these chapters spent more time in developing the ideas intended through theoretical discussions and left the examples to the final chapter.

Students working with the reviewer who have used other Adlerian readings find the book most helpful. This probably is because they are familiar with relevant information alluded to but not discussed in this book. If true, this suggests that its real value probably will be as supplementary reading with such truly great books as Dreikurs' *Psychology in the Classroom* and *The Challenge of Parenthood*.

Actually, there is much more to this book than is apparent on casual reading. It should have a wider reading audience than it is likely to get. In conclusion and in the academic tradition, this book rates a B, if we remember that C is par for the course.

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