

BOOK REVIEWS

INTRODUCING A "THIRD FORCE" IN PSYCHOLOGY

ABRAHAM H. MASLOW. *Toward a Psychology of Being*. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1962. Pp. ix + 214. \$1.95 paper.

A new book by Professor Maslow, chairman of the department of psychology at Brandeis University, is, of course, a 'must' for anyone interested in personality theory, and has special appeal for those who share the approach of this *Journal*. This is his first book since *Motivation and Personality* in 1954, and, similarly, is a collection of lectures and papers previously published. It is definitely to be considered no less a book because of being a paperback (unfortunately, without index).

Maslow located the present book within contemporary psychology as follows: "The two comprehensive theories of human nature most influencing psychology until recently have been the Freudian and the experimental-positivistic-behavioristic," but lately a third, increasingly comprehensive theory of human nature has been "coalescing" which might be called a "Third Force." This group includes Adlerians, Jungians, Rankians, the neo- and post-Freudians, Goldstein, the Gestalt psychologists, Allport, Murphy, Moreno, Murray, Rogers, the self-psychologists, existentialists, etc., and it is in this stream of thought that the book belongs. Maslow lists five journals in which this group is most likely to publish, the first on the list being this *Journal*.

Maslow declines to speak as an "official delegate" of this group. But he is surely the most prolific and persuasive representative of their common position. It is fitting that he should be regarded as the spokesman—for many reasons other than the richness and fluidity of his style. For one thing, he has actually been an encouraging and integrating influence among numerous individuals working singly in the field, thus enacting an adjunctive role to scholarship as worthwhile as it is rare. For another thing, and principally, his approach to the subject matter is integrative, and hence positive. His third-force position is not primarily an opposition to the other two: rather, it "draws a circle which takes them in" as much as possible. The scientific method, on the one hand, he believes only needs an "enlarging and deepening of the conception of its nature, goals and methods." He is convinced that the subjective can be studied scientifically. He submits his own discoveries as hypotheses — all confirmable (or not) by those interested in applying the scientific procedures which he acknowledges to be the only means of ultimate general acceptance. As for Freud, on the other hand, Maslow claims that his view "in no way denies the usual Freudian picture. . . . It is as if Freud supplied to us the sick half of psychology and we must now fill it out with the healthy half." Although Maslow rejects a great many Freudian conceptions, he does so in context, with his own alternative formulations, one at a time, rather than as a generalized *anti* position. In this way he has been free to direct his insights into the positive development of the third force.

A general emphasis on the positive may well be the most significant characteristic of Maslow's view. The present volume, which contains in effect a review and

summary of the preceding one, represents a continuity as well as a further development of these positive concerns, with two new areas, namely, the distinction between deficiency and growth motivations, and the nature and implications of peak experiences. Regarding these peak experiences and their relation to the book's scope as reflected in the title, Maslow says: "This is then a chapter in the 'positive psychology' . . . of the future in that it deals with fully functioning and healthy human beings, and not alone with normally sick ones. . . . I call it Being-psychology because it concerns itself with ends rather than with means, i.e., with end-experiences, end-values, end-cognitions, with people as ends." The being aspect is characteristic of "the way in which self-actualizing people do at times react to the world, and in which *all* of us react in our peak moments, . . . the way in which psychotherapists *try* to react to their patients." It is Maslow's merit that he has chosen to learn about human nature, with emphasis on its potentiality, by studying examples of its fullest flowering rather than of its deficiency or lowest common denominator, and that he had the perceptivity and courage to declare that it would be "foolish to deny the [peak] phenomenon simply because it comes rarely, temporarily, and impurely."

Readers who are used to looking at human nature from the Adlerian viewpoint will find many similarities with Maslow—literally too many to mention—including much of the positive approach, as in regarding human nature definitely not as "evil," and believing "that though 'bad' behavior . . . can never be abolished altogether, it may yet be expected to lessen as the personality matures and as the society improves." To experience so much support and harmony in another's views is exhilarating.

But certain of Maslow's conclusions come up sharply against those of the Adlerian position, and such differences should be most challenging precisely when arising out of a framework in many ways so similar. They demand both a careful testing of the other and a careful reappraisal of the held view. Naturally the differences vary in the quality of their challenge. For instance, Maslow defines the unconscious as the repressed and the forgotten; Adler defined it as that which is not understood. Here the Adlerian characterization can readily be defended as preferable because of its lower level of abstraction. But it is still possible to question whether the two views might be combined to form a more complete understanding of unconscious processes. In another example, Maslow's concept of Being is defined as "needing no future," as goalless, doing for the sake of doing itself. Is this to be reconciled with the Adlerian all-out teleological approach? Or again, should Adlerians adhere to the contribution-to-the-common-weal as the sole criterion of value, or is some modification necessary to admit Maslow's values of contemplation and the enjoyment of the inner life *per se*? Should Adler's interpretation of the absolute truth as the "iron law of the community" be limited in order to make room for Maslow's criterion, "the only way we can ever know what is right for us is that it feels better subjectively than any alternative. The new experience validates itself." These are cases to force rethinking the issues. Should we reject the conflicting concepts, or re-interpret them according to our principles, or should the principles be amended to permit acceptance of the differing concepts, wholly or in part?

Toward a psychology of being is filled with provocative stimulation, which should make it a powerful work as well as widely read. The strengthening and

developing of the third force cannot come only from the presentation of new concepts by creative observers; there must also be full utilization of their challenge—whether it results ultimately in rejection, acceptance, or modification and integration—by all those engaged in the psychological enterprise.

Burlington, Vermont

ROWENA R. ANSBACHER

PSYCHOLOGISTS, KNOW THE "SELF"

RUTH C. WYLIE. *The Self Concept: A Critical Survey of Pertinent Research Literature*. Lincoln, Neb.: Univ. Nebraska Press, 1961. Pp. vii + 370. \$4.50.

Many psychologists, from John B. Watson on, have contended that it is not possible to carry out satisfactory scientific research on subjective phenomena and that self-relevant considerations, therefore, have no place within our developing discipline. Wylie's admirable critique of numerous studies in the phenomenological area shows that subjectivity *can* be researched but also that this kind of work is *difficult*.

Graduate students who are searching for significant thesis problems, and who need to be aware of methodological booby-traps, can profit from reading this volume. They should not, however, have the impression that the studies cited here, numerous as they are, constitute the only kinds of evidence underlying the phenomenological orientation. There is, for instance, no consideration in this book of the work of Piaget.

Wylie argues that "it might prove profitable to effect more connections with the general experimental psychology of learning, motivation, and perception" (p. 320). Yet there is no mention in this volume of the important work of Cantril, Ittelson, Kilpatrick, Luchins, and others in these fields.

The bibliography contains 493 books, articles, and dissertations pertinent to self-concept research. Most thoroughly discussed in the text are psychometric methods which have been devised by Berger, Bills, Brownfain, Butler and Haijgh, Chodorkoff, Dymond, Fey, Fisher and Cleveland, Jourard, Leary, Maslow, Raimy, Rogers, Worchel, and others. The general conclusion is that there is much here that is promising but that more attention needs to be paid to construct validity, reliability, sampling, control, scaling, significance tests, and theoretical clarification.

Apparently the conscious-unconscious dichotomy dies hard, despite all that has been written about "figure-ground" and "levels of awareness." Wylie classifies studies according to whether they deal with the "phenomenal self" or the "nonphenomenal self" and speculates that unconscious processes "may someday prove to be of equal or greater predictive value than phenomenal constructs" (p. 320).

Is the distinction between "phenomenal" and "nonphenomenal" useful? Can one seriously talk about an "unconscious self concept"? Or does this kind of thinking contribute to the theoretical confusion which is complained about so bitterly throughout this book?

Southern Illinois University

ALFRED E. KUENZLI

CREATING DISSONANCE IN THE S-R CAMP

DOUGLAS H. LAWRENCE and LEON FESTINGER. *Deterrents and Reinforcements: The Psychology of Insufficient Reward*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962. Pp. vi + 180. \$4.75.

Whether or not Lawrence and Festinger have adequately supported their claim that rats act to reduce cognitive dissonance, is an open question, but that this monograph will create considerable dissonance in its readers, particularly those of an S-R persuasion, there is little doubt. Perhaps, the greatest value of this book will follow from the multi-faceted attempts to reduce this dissonance, hopefully by more reflection and research rather than invective.

Audaciously spiking Morgan's canon, the authors contend that when rats like people, are induced to engage "voluntarily" in an unpleasant activity (either because of the nature of the activity itself or because of the consequences occasioned by that activity) a state of dissonance is produced. Then, if the forces against engaging in the discrepant behavior are less than the forces for engaging in such behavior, the animal "will reduce its dissonance by finding extra attractions in the situation."

The greater resistance to extinction found after training involving either partial reinforcement, delay of reward, or increased effort, is now attributed to the introduction of dissonance, the one feature common to all three learning situations. That is, in each of the above conditions the animal engages in an activity which is unpleasant: it intermittently does something for which it does not get the expected reward, it runs into a situation where it is forced to wait before proceeding to the goal, or it has to expend increased amounts of effort to obtain the reward. Under these conditions, then, the animal is said to find extra attractions in the situation to "justify" its participation in an undesirable state of affairs, and it is this heightened attractiveness which results in increased resistance to extinction as compared with control animals who learned under straightforward or non-dissonance-producing conditions.

Having produced this ingenious interpretation of a considerable body of previous experimental findings, the authors then describe a series of intriguing studies designed to test step by reasoned step their dissonance thesis. A critical evaluation of methodology and reporting of results is beyond the scope of this review. However, lest the reader be persuaded by the confident style of presentation, a number of reservations need to be kept in mind. The looseness of dissonance theory makes it very difficult to disprove (a fault certainly not peculiar to this approach). But a more important aspect of the same problem is the possibility of interpreting the authors' findings in at least equally plausible and much more parsimonious terms—for example, by hypothesizing that the animals in the experimental conditions learn a "persistence" expectation (i.e., the expectancy that to keep trying in the face of adversity is eventually rewarding) which becomes associated with certain cues in the situation. Such an explanation does not necessarily lead to different predictions than does dissonance theory, but it does have the virtue of being deducible from a more general learning theory.

Even if more adequate theoretical templates are found to fit their findings, Lawrence and Festinger do not need to apologize for this lively and provocative piece of work. After so many years of attempting to reduce human behavior to

preconceived and oversimplified notions of animal processes, it is only just (and probably salutary) that some attempts are being made to reverse the direction of theorizing.

Ohio State University

SHEPARD LIVERANT

AN ADLERIAN EDUCATOR'S APPROACH

OSKAR SPIEL. *Discipline Without Punishment*. Ed. with introduct. by Lewis Way; transl. by Edward Fitzgerald. London: Faber & Faber, 1962. Pp. 171. 21s.

"In this book then, I have attempted to deal with this question of technique, and to show, in particular, how Adler's system of Individual Psychology can be of service to the teacher in the practical tasks that confront him." With this statement, the author, the late Oskar Spiel, sets forth his purpose in writing the book, first published in 1947 in Vienna and recently translated by Edward Fitzgerald and edited by Lewis Way, well known expositor of Alfred Adler's work.

This is not the first time a treatise has been undertaken wherein careful attention to discipline and teaching methodology is given, but it is one of the few relating knowingly to principles of Individual Psychology. In recalling similar attempts by non-Adlerian writers during the past four decades (1-3, 5-8), the reviewer is struck with the congruity of their thinking with that of Spiel.

The fact that the illustrations are limited (as were Spiel's experiences) to the educating of boys 10 to 14 years of age, in no way limits the book's application. Much of what he suggests has been in practice in America in our nurseries and kindergartens for many years, less so in our elementary schools, rarely in our secondary schools, and non-existent in our institutions of higher education where greater revolutions are needed in teaching technique. In fact the reader, aware of the learning and larger behavior problems of the total age range, will be impressed with the applicability of the techniques at all levels in a wide variety of situations—teaching the gifted, the handicapped, the disturbed, and the so-called normal.

Spiel seeks to achieve his purpose in providing transcript-like narratives of actual interactions involving teachers attempting to maintain order in the class and at the same time to provide children with worthwhile learning experiences. Some skeptics would attribute the apparent success of Spiel and his associate, Birnbaum, to ideal conditions were it not clear that "the school laboured under special disadvantages. Being situated in one of the most impoverished districts of Vienna, the children . . . came from . . . ignorant homes."

But this book is not for everyone! Without an appreciation of some of the principles of Individual Psychology the reader will be lost, as were six of the reviewer's graduate students who were assigned the book. In contrast, six graduate students who were enrolled in a seminar in Adlerian theory felt the book a most rewarding application of some otherwise theoretical principles.

For the teacher, democratically oriented, American style, some of Spiel's recommendations will seem harsh: "Sit down and listen," "The children assemble at a quarter to eight," "As the teacher walks through the ranks," and "The delinquents chorused." There appears repeatedly the inference of democratic procedures being attempted in an autocratic atmosphere. It is conceivable that in the translation something of the cultural setting is lost.

There is one point, more accurately a thread, throughout the book about which the reviewer has some consternation. It grows out of a real concern that this "thread" is characteristic of so much of what so many so-called Adlerians do—the personification if not deification of Individual Psychology: "Individual Psychology is well acquainted with . . .," "Individual Psychology is convinced . . .," "Individual Psychology asks instead . . .," "Individual Psychology is inclined to suspect . . .," ". . . confirms the view of Individual Psychology," and "Individual Psychology does not divide the individual. . . ." This process serves as a basis for attack from the increasing number in educational circles who seek to discredit new and helpful ideas in emphasizing what to the reviewer is a minor but not inaccurate observation.

Proponents of Individual Psychology must find other ways to pay tribute to the ideas of Alfred Adler if they wish to reach the vast numbers who would otherwise find considerable challenge in this point of view. Personification appears to do much for the status needs of the "in-group," but the price of admission is too great for the "outs."

Two chapters are of especial worth: "Self-government in schools" and "The problem child." These chapters do much to underwrite the discussion with a clear understanding of Adlerian thinking and are worth the price of the book (approximately \$3.00). These, together with Way's introduction, are excellent. Without Way's succinct and clear picture of both Spiel and his efforts, the many readers who did not know Spiel personally and the many who, like the reviewer, continue to be students of Individual Psychology, would be greatly handicapped. Not only did Way undertake a herculean task in editing the volume, but his presentation of the "man and his works" is as gifted as the text itself.

And what does the reviewer think of the book? He rushed a supplementary book order for his fall class for teachers as a companion volume to Dreikurs' *Psychology in the Classroom* (4). Each needs the other.

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OUTDATED RADICALISM

A. S. NEILL. *Summerhill: A Radical Approach to Child Rearing*. New York: Hart Publishing Co., 1960. Pp. xxiv + 392. \$5.75.

At first glance, the "leading educators, authors, and psychologists" who were asked to comment on A. S. Neill's description of the experimental school he established in Suffolk, England, in 1921 appear to be unanimous in their approval of Mr. Neill's "radical approach to child rearing." But on closer inspection one becomes aware of the fact that in a good many instances this seemingly unqualified praise is tempered by a reviewer's awareness that what began as an educational experiment must remain an experiment, and that "it would take a social revolution to install such a system or make it operate." And, in fact, in the 41 years since Summerhill opened its doors, its approach has never been duplicated by even its most ardent supporters. Similarly other reviewers recognize that some of the author's theses will undoubtedly be challenged, disputed, arouse skepticism, etc. But unfortunately they never spell out the specific concepts and procedures which gave rise to these objections. Nevertheless, it is immediately apparent to this reviewer that Mr. Neill's theories regarding child rearing cannot foster, and might even be said to inhibit the development of those qualities which are fundamental to the preservation of our civilization, namely, a sense of social responsibility toward the community, and a desire to cooperate in its efforts to alleviate the "human predicament."

Summerhill was founded to provide a setting which would allow the emotionally disturbed child to grow and develop at his own pace, in an atmosphere of freedom, unstinted love, and approval. Its student population was later extended to include normal children as well. These are educational ideals which, quite justifiably, met with wide recognition during the first half of this century, and inspired the large number of so-called progressive schools which sprang up in this country. However, despite the unquestioned merit of these theories on paper, educators encountered a great deal of difficulty in their attempts to apply them to everyday classroom procedure.

Mr. Neill has equated these concepts of freedom, love, and approval with the complete absence of authority and discipline. At Summerhill children are not only not compelled, but not even induced to attend class; "they can stay away from lessons for years if they want to." There are no home work assignments or examinations. Children are never urged to complete projects they have begun, once they seem to have lost interest in their work. Thus we are not surprised to learn that children have graduated from Summerhill, after being exposed to this regimen for many years, without having acquired the ability to read, with only the haziest knowledge of arithmetic, etc., a fact which Mr. Neill acknowledges and accepts.

Mr. Neill takes particular pains to protect his pupils from domination by the authoritarian adult. One wonders whether he exhibits the same concern for his teachers. For, in fact, it is the children who run the school, and are its real bosses. In brief, Mr. Neill's attitudes toward discipline are based on his belief that "there is no need whatsoever to teach children how to behave. A child will learn what is right and what is wrong in good time—provided he is not pressured." Moreover, he describes freedom and unqualified approval as the cure for all delinquency.

In addition, according to Mr. Neill, the problem child invariably is overwhelmed by masturbation guilt and/or unsatisfied curiosity about sex. Although my loyalties lie with Adlerian concepts, at this point in Mr. Neill's account I wondered why Freudians have not objected to his oversimplification and misinterpretation of Freudian theory. To illustrate: Billie, aged seven, had stolen a teacher's watch and hidden it in his trunk. When, on being questioned, the child denied having seen the watch, Mr. Neill put the more important question: "Billie, do you know where babies come from?" The boy's reply revealed that he had been misinformed on this subject, and the headmaster proceeded to enlighten him. "Without a word, Bille walked to the trunk, opened it, and handed me the watch. His stealing was cured, for he had been only stealing the truth." In another instance, the incendiarism of an eleven-year-old boy was attributed to his guilt over masturbation. Needless to say, once Mr. Neill had given the child permission to masturbate, and thus relieved his guilt, his pyromania was cured.

Finally, it is Mr. Neill's contention that by allowing the pupils at Summerhill to govern themselves, he is fostering in them "a community spirit that is in advance of its time." However, Mr. Neill's definition of those qualities which make for "community spirit" seems highly restricted: A child may be penalized by his classmates only if he is interfering with their activities. Thus this is a negative policy which fosters self-centeredness rather than the child's sense of social interest in a broad and positive sense.

We have learned from the distorted concepts employed by some of the pioneers in progressive education in this country and some disastrous consequences that, rather than freedom and unqualified approval, parents and teachers must impose *limits* on the child if they wish to insure his healthy growth and development. For extreme permissiveness is frequently experienced by the child as indifference to his welfare—as evidence that one does not care. We now realize that the child who deliberately does something he knows is wrong to "test" the adults around him, will be bewildered and confused by their tolerance of his misdeeds. Contrary to Mr. Neill's faith in the child's ultimate capacity for "self-regulation," children cannot acquire the ability to differentiate between right and wrong without help from the adults in their environment. Minimal participation in the life around them, the sense of belonging, requires that they develop values which govern adult behavior in our society.

Mr. Neill's aim was to create a school "to fit the child." It seems to me that he has created an environment ideally suited to the philosophy and ideals of its headmaster. And despite his undeniable love for children, life at Summerhill must be extremely unpleasant for the child who does not conform to Mr. Neill's concepts. He appears to be suspicious of the child who does not swear, who is obedient, of the child who sits in a corner at times and dreams, in contrast to the extrovert who "has no occasion for hate, laughs and dances and talks." In other words, at times Mr. Neill appears to be quite capable of the same intolerance and lack of understanding he is so eager to attribute to parents and teachers.

Obviously, many of Mr. Neill's theses are commendable. Children need love and support, but even Bettelheim has found out that "love is not enough." The sense of emotional security children develop on the basis of the knowledge of their parents' love, will not be destroyed if they must face the consequences of their misbehavior. Children need to be allowed to learn at their own pace; but certainly

they should be encouraged to learn. They should be given ample opportunity to develop their "creativity;" however, if the creativity is to produce tangible rewards, it must be disciplined. Finally, if children are to grow up to live in any society, they must learn the rules of cooperation and social interest. These are the true criteria of the child's preparation for life—and capacity for self-fulfillment. Clearly, when it is considered in relation to these standards, Summerhill can only be regarded as an interesting, but somewhat outdated laboratory experiment.

Alfred Adler Mental Hygiene Clinic
New York, N. Y.

DANICA DEUTSCH

ALL-PERSONNEL PSYCHOTHERAPY

ROBERT A. CHITTICK, GEORGE W. BROOKS, FRANCIS S. IRONS, and WILLIAM N. DEANE. *The Vermont Story: Rehabilitation of Chronic Schizophrenic Patients*. Washington, D. C.: Office of Vocational Rehabilitation, Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1962. Pp. 105. Paper.

This is the summary report of the six-year program which, in its many single aspects, has already been well covered by almost 20 contributions to the literature (see, e.g., this Journal, 1960, 16, 189-196). The program has been successful and unique. It achieved a release rate of 83% of 298 chronic schizophrenics in one year or more, and evidence derived from occupational data and interviews with the released patients confirms the judgment of recovery.

Two basic assumptions are that any person on the staff can establish therapeutic relations with patients, and that all personnel who work with patients can and should communicate with each other. The approach involves an over-all application of social and educational measures to both staff and patients; activities are designed to encourage or require group cooperation; there are few times, if any, during the day when the patient does not have opportunity to enter into a therapeutic relationship with a significant other person; and "there must be a continuing and relatively permanent commitment on the part of patients and staff, even after release." The authors have found the key elements in the success of this approach to be trust, optimism, and compassion, and they say: "It has struck us quite forcibly that these essentials in the atmosphere are none other than our old friends Faith, Hope, and Charity."

But while they see the homely scriptural virtues as most effective elements in therapy, and emphasize direct methods and the significance of non-professional staff, the authors in no way lack sophistication. For one thing, extensive use of drug treatment is basic to all other elements in their program, and they are particularly concerned with balancing individual dosages so as to minimize psychomotor impairment in which they have conducted research of their own. They have developed the use of graphs to keep personnel informed of the trends of the rehabilitative effort as a whole, applied sociograms and the Custodial Mental Illness Scale when these were useful, and varied group therapy techniques (concluding that the most successful were mixed groups led by both a male and a female therapist). Their report has a strictly pertinent bibliography of 118 titles.

Most sophisticated is the authors' insight into the methodology appropriate to their problem, even while acknowledging that their "main concern has been to

rehabilitate rather than to prove our methodological competence." They describe their general view as having much in common with existential, field, Gestalt, and Adlerian psychologies. More specifically, their procedure is "largely determined by the 'catch-as-catch-can' of a rapidly changing social situation . . . We have had to rely heavily on *ex post facto* or retrospective analysis . . . We have approached each situation with both a research and therapeutic orientation . . . Because the researcher realizes that he enters the research field and is, indeed, an integral part of how things turn out, a new type of data is made available which is of an order best described as a penetration of the ethos rather than as a description or an analysis of behavior from a position apart. . . . We feel that our type of data can and should be considered scientific because of our continuous attempt to dispassionately appraise and objectify our affective participation. . . . Participant observation . . . becomes a method by which the bridge between speculation and observed fact is made and . . . an observed fact may be speculated upon and further developed" (pp. 43-45).

Burlington, Vermont

ROWENA R. ANSBACHER

PSYCHOTHERAPY FROM KARL MARX UNIVERSITY

D. MUELLER-HEGEMANN. *Psychotherapie: Ein Leitfaden fuer Aerzte und Studierende*. 3rd ed. Berlin: VEB Verlag Volk und Gesundheit, 1961. Pp. 298.

The author of this textbook on psychotherapy, the first edition of which was published in 1957, is director of the neuropsychiatric clinic at the Karl Marx University in Leipzig. But Marx and Engels are mentioned only once, in a quite incidental quotation.

The author acknowledges Arthur Kronfeld as his first teacher in psychotherapy. (We recall that Kronfeld was at one time very close to Adler, contributed to Adler's journal, and wrote the opening chapter, "Individual Psychology as a Science," for the handbook of Individual Psychology edited by E. Wexberg.) The author mentions as his main teacher Schultz-Henke, and also that he found the views of Karen Horney helpful.

Psychotherapy is considered to be concerned with disturbances of interpersonal relations. The goal of psychotherapy is to enable the patient to solve his life tasks better, to increase his feeling of responsibility towards others, and to strive for a world view which is strongly humanitarian in content. Thus psychotherapy is by no means value free; self-knowledge is only a means to an end. There is the interesting statement, considering the home of the book, that it is not the therapist's business which political party the patient joins or which world philosophy he adopts as long as it is one of responsibility toward the human society.

The purpose of the therapeutic interview is seen in tracing the consistency of the patient's symptoms with his strivings and feelings, his conscious actions and unconscious processes, and his relations to the environment. Although the author is quite directive throughout, he holds that the patient must make his own life decisions, the achievement of freedom and independence being one of the goals of psychotherapy.

Among special techniques Mueller-Hegemann stresses autogenous training, a form of relaxation therapy and self-hypnosis developed by I. H. Schultz which

has found many followers in Germany during the last 30 years. Other forms of suggestion and hypnosis, group, milieu, and sleep therapy are also used by the author. These latter, it should be pointed out, play also a large part in Soviet psychotherapy.

Theoretically, the book attempts to integrate these various methods with the work of Pavlov into a "rational psychotherapy." The concept through which this is possible is the "second signal system," which Pavlov developed in his later years and which has become the theoretical keystone of Soviet educational psychology and psychotherapy. The second signal system, which is specific to man, is characterized by language and abstract thought processes. It dominates over the first signal system which corresponds to the animalistic conditioned-reflex processes, and over to the subcortical unconditioned-reflex processes.

"Depth" psychology is rejected for various well-known reasons, including that it deals with mechanisms rather than the whole human being.

The author's criteria for theory and method are: how well does the theory accord with physiological knowledge, and how effective is the method with the ordinary clinic patient with whom the author is concerned. The book ends modestly with a note of caution against underestimating the difficulty of psychotherapy and the reminder that it will be better to see if the patient can't solve his difficulties without psychotherapy.

In all, this book from behind the wall is encouraging reading, for its sincere endeavor to be factual, scientific, and free from polemics, and for its essentially sound theory and practice.

University of Vermont

HEINZ L. ANSBACHER

BOOKS RECEIVED AND BOOKS NOTED

BALET, L. *Rembrandt and Spinoza*. New York: Phil. Libr., 1962. Pp. x + 222. \$4.50.—The plan of this book is to disclose the relationship between the two "greatest representatives of seventeenth century Holland." Where Spinoza saw the highest good as "the consciousness of the unity of our mind with the whole of all that exists," Rembrandt "was even more of a totalist." He saw and depicted man as a psycho-physical unity, and time as a totality in the same way. The author gives much historical background and a detailed description of Holland at the time. The interesting presentation would, however, have been enhanced by editing.

BAUGHMAN, E. E., & WELSH, G. S. *Personality: a behavioral science*. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962. Pp. 566. \$7.25.—This work has been designed and carried out with careful regard for the student who is sure to get from it a "good general idea" of the current scene in personality research. But whether he will get a good idea of personality, or science, is a question of one's viewpoint. The authors, opposed to "indoctrinating," purpose to teach the student to distinguish between observations and constructs developed to explain them. This they do indeed, but they make no further differentiation between constructs, such as regarding their usefulness and justifiability, and treat traits, the id, fear, etc., all equally. In spite of seeming to identify 'scientific' with 'quantitative,' they employ many not (yet) measurable constructs in basic explanations. E.g., the development of "control" in the child is given as the essence of rearing and maturing, and individuals are compared on the basis of being "under-controllers" or "over-controllers."