

BOOK REVIEWS

A COMPREHENSION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES

BENJAMIN B. WOLMAN. *Contemporary Theories and Systems in Psychology*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. Pp. x + 613. \$7.50.

The wealth of general psychological theory is organized in this survey into three parts: conditioning, behaviorism, purposivism; psychoanalysis and related systems; and understanding, Gestalt, and field psychologies. The author believes that this corresponds to emphasis on natural science, psychoanalysis, and cultural science. But making some allowances, one could also take it to correspond to the units in Woodworth's S-O-R formula in reversed order: Response; the Organism in the sense of its central core, and the Sensory-perceptual processes. The order would also correspond in many ways to Krech and Crutchfield's division of psychology into the areas of learning, motivation, and perception. We consider Wolman's organization of theories according to a scheme which thus has general significance a great gain, in that it brings a larger order into what would otherwise appear to be an overwhelming multiplicity.

The scope of the book may be indicated by the wealth of footnotes in addition to a 44-page bibliography. And yet a number of names and trends one might expect here are missing. On the other hand, present-day Russian psychology is covered (for the first time in a textbook), in cogent relation to Marxian philosophy.

The author is also to be commended for admitting preferences that influenced his work. "An absolute impartiality could be accomplished only at the price of lack of analytic understanding." His own position, given in Part 4, is an eclecticism which proposes "a monistic *transitionism* . . . as an answer to the problems of reductionism. A general theory of *lust for life* based on studies conducted by Pavlov, Freud, and Goldstein is suggested instead of Freud's life and death instincts" (p. 553). The argumentation against the death instinct is especially convincing and original. Lust-for-life goes beyond pleasure and includes the "Antigone principle," the willingness to suffer for one's religious or political ideals or to make others happy. As to personality theory, "Murphy's biosocial theory of personality is suggested as a solution" (p. 553). In spite of thus being quite critical of Freud, the author concludes the part on psychoanalysis and related systems by expressing his belief "that none of the followers or opponents of Freud was capable of suggesting a system of hypotheses methodologically superior to Freud's or better equipped with empirical evidence" (p. 387).

On this, one may of course differ. But it being the author's conviction, what does he have to say about Adler? We find that he presents Adler eloquently in 16 pages in which he deals even with subtleties in a surprisingly adequate way. Wolman's appraisal is:

"Adler's analysis of human nature contains many brilliant observations and suggestions . . . The entire neo-psychoanalytic school . . . is no less neo-Adlerian than it is neo-Freudian. Adler's concepts of sociability, self-assertion, security, self, and creativeness permeated the theories of the neo-analysts." Specifically, in relation to the unconscious, Wolman notes: "Sullivan's concept of 'selective

inattention' sounds pretty much like Adler's reasoning. . . . Sullivan did not add much to it." With regard to Adler's self-ideal, Wolman comments: "No wonder Karen Horney is indebted to Adler in her concept of self-image." Unusually perceptive is the characterization of Lewin's indebtedness to Adler: "Both of them operated with the concepts of space, movement and goal." With all these considerations, Wolman concludes: "It has to be said that Adler's influence is much greater than is usually admitted" (p. 298).

As an over-all evaluation of this work, instead of trying to write our own, we shall render that of Gordon W. Allport with whom we fully agree. In response to a very unfair review, Allport comments:

Where else can the student find as comprehensive and as well organized a survey of both European and American trends in theory, including the schools of thought derived from the morphogenic—holistic, if you prefer—traditions on the Continent? One may disagree with Wolman's emphasis and deplore detailed errors. Yet one may rejoice that a book has appeared to counteract the anhistorical, fragmented, itsy-bitsy empiricism which threatens the perspective of our graduate instruction today (*Contemp. Psychol.*, 1961, 6, 191).

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MARX, HUMANISM, AND SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY

ERICH FROMM. *Marx's Concept of Man*. With a translation from Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts by T. B. Bottomore. New York: Frederick Ungar, 1961. Pp. xii + 260. \$1.75 paper.

Fromm sets out to show that the popular picture of Marx in the West, particularly in the United States, as a mechanistic materialist wishing for uniformity and subordination is utterly false. His aim was rather that of "restituting man in his human wholeness, of enabling him to find unity and harmony with his fellow man and with nature" (p. 3). "His philosophy is neither idealism nor materialism but a synthesis: humanism and naturalism" (p. 11). As to his concept of man, Marx never maintained that man's main desires are for maximal material gain (p. 12).

These claims are supported by copious quotations from Marx's writings, especially from those that follow Fromm's essay which represents the first 83 pages of the book. The next 93 pages contain Marx's main philosophical work, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts," which he wrote largely in 1844 but was not published until 1932. Its first translation into English, made in Russia, has been available in England since 1959. The present translation by Bottomore is the first to be published in the United States. The remainder of the book is given to other writings by and about Marx, including excerpts from "The German Ideology" which incidentally is the work of Marx and Friedrich Engels, not that of Marx alone as stated erroneously in the present book.

How well do Marx's writings support the claim of Fromm? To examine this question we shall use as criteria five assumptions about human nature presented by Rudolf Dreikurs (1, p. 7). He selected these as characteristic of a humanistic psychology such as that of Alfred Adler. Below we shall list these assumptions, matching them with statements from Marx (with references to the present volume).

1. *The social embeddedness of man*.—"The essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each separate individual. In its reality it is the ensemble (aggregate) of social relations" (p. 78). "Consciousness is from the very beginning a social product . . . Language, like consciousness only arises from the need . . . of intercourse with other men" (p. 203). "Even in a physical sense man owes his existence to man" (p. 138). "The relation of man to himself is first realized, objectified, through his relation to other men" (p. 104). "Every self-alienation of man, from himself and from nature, appears in the relation which he postulates between other men and himself and nature" (p. 105).

2. *Self-determination and creativity*.—"Free, conscious activity is the species-character of human beings" (p. 101). Men are "the authors and actors of their history" (p. 13). "The materialistic doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and education forgets that circumstances are changed by men . . ." (p. 22). "The whole of . . . world history is nothing but the creation of man by human labor, and the emergence of nature for man; he therefore has the evident and irrefutable proof of his self-creation, of his own origins" (pp. 26 & 139).

3. *Subjectivity of perception* (opposing the assumption of absolutes).—"What distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labor process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the laborer at its commencement" (p. 41). "The chief defect of all materialism up to now . . . is that the object, reality, what we apprehend through our senses, is understood only in the form of the object or contemplation; but not as sensuous human activity, as practice; not subjectively" (p. 11).

4. *Teleological nature of behavior* (opposing the causalistic assumption).—"The laborer "not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realizes a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi" (p. 41). According to Fromm, "For Marx man is characterized by the 'principle of movement.' . . . This must not be understood mechanically but as a drive, creative vitality, energy; human passion for Marx 'is the essential power of man striving energetically for its object' " (p. 30).

5. *The holistic assumption* (opposing reductionism).—"Our "premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation or abstract definition, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions. As soon as this active life-process is described, history ceases to be a collection of dead facts as it is with the empiricists (themselves still abstract), or an imagined activity of imagined subjects, as with the idealists" (pp. 198-199). "We see here how consistently naturalism or humanism is distinguished from both idealism and materialism, and at the same time constitutes their unifying truth" (p. 181). This is very much like the position of holism. For Smuts holism is an ontology opposed to materialism and spiritualism or idealism "to express the view that the ultimate reality . . . is neither matter nor spirit but wholes" (3, p. 117).

While Fromm's claim thus appears to be well supported, we must keep in mind that the above statements are taken from a context in which the emphasis is not on human nature but on economic and historical theory, and action plan-

ning. But no matter what the context, Fromm has shown us Marx's concept of man. Before Fromm, Lewis Feuer in his editorial preface to the writings of Marx and Engels has recently pointed out "the universal humanist bearing of Marx's ideas" (2, p. xx). Fromm has now made this view so clear that it can no longer be dismissed. Beyond this contribution to psychological knowledge he has performed the great service of giving us a far better understanding of the situation in Russia today and all the regions into which the influence of Marx extends.

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Soviet Psychology; A Symposium. Foreword by Ralph B. Winn. New York: Philosophical Library, 1961. Pp. 109. \$3.75.

This small volume of papers by five prominent present-day Soviet psychologists serves the useful purpose of showing the extent to which educational and child psychology in the USSR has developed in a direction very similar to those trends in Western psychology which recognize man as active, creative, and responsible, and therefore also take a more optimistic view of man, in accordance with humanistic tradition.

To many this may still come as a surprise because they consider Marxism to imply a mechanistic, deterministic view of man, and they wonder how such inconsistency between official doctrine and psychology can be possible. But the new book by Erich Fromm, *Marx's concept of man*, reviewed above, has shown quite definitely that Marx understood man as active and creative, in a concrete situation.

The pronouncements in the present volume are fully consistent with the propositions of Marx pointed out by Fromm. To give a few examples, A. A. Smirnov, president of the USSR Society of Psychologists asserts: "Mechanistic materialism had no understanding of the active role of consciousness of progressive ideas in changing reality. This materialism finally mechanized man's entire life and turned him into an automaton. . . . Contemporary mechanistic theories are also quite incapable of a correct understanding of man's mental life. This is especially true of American behaviorism" (p. 15). Differing from mechanistic materialism as well as idealism, Smirnov's position is that of dialectical materialism which recognizes that "mental life is a special property of highly organized matter," and which "alone has the correct idea of the effective role of consciousness and of the importance of progressive ideas in the life of society" (p. 16).

With the emphasis on conscious activity, Soviet psychology becomes a cognitive psychology, and as such is optimistic regarding the relation of the individual to society. Smirnov speaks of the potential "harmony of personal and social interests" (p. 19). "It is absolutely false to claim, as the personality theory of depth psychology does, that the influence of social and historical conditions operates through an upper part of human personality, which is opposed by a lower part, consisting of natural drives. Actually, the social influences embrace the

entire personality" (p. 17). Those theories are wrong "which assure us that social influence can manifest itself only as the suppression of the personal strivings of man. Among such theories is . . . the theory of Freud" (p. 19).

A. N. Leontiev, vice-president of the Society, says regarding child development: "The child is anything but a passive observer . . . He wants to put into action through his own activities everything he has seen and learned" (pp. 60-61). This activity must be directed into socially useful channels. Thus, "The child must understand as soon as possible, that the money his parents bring home is not merely a useful thing to spend, but the reward for a great and socially useful work" (p. 67). Homework has the secondary function of a training in responsibility. "If the homework is taken from the child, he becomes irresponsible and gets used to relying on others instead of on himself. . . . His independence and sense of responsibility must be fostered by all possible means" (pp. 74-75).

One of the strongest statements comes from G. S. Kostiuk, director of the psychological institute, Kiev: "The art of educational guidance consists in arousing the child's spontaneity. . . . The driving forces of psychological development are to be sought neither in heredity or environment, nor in any combination of these 'two factors.' . . . They are rather contained in the life of the child himself" (p. 92). Psychological development is explained as "the overcoming of contradictions" (p. 93), with contradiction defined as "the tension arising between the level of psychological development already reached and the new problems set by life." "The growing personality . . . sets about solving these problems" (p. 92). The child's "entire being is directed towards the future" (p. 93).

While the authors believe that all this is in opposition to "bourgeois" psychology, we can assure them that growing circles on our side see fully eye to eye with them. If similar understanding existed in political issues, there would be nothing to worry about. Meanwhile we take heart in the psychological agreement.

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RESEARCH IN THE ASSUMPTIVE WORLD

FRANKLIN P. KILPATRICK (Ed.) *Explorations in Transactional Psychology*. New York: New York University Press, 1961. Pp. xiv + 405. \$7.50.

The problems presented by the Ames perceptual demonstrations are attacked from the point of view of transactional psychology as developed and interpreted by Adelbert Ames, Jr., Hadley Cantril, William H. Ittelson, and the editor, who, as individuals or as collaborators, have participated in 19 of the 22 papers of this volume.

Anyone interested in any aspect of the phenomenological approach to psychology will find reading this book a rewarding experience, all the more so because of the extreme sectarian attitude of the authors who seem to have developed their conceptual system unaffected by other phenomenological systems past or present. Phenomenology is not in this country an honored, going concern with a historical past. American phenomenologies therefore emerge rather suddenly, as workers in applied fields run into problems they cannot solve by the traditional objective approach, are forced to develop conceptual models better suited to their needs, and then go on to apply them in wider fields. The transactionalists fit this pattern.

Ames was a universal man, an artist, and a physiologist; Cantril is a social psychologist, and Ittelson and Kilpatrick were his students. Where comparable American systems have gotten their primary cues from Koehler, Lewin, Tolman, Adler, or Rank, the transactionalists have taken their cues from G. H. Mead and Dewey, and independently derived their conceptual scheme. At first glance it is the correspondences with other phenomenological systems which are impressive. The papers say:

1. The individual is an active organism trying to organize his world.
2. The immediate product of his strivings is a private "assumptive world" which his actions test and fulfill.
3. Some statements of the authors seem to imply a law of least change. "He endeavors to create in the 'now' a world which as closely as possible resembles his world of the 'past' and which, therefore, gives him a feeling of surety he can act effectively in the 'future'" (Ittelson, p. 349).
4. The assumptive world is a phenomenal field. "This is the only world which he can know" (*ibid.*). "Reality and percept do not correspond" (Kilpatrick, p. 46).
5. The assumptive world determines behavior, e.g., Ittelson and Ames demonstrated that the degree of eye convergence changes if the individual thinks the object being viewed has moved closer, even though it is actually stationary (p. 113).

The exact role of the assumptive world in determining behavior is not precisely defined. Does an object have to be perceived before it will affect behavior? To what extent may the organization of the assumptive world block off potential perceptions? It is probably inevitable that any phenomenological psychology will move in the direction of free will, but so far transactional psychology has not moved as far in this direction as others. The assumptive world, we are told over and over, is the result of past experiences, and the possible effect of innate characteristics of the organism is ignored completely.

The bibliography lists 74 primary references and a number of others on the implications of transactional psychology for art, architecture, education, philosophy, and scientific method. Except for the Rogerians, no phenomenological group in America has been so productive of research. And this book should lead to much further research. Kilpatrick discusses problems the authors would like to have investigated. The most casual reader will think of others.

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EMOTIONS, GUARDIANS OF THE SELF-IDEAL

MAGDA B. ARNOLD. *Emotion and Personality*. Vol. 1. *Psychological Aspects*. Vol. 2. *Neurological and Physiological Aspects*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. Pp. xiv + 296; xviii + 430. \$7.50 each volume.

In a scholarly, reasoned approach to the problem of emotion and its relation to personality, Dr. Arnold makes a valuable contribution. After reviewing previous theoretical explanations of emotion, she sets out to show that a pheno-

menological analysis of emotional experience can guide us to discover and identify the brain paths that mediate emotion. Her reasoning is appealing and lucid. Her evidence is impressive.

The phenomenological approach allows Dr. Arnold to draw important conclusions about the function of emotions from neurological evidence that a reductionistic approach could not permit. In the course of her reasoning Dr. Arnold demolishes a number of ideas about emotion still held by some of the more mechanistic psychologists, including notably the tension-reduction and the frustration-aggression theories.

The essence of Dr. Arnold's work is that emotion always impels toward action, and that the choice of the action determines the choice of the emotion, rather than vice-versa. Such a process requires a "direct, immediate, intuitive appraisal" of the presenting situation. Thus the schematic sequence of processes is: perception—appraisal (emotion)—action, emotion being the catalyst which facilitates the action and then reinforces it. Is this not the Individual Psychologist's explanation of the function of emotion?

Direct, immediate appraisal requires an "estimative system" which Dr. Arnold locates in the limbic lobe. On what basis does the individual estimate? What is his measuring stick? Dr. Arnold answers these questions with a very skillful discussion of motivation theory, and concludes that a "self-ideal" is both an organizer of personality and a center around which the motivational system is established and organized. Emotions become the "guardians of the self-ideal." This also sounds familiar to the Individual Psychologist who also assumes that man chooses the direction of his striving, and this choice (the "guiding self-ideal," as Adler called it) is a motivator of the ensuing system of emotional attitudes (a part of the life style). Thus all emotions are "in the service" of the self-ideal.

For both Dr. Arnold and Adler the person is an agent, an initiator of activity, a chooser of directions, a judge, a guesser, and a self-estimator. Although Adler anticipated her in many ways, Dr. Arnold goes further than Adler's own writings in her keen inductive reasoning. We are indebted to her in that she has placed some of Adler's ideas on emotions on a high scholastic level, and fortified them with a physiological model.

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PERSONALITY, A NATURALISTIC APPROACH

ROBERT WARD LEEPER and PETER MADISON. *Toward Understanding Human Personalities*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959. Pp. xvi + 439. \$5.50.

This is a textbook grown from the senior author's conviction that a course in Personality should be a means of getting an understanding of human life. He finds Freudian psychoanalysis and S-R theory unsatisfactory as conceptual backgrounds. The approaches he considers promising are those of Adler, Rank, Frederick Allen, the neo-Freudians, Rogers, and George Kelly, among the psychotherapists; and of Tolman, Lashley, N.R.F. Maier, Bartlett, Werner, Woodworth, Konrad Lorenz, and of the Gestalt people, among the experimentalists. From these he develops his own *organizational theory* of personality.

The general approach is naturalistic and phenomenological. In accordance with this, the book is replete with illuminating concrete examples by the authors, or citations from widely varying sources. Furthermore, it starts from the premise that in everyday life people are sometimes remarkably successful in dealing with problems of personality. Thus the book becomes an attempt to present those concepts attained by scientific work which may be helpfully absorbed in our everyday way of looking at personality. Central among these is the ambiguity of the objective situation — “the person lives only in terms of his perceptual response to such *vieldeutig* situations, rather than in terms of objective realities as such.”

Unorthodox in its conception, the book is problem-oriented rather than method-centered. It omits many of the conventional topics and nearly all technical jargon. But it is written clearly, with great thoughtfulness and subtlety and should certainly attain its purpose, to give the student a better understanding of human personalities.

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THE SELF, THE THIRD DETERMINANT

JAMES C. COLEMAN. *Personality Dynamics and Effective Behavior*. Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 1960. Pp. 566. \$5.50.

The author starts from the premise that “man has an inborn capacity for responsible self-direction.” This is indeed “a new concept of the human organism”—for an undergraduate textbook. There the traditional view has been that man is determined by heredity and environment. Coleman breaks with tradition by introducing the self as a third determinant. He takes the “active,” in contrast to the “reactive” viewpoint of human nature.

The developing self-structure of each person gives him a fairly consistent life style; a continuing pattern of assumptions and attitudes makes his behavior somewhat predictable. Rarely is behavior a simple reaction to external stimulation. Usually it incorporates some degree of screening, evaluation, and selection from among alternatives (p. 138).

The *Diary of Anne Frank* is cited as an example of how, under extreme conditions, each individual still behaves in accordance with his life style.

Meant for courses in “adjustment” or mental hygiene, this book, by the author of the well known *Abnormal Psychology and Modern Life*, has been strongly influenced by G. W. Allport, Cantril, Snygg and Combs, Rogers, Maslow, Mowrer—and Adler. It is well produced in double-column format, has very clear tables and illustrations, is amazingly up-to-date in its content and references, and presents such useful information as the addresses of organizations for psychotherapeutic help and mental health. A special feature is a section in recent theory of over 100 pages of readings prepared by Alvin Marks. The sixteen selections include systems theory, cybernetics, self theory, game theory, and existentialism. We welcome the book for the good influence it is bound to exert on what will be undoubtedly a very wide student readership.

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THE MORAL PROBLEM IN MENTAL DISORDER

THOMAS S. SZASZ. *The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct*. New York: Paul B. Hoeber, Medical Division of Harper & Brothers, 1961. Pp. xiii + 337. \$7.50.

The author of a recent provocative article (by the same title as the present book and noted in this Journal, 1960, 16, 228) and professor of psychiatry, Upstate Medical Center, Syracuse, N. Y., has now presented his views in detail.

Using hysteria as a typical example of mental illness, the author contends that persons so afflicted are not actually the passive victims of an illness such as tuberculosis or typhoid fever. Rather, "they have problems in living" (p. 255) for which they seek help. These problems refer to "mastery or control of interpersonal processes" (p. 259).

Such mastery can be achieved in three ways: through coercion, self-help, or cooperation, of which the last is the most complex (p. 259). The hysteric is characterized by valuing coercive strategies without, however, being aware "that he has made a choice between coercion and other human values" (p. 260). His particular method of domination employs suffering rather than "selfish" will, although with the passage of time he may give up this disguise and adopt more direct methods of domination or coercion.

The person who values coercion and heteronomy actually adheres to immature rules of the game of life. The mature rules are based on the values of cooperation, reciprocity, and autonomy (p. 228). To follow the mature, cooperative rules, a feeling of relative equality among the players is a prerequisite. But the hysterics "feel—and often are—inferior and oppressed. In turn they aspire to feel superior to others and to oppress them" (p. 262).

As to the practice of psychotherapy, Szasz finds "that the notion of a person 'having mental illness' is scientifically crippling. It provides professional assent to a popular rationalization, namely, that problems of human living experienced and expressed in . . . 'psychiatric symptoms' are significantly similar to diseases of the body. It also undermines the principle of personal responsibility, upon which a democratic political system is necessarily based, by assigning to an external source the blame for antisocial behavior" (pp. 296-297). But psychiatrists are in reality not concerned with an illness. "In actual practice they deal with personal, social, and ethical problems of living" (p. 296). Consequently, "psychotherapy should be systematized as a theory of human relationships, involving special social arrangements and fostering certain values and types of learning" (p. 297).

While the book is very Adlerian throughout, it is in his discussion of the place of ethics in psychotherapy that Szasz pays his great tribute to Adler:

In contrast to Freud, who never discussed the notions of democracy, equality, reciprocity, and cooperation in his writings, but insisted that the psychoanalytic relationship between analyst and analysand must be that of "a superior and a subordinate," Adler freely expressed his concept of the morally desirable or "mentally healthy" human relationship. It was characterized by a high degree of *social interest* and *cooperativeness*. . . . Freud thus disguised and obscured, whereas Adler openly acknowledged and discussed, the moral values inherent in their respective psychological observations and theories. It seems probable that this is one of the significant reasons for the different receptions that Freudian and

Adlerian psychologies received. Freud's work bore the stamp of the impartial, cool-headed natural scientist. . . . Adler, in contrast, did not hide his values Adler's work has been generally considered less serious and significant scientifically than Freud's. This despite the fact that his views were much more sociopsychologically oriented than Freud's and have, in fact, anticipated a great deal of later psychoanalytic ego-psychology. The point that I wish to make is that I believe Adler was ahead of his time in openly acknowledging the role of values—and moral problems, generally—in human psychology and psychotherapy (p. 266).

It has recently been observed that the young psychiatric intern today, usually must first unlearn the rigidity of the Freudian system and its vocabulary which he has acquired in medical school, before he is of use in dealing therapeutically with the patient on the ward, that is, before he sees the patient as a fellow man with his life problems. The present work by Szasz offers a theory which would certainly start the student off in a direction that is in accord with the best present-day knowledge and practice, as we see it. No unlearning would be required. In this sense we strongly hope that this book, which will be a challenge to many, will find an important place in the medical-psychiatric curriculum.

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O. HOBART MOWRER. *The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion*. Princeton, N. Y.: D. Van Nostrand, 1961. Pp. vii + 264. \$1.95 paper.

This collection of 13 articles (all but 4 of which have been previously published) presents Mowrer's rejection of psychoanalysis, his own particular alternative view, and his critique of the role religion is presently playing in mental health. Professor Mowrer shows himself to be learned, courageous, open-minded, forthright, simple, and a good writer. For these qualities we admire him, and they bring significance and freshness to his work. We are wholly on his side, yet the very involvement which we have with his book makes us the more sensitive to certain imperfections.

We can feel with Mowrer when he sighs: "For more than a decade now, I have been pointing to the logical and empirical incongruities in psychoanalytic theory, on which so much psychiatry and psychology is directly or indirectly founded . . ." (p. 76). But our great disappointment is that this volume bears neither "logical" nor "empirical" witness against psychoanalysis. Mowrer declines a systematic treatment with the statement: "This body of theory and practice needs no criticism here; the logic of events seems to be making purely verbal objections gratuitous" (p. 7). In spite of this, Mowrer proceeds to fill many pages with just such "verbal objections." Whereas many of these are extremely penetrating, his own blanket judgments and those quoted from others are but hearsay evidence. Similarly, Mowrer does not support his own position either logically or empirically. Perhaps he did not set out to do so, since he describes this book as merely a rough delineation of his case. In any event, we regret the limitation.

It will, however, directly become clear that even without finer delineation and incontrovertible support, Mowrer's view has an immediate cogency. Essentially he believes that emotional instability occurs in individuals who have actually *been* guilty (not only *felt* guilty) of certain forms of sinful conduct. Sin is appar-

ently anything which the individual regards as mean, vicious, or shameful, or—put another way—anything which society in its long-range common wisdom condemns. If such conduct secretly bothers the individual, i.e., if his conscience bothers him *and* he takes no further steps, he will suffer from neurosis or psychosis. The way to health is (a) to acknowledge or accept the fact of his sins by confession, which means making them public to a degree, and (b) to atone and make restitution by correcting his sins and re-forming his conduct along lines of ethical values.

Even so brief a summary reveals the great number of significant particulars at which this theory touches others. For one thing, it is a behavioral explanation rather than one in terms of "illness" (pp. 47-55). The origin of the individual's trouble is misbehavior, and his recovery depends in the end on a "program of action rather than groping for 'insight'" (p. 46). "Disturbed persons have not *talked* themselves into their difficulties . . . and likewise cannot *talk* . . . [themselves] out of them" (p. 232). This leads to a shift in emphasis from intra- to interpersonal difficulties. There is, however, the need to be honest with oneself. "Just so long as a person lives under the shadow of real, acknowledged and unexpiated guilt, he *cannot* accept himself; and all *our* efforts to reassure and accept him will avail nothing" (p. 54). The inter-relationships of sin and secrecy, and of open admission and public commitment (as in Alcoholics Anonymous) with the general problem of strengthening social ties are highly suggestive. Obviously the theory is on common ground with that side of religion which also deals with "personality in its social and ethical dimensions." We have not here mentioned any of Mowrer's more specifically religious terms and postulates because they seem incidental—even dispensable—to the main assumptions. We also believe that further development of his theory will broaden the class of situations to which he refers as sin, and that this term will outgrow its initial usefulness.

To many readers it will have become obvious in the above to what extent Mowrer's position reaffirms Adler's. Among other common foci there are the social basis for mental health and psychopathology, the distinction between neurotic and real guilt, the dividing line between religion and psychology as well as the common ground, and that quality which Mowrer calls the hypocrisy of the maladjusted, and Adler calls their life-lie. Although Mowrer cites several Adlerians, he does not refer to Adler's work. It is another of Mowrer's distinctions, however, that he cultivates a historic perspective and a respect for the knowledge—even common sense—of previous generations. It is likely that this book will do much to dispel the pluralistic ignorance of psychologists precisely on these points which Mowrer and Adler have in common.

Having broken ground for a framework equally acceptable to psychiatrists, psychologists, and ministers, we earnestly hope that Mowrer will capitalize on the influential position he deservedly holds in these three groups to spearhead a concerted attack on the problems of theoretical refinement and practical application, which are still pressing.

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RATIONAL VERSUS FREUDIAN MARRIAGE COUNSELING

LUCY FREEMAN and HAROLD GREENWALD. *Emotional Maturity in Love and Marriage*. New York: Harper, 1961. Pp. xii + 255. \$4.95.

ALBERT ELLIS and ROBERT A. HARPER. *Creative Marriage*. New York: Lyle Stuart, 1961. Pp. 288. \$4.95.

The first book undoubtedly contains much good advice. Its jacket states more bluntly—and unconsciously—than we would: “The . . . approach is Freudian, but the book strikes a hopeful note throughout.” The Freudian orientation shows in the authors’ emphasis upon controlling our savage impulses and accepting the frustrations of civilization, and in repeatedly explaining love-life misbehaviors through the mistakes of the parents. This simple causality is offered in spite of pointing out that the same parental attitude or example may result in various outcomes in the adult offspring, and, conversely, that the same type of person may be “the product” of varied childhood situations.

Just as the Bard knew, “There’s nothing good or bad, but thinking makes it so;” and Adler based his subjective view on Seneca’s dictum, “*Omnia ex opinione suspensa sunt*,” so Ellis and Harper tell us that nothing need upset you—but the nonsense you tell yourself about it. In their “rational psychotherapy” you look at the disturbing situation objectively, separate it from what you have been telling yourself about it, and instead tell yourself something more reasonable and helpful. You may be able to do this by yourself, or the change of values and thinking may require the rigorous directive of a therapist. The latter seems called for when, as in most cases reported as treated by the authors, the therapeutic change involves first of all building up the patient’s self-respect so that he may be freed from the domination of the negative opinions of others. In any event, though, marital difficulties *can* be approached in a problem-solving manner, and the authors give a clear, specific account of how rational understanding and hard work can create better relationships and states of mind. Thus every reader’s vision will be enriched by the distinctive perspective of rational psychotherapy, and every one should be able to learn something extremely valuable for his own problem-solving.

Both of these books are well-written popular accounts based on the experience of clinical psychology, liberally illustrated with cases. (With the exception of Lucy Freeman, the authors are practicing clinicians with Ph.D.’s in psychology.) The cases of Freeman and Greenwald tend to be briefer, and more simply descriptive, whereas those of Ellis and Harper are more developed, and in every case include the therapeutic process and its outcome. As one would expect, this difference and others reflect the different orientations of the authors. Although Freeman and Greenwald are not unaware of *processes* in therapy and maturing (they say, for instance, “the purpose of love is to be able to love”), they nowhere deal with the nature of any process. At best one is told that “during the course of treatment which lasted a few years” certain things “became clear” to the patient and “eventually he found the courage” to start off on a different tack. *Somehow* the mature person recognizes his feelings for what they are—oedipal, sexual, fearful, etc.—and accepts them; mature marriage partners are able to verbalize their feelings quietly and honestly and thus come to an understanding. Beyond

anecdotal description the authors' emphasis is, as mentioned above, on how the symptoms came about originally.

Ellis and Harper, on the other hand, finding that patients may often come to understand quite fully the origins of their present disturbances and still remain disturbed, concentrate on how the patient is *presently* reindoctrinating himself with "nonsense" that someone else had originally led him to believe, on showing him the error of his beliefs, and correcting them.

Some observations appear in both books, such as the basic importance of self-respect. The Freud-oriented authors put this in terms of accepting oneself as one is with one's limitations, "accepting the reality of being human;" the rational psychotherapists, who also admit the imperfections of the individual and society, and the human quality of erring, spell out the basis of self-respect more positively in affirming that just because he is a human, a person is intrinsically valuable. Ellis and Harper, because of their emphasis on the positive, the dynamic, and the present would seem to have written much the more helpful book.

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BOOKS RECEIVED AND BOOKS NOTED

ACADEMY OF RELIGION AND MENTAL HEALTH. *Religion, culture, and mental health*. Introd. by T. Parsons. Proc. 3rd Acad. Sympos. 1959. New York: N. Y. Univer. Press, 1961. Pp. xv + 157. \$3.50.

ANDREWS, M. F. (Ed.) *Creativity and psychological health*. Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1961. Pp. ix + 148. \$2.25 paper.—The contributors are R. H. Ojeman and C. Moustakas, psychologists; P. A. Sorokin, sociologist; C. V. Virtue, philosopher; L. A. Fliegler and R. L. Mooney, educators; V. Lowenfeld and the editor, art educators; O. Tead, publisher; and G. A. Cronk, physician. They all appear to agree that "creativity and mental health involve mutual respect, confidence, and deep contentment. A creative person . . . is capable of living happily and productively with other people without being a nuisance." Sorokin states, "Contrary to the prevalent Freudian, Jungian . . . claims, the unconscious cannot and does not create anything." Instead, the greatest achievements come from a kind of egoless, supraconscious intuition.

AYD, F. J., JR. *Recognizing the depressed patient, with essentials of management and treatment*. New York: Grune & Stratton, 1961. Pp. v + 138. \$3.75.—A very detailed description of the symptomatology of depression "to assist the non-psychiatrist to recognize depressive illnesses, which he sees far more often than the psychiatrist." The most frequent symptoms are feelings of guilt, hopelessness, unworthiness; irritability; sleep disturbances; morning "worst time of the day;" "everything is an effort." Treatment is given only 20 pages, dealing largely with drugs, rest, hospitalization. As to psychotherapy: "It is essential to stimulate hope in every possible way."

BAHM, A. J. *Types of intuition*. Albuquerque, N. M.: Univer. New Mexico Press, 1960. Pp. 58. \$1.25 paper.—A professor of philosophy discusses objective, subjective, and organic intuition which includes characteristics of the first two. Actually, "all intuition is organic."

BICKEL, L. *The unity of body and mind*. Ed. transl. W. Bernard. New York: Phil. Libr., 1959. Pp. 167. \$3.75.—Bickel (1902-1951), an M.D. and philosopher, is a follower of C. Brunner (1862-1937) the German philosophical writer who appointed Bickel as editor of his literary inheritance. Influenced