

## BOOK REVIEWS

### THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 'SOMETHING MORE'

GORDON W. ALLPORT. *Personality and Social Encounter: Selected Essays*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1960. Pp. x + 386. \$7.50.

Recently Edwin G. Boring jestfully coined a new term to fill what we have long considered a deplorable lacuna. Noting that the large cleavage in psychology is between the reductionists and the other people who have no single name to cover them, he called the first the 'Nothing-But' (NB) people and the second the 'Something-More' (SM) people.

The NB people are the positivists, the physicalists, the operationists, and they are opposed by SM people who will not tolerate the restrictive canons of an ironclad reductionism, reduction to sets of rules that shackle the free play of the scientific imagination. Phenomenologists, intuitionists, they might sometimes be called. They are people like William James, Wolfgang Koehler, and Gordon Allport, if you can manage to see in what way these three are alike. The important dimension is from rigidity to freedom. The experimentalist and the philosopher represent the two poles, but there is lots of good SM science that is not philosophy (*Contemp. Psychol.*, 1960, 5, 124).

Accepting and agreeing with Boring's classification, we welcome Allport's latest book as his up-to-date presentation of SM psychology, with which we identify.

What are some of the principles of SM psychology? Being concerned with the whole individual, it is keenly aware of the fact that "because of their habits of excessive abstraction and generalization, many psychologists are actually inferior to other people in their comprehension of the *single* lives that confront them" (p. 12). The method of SM psychology would be quite similar to that of good biography, but would go further in striving to be more exact, more reliable and verifiable, and, from the point of view of human progress, more helpful (p. 15).

Allport considers all mechanical and phylogenetic models of man inadequate, i.e., models derived from animal, child and machine, among which he includes the model of Freud who wanted his doctrine of motivation anchored to neuro-anatomy (p. 59). What is required instead are "concepts that reflect the basic nature of conduct, goal-directed and intentional" (p. 55). The reductionistic psychologists typically quite overlook this forward-thrust. "While people are living their lives forward, psychologists are busy tracing them backward" (p. 61). Accordingly Allport also holds "that conscious values and intentions are far more important than Freudian and other irrationalist theories of motivation would allow" (p. 95). Allport describes his well-known concept of the functional autonomy of motives as marking "a shift of emphasis in the theory of motivation from geneticism . . . to the 'go' of interests that contemporaneously initiate and sustain behavior" (p. 140).

Among Allport's criteria of normality we find: *ego-extension*, the capacity to take an interest in more than one's body and material possessions; a *unifying philosophy of life*, a frame of meaning and of responsibility into which life's major activities fit; the capacity for a warm, profound relating of one's self to others, *Gemeinschaftsgefuehl*; respect for individual persons and a disposition to participate

in common activities that will *improve the human lot* (p. 162). The abnormal person, on the other hand, suffers from an "exclusionist style of life—a sentiment structure narrowly built around a limited conception of self-interest and a small 'safety island' of affiliation" (p. 215). "True neuroses, we know, are best defined as stubborn self-centeredness" (p. 173).

As Boring stated, SM psychology borders on philosophy. What exactly is the relationship? Allport notes that especially in the fields of therapy and guidance psychologists are haunted by problems of value (p. 155) and that to this extent "they are trespassing on the traditional domain of moral philosophy" (p. 156). The difference is that the psychologists "seek their ethical imperatives from biology and psychology, not from value-theory directly . . . . They boldly seek the *ought* . . . from the *is* of human nature" (p. 157).

Religion is generally a concern of the SM psychologist, and he sees it as an extension of future-oriented growth motivation. Allport's particular contribution in this area is that he deals also with the many obvious cases where a religious attitude is found with otherwise undesirable attitudes. In such cases religion plays an instrumental role only, while the master-motive is self-interest. This he calls *extrinsic* religion (p. 264). It is contrasted with *intrinsic* religion which "marks the life that has interiorized . . . the commandment to love one's neighbor. A person of this sort is more intent on serving his religion than on making it serve him" (p. 257).

The book consists of 21 essays previously published in various journals and symposia. Only five have been taken over from Allport's earlier (1950) collection of papers, and over one half have appeared since 1953. An unusually fine portrait of the author goes with the book—unfortunately on its jacket rather than as the frontispiece.

*University of Vermont*

HEINZ L. ANSBACHER

### THE UNCONSCIOUS, EIGHTY TIMES DISCOVERED

LANCELOT LAW WHYTE. *The Unconscious before Freud*. New York: Basic Books, 1960. Pp. xiii + 219. \$4.50.

The fascination of the history of ideas has seemed until now to touch only a small segment of serious students, but the present volume, so timely and so readable, is bound to appeal to a wide range of the psychologically interested. They may then absorb something of the historic perspective and the qualities of scholarship which are its natural concomitants.

Whyte characterizes his work as therapeutic history—since one way to improve current ideas is to recognize where earlier thinkers knew more than we do. One immediate function of this understanding is "warning the young from accepting any doctrine as absolute." All ideas are partial and all are transitory. "The greatest possible achievement of a single human mind . . . is to eliminate a few errors, while remaining blind to others." Human comprehension is distilled extremely slowly, as man's observations and his ordering of them are constantly changing. "The self-correcting character of reason is only reliable tomorrow, never today—in the long run, never *now* . . . Reason can never know the hidden assumptions which restrict its momentary reasoning."

"Self-conscious European man discovering his unconscious," principally from 1600 on, is the specific segment of history Whyte has chosen. Over half of the book is a chronological selection of quotations from some 80 "discoverers," thinkers from all fields, mostly prominent but some less known, including St. Augustine, Shakespeare, Rousseau, Hamann, Goethe, Carus, von Hartmann, Nietzsche. In Whyte's final chapter he gives his own formulation of the problem of the role of the unconscious, and suggests the direction which its solution will take.

Two aspects of this book touch problems which have long concerned Adlerians: the problem of credit for originating ideas, and the critical evaluation of Freudian theory. Regarding the first, we have continuously been dismayed by the presentation of ideas unmistakably formulated by Adler set forth anew by later students of personality without knowledge or acknowledgment of the earlier statements. But there is no reference (let alone balm) to be found in Whyte for personal stakes; he is not interested in history as setting the record straight, giving credit where it is due. On the contrary, he emphasizes for each idea its dependence on what went before, and de-emphasizes the significance of originality. One of the two quotations from Goethe, which Whyte has chosen to preface his book, reads: "No one can take from us the joy of the first becoming aware of something, the so-called discovery. But if we also demand the honor, it can be utterly spoiled for us, for we are usually not the first."

Bridging our two concerns is the illumination which Whyte throws on the primacy of Freudian ideas. Freud's reading in this field had been very narrow, and he had a wholly mistaken evaluation of his own originality. Whereas the conception of the unconscious mind was a European commonplace by 1870-1880, Freud wrote, as late as his 70th year, "The overwhelming majority of philosophers regard as mental only the phenomena of consciousness." It is interesting that Whyte expresses no derogation in this connection. Instead, he explains: "Not only Freud, but most of us are largely unaware of what has made us what we are and led us to think as we do, and it is sometimes as well that we should be ignorant."

Criticism of Freud is given a minor position throughout the book. In part this is accomplished by what almost seems like a clever maneuver of Whyte, in that he chooses to accord the greatest significance to Freud's unintended contributions. "Freud changed, perhaps irrevocably, man's image of himself. Beside this it is of secondary import that some of his valid ideas were not new, his specific conceptions questionable, and his therapeutic methods uncertain." *Sub specie aeternitatis* this may indeed be the true judgment regarding primary and secondary import; nevertheless, it should not distract us from the severity and completeness of Whyte's criticism of the ideas which Freud presented to the world as his own considered formulations.

Whyte's more personal criticisms of Freud are similarly keen, and inevitably paradoxical. "Sexuality, which he enjoyed little in his own experience, though it is the source of beauty in most human lives, took its revenge by obsessing his thinking to the exclusion of the biological order which sexuality serves, and to which it is normally subordinate." With his "puritanical morality and narrow conception of the scientific method" and his belief in rationalism, Freud is shown to be, as it were, the last of the pre-Freudians!

Whyte's own point of view in psychology, which is presented only incidentally, would seem to be holistic and transactional. Thus he gives a particularly nice

integration of historical perspective and personality in the following: "To be a good historian of ideas it would seem necessary for a writer to be a good man as well as a good thinker; he should not only be clear, precise, and logical, but generous, open, and free; himself an adequate channel for the factors that have brought about the development of the human mind, for they must repeat that process in him."

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ROWENA R. ANSBACHER

### SUBJECTIVE BEHAVIORISM

GEORGE A. MILLER, EUGENE GALANTER, AND KARL H. PRIBRAM. *Plans and the Structure of Behavior*. New York: Henry Holt, 1960. Pp. x + 226. \$5.00.

This is an exciting inquiry which broadens one's outlook on all sorts of topics—including cybernetics, instincts, motor learning, neuroses, social sharing, hypnosis, memory, language behavior, problem-solving, and neuropsychology. The book abounds in provocative theoretical points and in suggestions for further research.

The general thesis is that the notion of a plan which guides behavior is "quite similar to the notion of a program that guides an electronic computer" (p. 2). The authors have worked in the cybernetics area, and it is from this field that they draw most of their inspiration. A Plan is defined as "any hierarchical process in the organism that can control the order in which a sequence of operations is to be performed" (p. 16). Other important concepts are "image," "testing," "incongruity," "intention," "metaplan," "retrieval," "strategy," "tactics," "coordination," "execution," "control," "information," "feedback," and "stop-rule."

The basic unit of analysis is the TOTE (Test-Operate-Test-Exit) rather than the reflex arc of classical behaviorism. The organism's plan for hammering a nail, for example, involves a sequence of appraisals and actions—ending as a result of a "stop-rule" when the nail is flush with the surface. An Image is defined as "all the accumulated, organized knowledge that the organism has about itself and its world" (p. 17). This is a "private representation" which includes facts, values, and concepts. The authors describe their position hesitatingly as "subjective behaviorism."

The authors state that their central purpose is "to explore the relation between the Image and the Plan" (p. 18). While this is a worthy objective, it is not—in the reviewer's opinion—really accomplished. In fact, "the organism's picture of itself and its universe" seems to have little bearing on the discussion.

At one point the authors do make the following statement: "Giving up the Plan must affect the person's Image of himself in ways that are difficult for him to accept" (p. 116). But otherwise, the literature on ego-involvement in planning and problem-solving activities is not considered.

Probably the reason why self-regarding factors are not featured is that electronic computers do not, after all, have feelings of success and failure. And, if this is true, then the general thesis of the book must be rejected since people's plans and computers' programs do, in this respect, differ.

The authors speak of cases where computers are unable to handle tasks which are too complicated for them, as in the case of translations (pp. 53-54). Does the machine, at that point, develop "inferiority feelings"? And does its strategy include a lowering of its "level of aspiration" so as to avoid further feelings of fail-

ure? The suggestion, then, is that until computers can simulate planning processes which involve self-enhancement, the cybernetics approach can have only limited usefulness.

But this is not to deny the importance of research on the partial processes that *can* be simulated. The concept of "stop-rules" which the authors use in connection with hypnotic suggestion may, for example, provide a clue to baffling phenomena in the field of hysterical disorders—such as paralysis or anaesthesia.

And, most important, simulation studies are changing the whole orientation of the behavioral sciences by showing that "it is not necessary to suspect metaphysical booby traps in every psychological process more complicated than a conditioned reflex" (p. 192).

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ALFRED E. KUENZLI

### PERCEPTION AS RESTRUCTURING

CHARLES M. SOLLEY AND GARDNER MURPHY. *Development of the Perceptual World*. New York: Basic Books, 1960. Pp. xiv + 353. \$6.50.

Certainly, many of us find it hard to escape the nagging fear that psychology is caught in a huge centrifuge, with big and little pieces of theory and experiment flying off in all directions and getting farther and farther apart. We feel the need for counter-forces, for integration and order. Solley and Murphy not only have perceived this need, but have done something about it in a very major way.

*Development of the Perceptual World* is an experimental-theoretical treatise that brings together into a common framework a wide variety of perceptual theories and experiments, and learning theories and experiments. The authors conceptualize perceiving as an *act* which "restructures the perceived environment just as a motoric instrumental act restructures the physical environment." This concept paves the way for their integration of the fields of perception and learning. The motoric act commonly has been analyzed into temporal components, and Solley and Murphy apply temporal component analysis to the perceptual act, outlining the following temporal sequence: expectation of stimulation—attending—reception—trial-and-check, along with autonomic and proprioceptive arousal and feedback—final structuring, particularly along natural lines such as figure and ground. This temporal sequence provides the framework of their theory and forms the outline of the book.

Part one consists of theoretical arguments on perceptual learning, first in broad perspective, and then specifically, taking up in turn such major "mechanisms" as motivation, reinforcement and effect, autism, practice, reward and punishment, and maturation. Part two takes up in turn each of the sequential "molar components" of the perceptual act, discussing relationships with the mechanisms and how the components are altered through learning. The authors include some of their own research, but draw most heavily on such diverse sources as Pavlov, Guthrie, Hull, Tolman, Skinner, Helmholtz, Titchener, Woodworth, Brunswick, Bruner, Ames, Gibson, James, Piaget, Freud and a host of others. There is, however, not a bland, unproductive "a little bit of the best of everything" eclecticism, but a thoughtful eclecticism that accepts the responsibility of finding patterns of underlying agreement.

It is inevitable in a work of this kind that many readers, particularly those whose work has been drawn upon, may feel that important aspects have been

overlooked, discounted, or misinterpreted. For example, I find it hard to understand how, in the face of transactional and related research, the authors can include as a basic part of their theoretical structure, an assumption that reality is somehow independently knowable, that it is a "given" which can serve as a base for assessing the processes and the accuracy and adequacy of perception. Nevertheless, Solley and Murphy have done well a difficult and worthwhile task, with fair-mindedness and exemplary respect for the work of others.

This book should promote an overdue fruitful integration of perception and learning.

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### ON UNDERSTANDING KIERKEGAARD

SOREN KIERKEGAARD. *The Diary of Soren Kierkegaard*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1960. Pp. 255. \$4.75.

It has been twenty-two years since the publication of Alexander Dru's translation of major selections from the *Journals*, those 8000 pages to which Kierkegaard addressed his private and precursory thoughts for most of his life. Now here, in a rather free, ingenious translation by Gerda Andersen, is a selection which manages to cover the major interests as well as the salient circumstances of Kierkegaard's uneventful but full life. Peter Rohde, as editor, has made a careful selection and provided detailed notes which are sometimes obtrusive but often amazingly thorough and useful.

One hardly knows whether to recommend the *Journals* as a way of understanding Kierkegaard. Not that they are difficult or obscure. On the contrary, in their uncompromising pages he usually revealed his passions most directly and thus expressed himself with greatest clarity as a person. It is rather that in these selections we enter with him into the *existential* problem which was central to all his philosophy. He insisted that he was not a thinker—or as he would say, a "professor"—for to him that was blasphemy. His task, he claimed, was to be a witness to the living truth. Therefore he fashioned the very events of his own life as a continuing representation of Christianity as he saw it—the breaking of his engagement, his struggle over the problem of material success and even over accepting a position so as to gain economic security, and most of all his agonizing over how to publish, and publicize, the writings which were his life's work. Somehow he had to persuade without succeeding in persuading, for success would have meant that what he had to say had become accepted and systematized as a presentation; and this, according to his own demand that truth had to be lived rather than known about, would have reduced him to the level of the Christians whom he cursed. No man ever lived out a more terrible paradox, nor more fully plumbed and announced what is so glibly discussed today as the human predicament.

It is indeed the greatest of all historical ironies that this most magnificent and wretched of ironists, this most revolutionary philosopher since Socrates (who died for his ideas, remember), should be presented here in a manner well calculated to make him both popular and understood.

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## AN INTRODUCTION TO HEIDEGGER

MARTIN HEIDEGGER. *Essays in Metaphysics: Identity and Difference*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1960. Pp. 82. \$2.75.

Heidegger's style of thought, like water, is both flowing and incompressible. It is revealing and expressive rather than declaratory. One can only go along with him: savoring the "elaborate hints," as he calls the nuances of his own phrasing and terminology; accepting language, as he does, as both gift and burden.

In these two lectures, first delivered in 1957, he continues both his exegesis of the problem of Being, which he began with his *Being and Time* in 1927, and his attempt to make of metaphysics an existential endeavor, which he first undertook in *What is Metaphysics?* in 1929. The essay on "The Principle of Identity" is perhaps of more immediate concern to students in the human sciences, for in it he traces out that inwardly spiralling mode of relation in which Man and Being "touch each other in their essence." The title of the second essay, "The Onto-theological Nature of Metaphysics," refers to metaphysics as both the science of existence (ontology) and as systematized thinking about the ground of all existence (theology). We may be grateful to Kurt F. Leidecker for a most readable translation as well as some useful notes and a glossary of eighty-seven of Heidegger's terms.

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## EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

H. J. EYSENCK (Ed.) *Handbook of Abnormal Psychology*. New York: Basic Books, 1961. Pp. xi + 816. \$18.00.

This detailed book fills a rather glaring gap in the literature on psychopathology by showing that an experimental approach to this area is not only possible but also profitable, a fact which has unfortunately often been ignored. The only comparable works are Arieti's *American Handbook of Psychiatry* (1959) which approaches the problem from the traditional standpoint of classification and treatment techniques, and J. McV. Hunt's *Personality and the Behavior Disorders* (1944) which is somewhat dated.

The book contains some twenty chapters arranged under three broad topic headings (description and measurement, cause and determinants, experimental study and modification) written by 19 contributors, for the most part by Eysenck and colleagues in his department. Although no attempt is made to cover all of the traditional areas in this field, those that are covered are given a scholarly and comprehensive treatment. Extensive reference lists at the end of each chapter make this an invaluable source work.

Some of the chapters are provocative. Especially that by the editor on the continued lack of evidence for the effectiveness of psychotherapy is designed to fan anew the flames of a fire originally set in 1952. Other chapters are unique, such as Brengelmann's on expressive movements, in that they demonstrate the efficacy of experimental methodology in areas often considered beyond the pale of such an approach.

This handbook is strongly recommended for the serious student and professional in psychopathology.

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RICHARD M. MARTIN

## THERAPISTS LEARN FROM LEARNING THEORY

H. J. EYSENCK (Ed.) *Behaviour Therapy and the Neuroses: Readings in Modern Methods of Treatment Derived from Learning Theory*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1960. Pp. xi + 479. \$10.00.

A book of this sort is long overdue. It is a collection of articles, some appearing for the first time, on the application of learning theory principles to psychotherapy. The first section, of seven articles, presents a general discussion and some classical older papers such as the Watson and Rayner report on the production of phobia. The other four sections are concerned with more recent applications, such as the reciprocal inhibition approach of Wolpe, Dunlap's negative practice principle, aversion conditioning, and the use of positive conditioning. These techniques have been used with phobias, tics, enuresis, stammering, obsessions, homosexuality, hysterical deafness and anesthesia, etc. Each report is generally preceded by a rationale stemming from various learning theories, such as Pavlov's and Hull's. Much of this work has been done in England, particularly Maudsley Hospital.

The approach taken is that neurotic reactions are learned, just like any others, and that the task of therapy is to alter unadaptive behaviors. This is often criticized as *merely* symptomatic treatment; but in point of fact, any treatment must show behavior change as its ultimate result or else it has failed. To speak of changes in "underlying" attitudes is still to speak of behavior change. The notion that symptomatic treatment leads to relapse or symptom substitution is exposed for the fiction that it is, by Yates's incisive article.

Although the cases presented are not intended as proof of the validity of the theories behind them, the follow-up data are nonetheless impressive with regard to the question of the efficacy of this approach to treatment. For instance, Wolpe reports that with reciprocal inhibition techniques, 90% of the patients were cured or much improved, as compared to the usual 60% figure with psychoanalysis or other therapies. It is high time that clinicians shed the blinders of psychoanalytic dogma and took advantage of the variety of techniques offered by learning theory.

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NORMAN J. SLAMECKA

## THE SELF-CRITICAL CLINICIAN

FREDERICK C. THORNE. *Clinical Judgment: A Study of Clinical Errors*. Brandon, Vt.: Journal of Clinical Psychology, 1961. Pp. xiii + 165. \$6.00.

This book is a significant, further contribution of Dr. Thorne's sustained endeavor to study and enrich the process of clinical judgment, a field in which he writes with experience, learning, and dedication. Many readers will already be familiar with his approach to the individual case, which recognizes the uniqueness and complexity of the personality organization, seeks to evaluate everything that can be known about the person (while studying him holistically), and, above all, tries to see the case as it actually is, without "contamination or bias."

Thorne elaborates this approach in the present book. Since each specific case "can be studied and manipulated only in terms of its own individual characteristics," he favors the inductive approach over the deductive. A common error of judgment, he believes, is the distortion caused by applying generalizations which do not fit individual cases, by projecting implications from a theory onto the data.

Wherever possible one must deal with the raw data, as directly as possible, and keep one's abstractions at the lowest level.

Primarily Thorne relies on history and direct observation, not only because of their immediacy, but also because through them one may collect the widest range of information—far beyond what a standard battery of tests, for example, can only sample incompletely. On the other hand, he would seek physical findings and valid psychological testing whenever indicated, and objects to the limitations which certain theories impose in this regard. Thus Thorne stands for complete freedom from entangling theoretical alliances which limit and distort the fullest possible picture of the person.

Thorne's objections to the use of theories, of course, refer only to those he regards as not yet validated. He squarely recognizes the necessity for the clinician to function in the absence of validation, often with insufficient data, experience, and professional security, as well. But, it is the burden of this book that inadequacy itself is not a sin: The real harm is to let it go unrecognized or not to state it as a factor qualifying clinical judgment.

The errors of judgment used as illustrative material in the text were obtained from clinical psychologists. Out of 1,000 who were asked to send in an example from their own practice anonymously, only 77 replied. Thorne takes this as weighty indication of "defense by denial," but is hopeful — and his work supports the hope — that pointing out the positive potential of identified error will foster self-reflection and the genuinely, constructively critical attitude which characterizes healthy clinical judgment.

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ROWENA R. ANSBACHER

#### A NEW LOOK AT THE HOSPITALIZED MENTAL PATIENT

HERMAN C. B. DENBER (Ed.) *Research Conference on Therapeutic Community, Held at Manhattan State Hospital, Ward's Island, New York.* Springfield, Ill.: C. C. Thomas, 1960. Pp. xvi + 265. \$11.00.

Some of these papers, compiled by Dr. Denber of the Manhattan State Hospital, while informative and well worth reading, have little to do with "therapeutic communities;" some are original, well written and impressive; others are haphazardly presented and say nothing of importance. The most valuable papers are probably those that reflect the great and growing dissatisfaction with our traditional way of treating the patient who has been hospitalized for a long time. Most of what is wrong is brought out. Remedies are also mentioned, such as a return to Dorothea Dix's original suggestions, the open door, more public education, correction of prejudice within the medical and psychological professions, consistent attempts to return the patient to the community, day hospitals, self-government, group therapy, and preparation of the community for the return of the patient. It is noteworthy that many of the authors give credit to recent pharmacological advances for the decreasing in-patient population, which in turn allows the less crowded hospital to do more about rehabilitating its chronic population.

Implicit, especially in the contributions of Brill, Denber, and Sarwer-Jones, but not actually expressed, is the new way of looking at the mental patient. He is seen as a human being; he has more prestige; there is less felt need to "control"

him, to make him behave. Furthermore, the personnel are not permitted to hide behind the shield of their own "normalcy" which always makes them "right" and patients "wrong" in their disagreements. Such a new atmosphere is intensely democratic, and sometimes comes a cropper upon the totalitarian and authoritarian prejudices of nurses, aids, and administrators. But they are not the only saboteurs: the pessimistic therapist is another real danger to these patients.

These papers should have the effect of stimulating the imagination of hospital personnel, and encouraging them to throw off the traditional shackles of the "asylum which protects society against the insane," and to search for more ways of making the hospital a therapeutic and corrective human experience for the patient.

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BERNARD H. SHULMAN, M.D.

### LONGITUDINAL DATA ON ALCOHOLISM

WILLIAM McCORD AND JOAN McCORD, WITH JON GUDEMAN. *Origins of Alcoholism*. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1960. Pp. xi + 193. \$4.75.

This "first longitudinal study of the genesis of alcoholism" carries psychology a step further in solving the problem of how to obtain controlled observations in sufficient quantity on long-term, molar behavior segments. All who regard this problem as central and basic will be extremely interested in the scholarly and careful work of the McCords—for its methodology as well as its conclusions, and for the questions it raises as well as the difficulties it has overcome.

An unusual fund of data was supplied from the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study in the nature of thorough observations on 255 boys and their families, made continuously through an average of five years, beginning when the boy was nine. A follow-up study identified the 29 who had become alcoholic adults. Whereas other studies have started with the alcoholic and traced backwards, the present study started with a population of boys non-selected with regard to alcoholism. Furthermore, the observers who worked over these data did not know which subjects became alcoholic adults.

With the original data arranged into such categories as family interaction, socio-economic and cultural aspects, the boy's personality traits, etc., a great range of factors could be related to the occurrence of alcoholism. For example, 8% of the 99 actively affectionate mothers were found to have sons who became alcoholics, 10% of the 37 passively affectionate mothers, 21% of the 24 rejecting mothers, and 35% of the 23 mothers alternating between affection and rejection. Such comparisons with the appropriate statistical measures of significance are the factual findings of the study, and there are about 100 such tables.

Sometimes these data directly yield results of a descriptive nature. One such most important result is that pre-alcoholic boys, in contrast to alcoholic fathers, appeared self-confident, emphasized their independence, and participated in group activities; they resembled their adult counterparts in being aggressive and tending to reject members of their immediate families.

The authors' purpose was, however, to go beyond the descriptive. Where they found a relationship between some factor and alcoholism, they made the causal inference, as in the above example: alternating mothers *produce* alcoholic sons. Since, obviously, to accept certain factors as causal *per se* would deny all

intervening factors within the responding individual, the authors also took the next step, of hypothesizing the subjective processes. To continue with the above example, their interpretation postulates an increased need for maternal care and an uncertainty about the kind of behavior that will satisfy this need.

The authors marshal many inter-relations of their data to support their hypotheses regarding the personality dynamics of the alcoholic. Their evidence is impressive, but of necessity, will convince readers to varying degrees. The study left this reviewer with the insistent question, how far can its data take one? The authors themselves mention that their data do not cover the earliest years of their subjects; we should add that probably an equal omission is the later adolescent years and especially the phases during which the exciting influences were taking place, and the changes which mark the pre-alcoholic from the alcoholic personality. Perhaps if the objective data were more complete, the interpretations regarding the subjective data would seem fully justified; perhaps further checking with phenomenological accounts is always needed. Certainly in the case of the McCord's data we should require such supplementary checking, and actually this is no contradiction in terms of method, inasmuch as forms of self-expression could also be collected by unbiased observers.

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## CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

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ministration. He is the author of some 50 journal articles and four books, including *The Wechsler-Bellevue Scales* (Thomas) and the forthcoming *Counseling and Guidance Services in Schools* (Harper).

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