

BOOK REVIEWS

LOVE AND HATE REVISITED

IAN D. SUTTIE. *The Origins of Love and Hate*. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1960. Pp. xvi + 222. 3s. 6d. paper.

Any serious student of the poignant puzzles in human conduct will be grateful for this reprint of a volume that has long been hard to obtain and has never had the attention it deserves.¹ Reading it now, twenty-five years after the first edition was published on the day of its author's death, one finds many ideas that have acquired wide currency in present-day clinical and social thought. But this book is by no means a quaint historical document. Its primary themes are objects of both contemporary debate and current research, and they are enlivened by a freshness of expression and a feet-on-the-ground forthrightness that reflect a warm humanity as well as a challenge to open argument.

Nurtured in the Scottish tradition of independence and criticism, Suttie was a physically frail man with a robust and original mind. He devoured Freud's publications, testing them against his own sharp intellect and his wide experience as an Army physician in World War I, as a staff member at the Glasgow Royal Asylum, as superintendent of an institution for the criminally insane, and, finally as a staff member of the Tavistock Clinic. His sharply phrased criticisms of Freudian theory were based on a genuine understanding and an intensive clinical practice. Significantly, his reconstructions of psychoanalytic thought, although he is rarely credited with them, are among those that are most widely accepted today.

For example, Suttie's emphasis on the theoretical importance of the therapeutic relationship in effecting beneficial changes in the patient's personality has close affinities to the notions of Sullivan and Rogers. His formulation of aggression as based on frustration predates the comparable and much more influential frustration-aggression hypothesis developed at Yale. Oddly, there is no mention of Suttie by Dollard, Doob, and their collaborators in the 1939 edition of *Frustration and Aggression*. His conception of the strengthening effects of "tenderness" in the socialization process has all but been institutionalized (and distorted) in the contemporary cult of permissiveness. And the consoling, ego-developing potentialities that Suttie, in opposition to Freud, perceived in religion are matters of considerable, if still dubiously respectable, concern among behavioral scientists a quarter-century later—witness the popularity of Tillich and the existentialists, the overflowing attendance at professional meetings devoted to religion and mental health, and the growing revolt against the dominance of positivism in sciences of man.

Most of all, Suttie's notions of "mental illness" anticipated Szasz's recent (*Amer. Psychologist*, 1960, 15, 113-118) insistence that this widely used term is a sheer instance of mythology. The psychiatric disorders, says Szasz, involve com-

¹The book is "Not for sale in the USA" but can be ordered from any English bookseller directly.—Ed. note.

plex problems in living that bear little resemblance to genuine illnesses like tuberculosis or smallpox; they imply, rather, social and psychological events in which the therapist, within the diagnostic and treatment situations, is an inevitable participant. Now hear Suttie: "Mental trouble is fundamentally merely an abnormality of social feeling and interest adjustment—which exceeds either the tolerance of the community or the patient's power of endurance" (p. 146).

Here Suttie virtually restates an earlier observation of Adler according to which psychological disorders are manifestations of an individual "in meeting problems of life which require more social interest than he is able to muster" (*The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler*. New York: Basic Books, 1956. P. 294). Altogether the similarities between Suttie and Adler are striking.

The dynamic of mental trouble as an abnormality of social feeling and interest adjustment entails the experience of alienation through too long or too intense an exposure to a loveless environment. One aspect of the result is a regressive yearning for quasi-parental nurturance, often expressed in behavioral forms that are socially obnoxious and productive of a spiraling guilt in the afflicted person. The remedial steps, therefore, involve a loving relationship, partly as the vehicle by which the patient can be helped to an acceptance of both the responsibilities and the privileges of adult life. Critical precepts are of little account. What matters is the simultaneous discovery of self and of one's "fellow relation" to others through "friendly and confidential conversations" with another person who, as psychotherapist, is "less of a Healer than a Consultant in the Art of Living" (p. 172).

The developmental basis for this point of view lies in Suttie's rejection of Freud's pansexualism in favor of the concept of love. The infant, he held, is not a collection of unbridled instincts but is born with a simple attachment to the protecting, nurturing mother. The origin of love lies in this direct and primal affection for the mother. Hatred and fear, on the other hand, have their genesis in the frustration of this positive affect. Under natural conditions, the loss of the mother is the precursor of death; when a threat of such a loss is presented, the most probable response is one of terror and rage. Thus, love is primary, both in its importance and its sequence of development, and hate can only be understood against the centrality of love in the human condition.

On this ground, Suttie is able to avoid Freud's oversimplification of construing socialization as merely the overpowering of the sexual instinct and sexual jealousy by fear and coercion. Effective socialization, leading to genuine adulthood, adds to Freud's idea of honesty with oneself the equally important notion of responsible and zestful communion with others, springing from a developed capacity to love and to receive love. Built on as firm a foundation of clinical observation and critical judgment as Suttie has provided, such an idea merits serious consideration. Few therapists have better shown the empirical bases for their ideas and their methods of communicating them in a spirit of responsible helpfulness to their patients. Nor have many earned the right to say of their systematic thought: "It seems to me (in moments of enthusiasm) that (it) re-introduces common sense into the science of psychology" (p. 208).

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EDWARD JOSEPH SHOEN, JR.

COGNITION VERSUS AFFECTION IN BELIEF THEORY

MILTON ROKEACH. *The Open and Closed Mind: Investigations into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems*. New York: Basic Books, 1960. Pp. xvi + 447. \$7.50.

In this extraordinary volume Dr. Milton Rokeach and his 22 collaborators have addressed themselves to the task of analyzing why people believe as they do. Here is a stimulating theoretical orientation that clearly represents a step forward; a related series of research studies, many of which reflect considerable ingenuity; and an assessment of the status of the theory in the light of the research, together with some suggested guide lines for further development. Presented with realism and modesty, the book gives evidence of an orientation which can readily be identified with the "open" rather than the "closed" mind. Stylistically, it is addressed to both professional and non-professional readers and merits the serious attention of both.

From original concern with beliefs, says Rokeach, it becomes necessary to think of belief systems. He attempts to identify and analyze the *structure* of such beliefs rather than their content. There may be authoritarianism of the right and of the left; there may be structural similarities in the belief systems of some political parties and some religious organizations; democratic principles may be promulgated in an anti-democratic fashion. Rokeach seeks to identify the common themes in the personal response tendencies that would cut across such diverse ways of betraying them, to establish and study the genotypic aspects of belief systems without being sidetracked by the phenotypic formats.

In this endeavor Rokeach examined three major dimensions: (1) a belief-disbelief dimension; (2) a central-peripheral dimension, involving a *central* region of the person's "primitive," basic, often unstated beliefs; an *intermediate* region of beliefs about authority; and a *peripheral* region of beliefs derived from authority; and (3) a time-perspective dimension, involving orientation to the past, present, and future. The next step was to delineate the integration of these three dimensions into the constellations of "the open mind" and "the closed mind."

From here on, the task was primarily empirical. A scale of openness or closedness of belief systems (the Dogmatism Scale) and an independent measure of general intolerance (the Opinionation Scale) were developed. A series of studies of individual differences in problem solving behavior under various conditions used an "experimental cosmology," modifications of the Denny Doodlebug Problem. The authors are scrupulously honest in describing aspects of studies which fail to confirm hypotheses, and analyses which provide differences in the "right" direction, but fail of statistical significance.

On the theoretical side, Rokeach recognizes the intimate relation of the affective and the cognitive processes and developed a "conceptual and research strategy . . . to translate the affective to the cognitive. . . . Indeed, a way is paved for the study of a person's emotions through an examination of his cognitions" (p. 400).

Appreciative as this reviewer is of the fine work of Dr. Rokeach, there are, of course, points where he would want to pause and "argue" a bit with the author. Complex theoretical statements always contain difficulties. Rokeach's "strategy" of approaching the affective through the cognitive seems to be a pious wish rather

than a genuine program. Belief systems serve two functions, he acknowledges, (1) providing a basis for understanding the world we live in, and (2) providing a defense against aspects of the world which may threaten the ego. Rokeach continues:

We do not agree with those who hold that people selectively distort their cognitive functioning so that they will see, remember, and think only what they want to. Instead, we hold to the view that people will do so only to the extent that they have to, and no more. For we are all motivated by the desire, which is sometimes strong and sometimes weak, to see reality as it actually is, even if it hurts (pp. 400 f.).

Here we have the crux of the "controversy" of the cognitive vs. the affective approaches: How strong is the desire to see things as they really are, quite apart from the philosophical problems raised? Does the strength of this motive vary within the individual as well as between individuals? What about the differences among individuals with respect to their "pain thresholds," the point at which reality may hurt, and how much hurt may be tolerated before defense mechanisms are called into play? The present study offers no answers to these questions, although it presents the issues and contributes to the available arsenal of techniques for the study of these problems.

In trying to clarify the distinction between open and closed belief systems, Rokeach relates the extremes to the models of man developed by the different theories:

As we see it, Gestalt theory would be most appropriate if man were completely open in his belief system For them the model of man seems to be primarily a rational one. People act primarily in accord with the meaningful, structural, configurational requirements of the situation. . . . Action on the basis of irrational motives or arbitrary external reinforcements is de-emphasized At the other extreme are those theoretical positions that have as their model a man closed in his belief system, evaluating and acting only rarely in accord with situational requirements, but rather in accord with pressures irrelevant to the requirements of the situation Behaviorism emphasizes the importance of external reinforcements, or rewards and punishments, as determinants of behavior. If man were completely closed in his belief system, he could be completely controlled and directed by such arbitrary reinforcements Classical psychoanalysis also has as its model a person with a closed system, but here the emphasis is on irrelevant *internal* motivations rather than *external* reinforcements (pp. 64 f.).

Since, as we have already noted, Rokeach leans toward the "open" mind in his belief system, may we not be running special risks in analyses which identify opponents in scientific controversy with affect-loaded terms? Who can deny the general preference for an open mind over a closed mind? Are our opponents really as bigoted as they appear to us? Or does such a feeling simply reflect our own bigotry? Here, of course, we are going far beyond Rokeach, but psychologists are human and have been known to respond in accordance with psychological principles. May they, too, not be subject to propaganda devices?

On the methodological side, questions also arise. For example, it seems too bad that the Dogmatism and Opinionation scales follow the format of the California "F" scale to the point where the problem of position habit or, as Lorge identified it long ago, the gen-like tendencies have to be argued away rather than having been built out of the instruments. The use of complex, "double-barreled" items also seems an anachronism. That the instruments proved helpful in illuminating various aspects of the theory despite their low reliabilities (.80 and .75 respectively) may be a tribute to the viability of the variables being analyzed.

But these are minor points, and we can look forward confidently to a great deal of stimulating research, interesting theoretical development in many fields, and much useful application to a variety of human problems, as a result of this book.

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EUGENE L. HARTLEY

COGNITION VERSUS AFFECTION IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

ROBERT A. HARPER. *Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy: 36 Systems*. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959. Pp. viii + 182. \$1.95 paper.

A survey of 36 contemporary American systems of psychotherapy—among these, naturally, a number of the most recent and less well-known—would in itself make for a worthwhile book. Since the material is presented with competence, dispassionately, and in straight-forward simple language, we have here a small volume which can well be recommended to the student and intelligent layman, for whom it is intended. This is true the more since the author gives his discussion the proper perspective by warning the reader that none of the systems has the ultimate answers but that they should be considered “stopgap measures” until some future time when we shall be on a firmer basis. An adequate list of readings after each chapter and a glossary of 16 pages further recommend the book as a text or for self-education.

Among the less known recent systems included are those of Camilla Anderson, John N. Rosen (direct analysis), Frederick C. Thorne (directive psychotherapy), Frederick Perls (Gestalt therapy), Lewis R. Wolberg (hypnotherapy), Carl A. Whitaker and Thomas P. Malone (experiential therapy), E. Lakin Phillips (assertion-structured therapy), and Albert Ellis (rational psychotherapy). The various forms of group psychotherapy are also presented.

A multiplicity such as shown here inevitably raises the question of an intrinsic order. The author answers the question by distinguishing between emotionally oriented or affective, and intellectually oriented or cognitive therapies. With this broad division we would agree, although in some instances we find the author's resulting alignment of therapies debatable—as is to be expected where the attempt is made to classify such complex material. He includes in the affective group, the vast majority: all types of psychoanalysis with the exception of Adler's Individual Psychology (“which is discussed as a form of psychoanalysis more for historical than content purposes”), client-centered therapy, Gestalt therapy, hypnotherapy, experiential therapy, conditioned reflex therapy, and therapy of reciprocal inhibition. His cognitive group includes: the psychobiologic therapists, the Adlerians, Thorne, the general semanticists, those coming from learning theory (John Dollard, Neal Miller, O. H. Mowrer, George Kelly, Julian Rotter, Edward Shoben, and Phillips), and Ellis. While this group is small, Harper notes “a trend in the direction of . . . the cognitive.”

Where does the author stand in this broad division? He considers himself an eclectic and advocates eclecticism. But even the eclectic necessarily has a point of view, else he would have no basis for selecting. And thus we find that in his most recent paper Harper (*J. Indiv. Psychol.*, 1960, 16, 197-207) takes sides with the cognitive therapists, more specifically with Ellis' rational psychotherapy.

University of Vermont

HEINZ L. ANSBACHER

ANCIENT EAST AND RECENT WEST

K. GURU DUTT. *Existentialism and Indian Thought*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1960. Pp. 92. \$2.75.

This is a small work of three chapters by an Indian philosopher which is introductory to the relationship between Western existentialism and the richness of Hindu philosophy. Throughout the book Sanskrit terms are given to parallel existential terminology. In the first chapter the author sketches the philosophical background of existentialism, particularly in the thought of Pascal, Coleridge, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. In this he depicts existentialism as "an attempt to reach the inmost core of human existence in a concrete and individual fashion" (p. 2). In the second chapter he surveys the moderns—Dilthey, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre and Marcel. In all this development Dutt sees Western man as finally turning away from the effort to order all of reality, toward seeing interior experience as the basis of all known reality. In the last chapter the author comes to his central point. Finally and all too briefly, he shows that Western existentialism is an entrance into the region well explored by Hinduism. Knowing both sides, I am in agreement with the author when he says the West is going over ancient ground. This is part of *Lila*—the play of existence—that the same things should be found repeatedly.

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WILSON VAN DUSEN

JOSEPH NEEDHAM. *Science and Civilisation in China*. Vol. 2. *History of Scientific Thought*. Cambridge, England: University Press, 1956. Pp. xxiv + 697. \$16.50.

Needham presents the history of Chinese philosophy with its profoundly organismic and non-mechanistic character, in relation to the development of scientific thought. "In China even the word 'philosophy' did not mean quite what it came to mean in Europe, being much more ethical and social than metaphysical" (p. 1). For the Chinese, man, society, and nature were an inseparable whole. As man fulfilled his own intrinsic nature, which was itself formed for uprightness in terms of being ethical and social, he accorded with the Tao or the Way. Needham points out, "The harmonious cooperation of all beings arose, not from the orders of a superior authority external to themselves, but from the fact that they were all parts in a hierarchy of wholes forming a cosmic pattern, and what they obeyed were the internal dictates of their own natures" (p. 582).

This volume deals with the Confucians and their concern with man's social life; the Taoists who were concerned with man's oneness with nature and hence formed the basis of all Chinese science; the Mohists who, concerned with militaristic interests, developed some practical technology; the Logicians who, although comparable to the Greek Sophists, emphasized more acceptance of paradoxes; the Legalists who were largely responsible for bureaucratizing Chinese scholarship; the Naturalists (Yin-Yang school) who developed a philosophy of organic naturalism and gave to Chinese proto-scientific thinking its characteristic fundamental theories, i.e., the theory of five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, and earth), and the theory of the two forces (Yin—negative, feminine, damp, cold, and Yang—

positive, masculine, dry, hot); the pseudo-scientific and the skeptical traditions, many of whose projections were divinations; the philosophy of Buddhism which, although favorable to the epistemology of science, handicapped its motivation because of its emphasis on illusion; and neo-Confucianism which attempted to reunite much of the philosophy of China and in many ways anticipated the organic naturalism of our own time.

Needham then discusses the controversy which has always been strong in China between anti-scientific idealism and materialism. Finally he compares human law and the laws of nature as seen in China and in Europe. Here we find a critical analysis of Chinese science in its ultimate failure to develop practical knowledge out of theoretical speculation, yet with respect for that part of Chinese philosophy which was profoundly organic, subjective, non-mechanical and holistic, as distinguished from the lineal logicity and mechanicalness of the West.

We find in this work much of the thought of Individual Psychology, growth psychology, and existentialism, which was already existent in the organic and holistic wisdom of the East. It helps us rediscover and appreciate Eastern wisdom.

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MISAKO MIYAMOTO

DEGREES OF TRANSCENDENCE

IRA PROGOFF. *The Death and Rebirth of Psychology*. New York: Julian Press, 1956. Pp. 275. \$4.00.

Progoff has done three works which show a continuous development. The first was *Jung's Psychology and Its Social Meaning* (1953). This one is the second, and *Depth Psychology and Modern Man* (1959) is the third. In these he surveys psychoanalysis and shows that depth psychology is Western man's approach to the ultimate creative principle of the cosmos. We have selected the second one for review because it is the most concerned with the work of Adler.

Progoff draws on a wide variety of sources including the biographical to compare Freud, Adler, Jung and Rank. He brings out the strengths of each, not appearing really biased in the direction of any particular one. The thesis running through this book, as through all his works, is that depth psychology began in the realm of medical treatment, but in the hands of successive innovators expanded horizons until it came to the realm of "beyond psychology;" it found that man's nature must be understood as involving a transcendence of itself. Thus these psychologies have walked into the larger question of the meaning of life.

Freud began the break with scientific reductionism by opening up the area of the unconscious. Progoff shows that Freud, as well as all the innovators, revealed their own styles of life in their theories. But this does not vitiate the meaning of the theories. Rather, it grounds them in the theory maker's existence. Freud was indirectly influenced by the very associates he turned against. In effect, in his later years in *The Ego and the Id*, he said there was more to the unconscious than the preconscious and the repressed unconscious. Moreover, he acknowledged the *more* may be more critical than what he had explored.

Adler was the first important departure from Freud. He was the first to see the person as a unity and to inquire how the person finds meaning in life through guiding fictions. Adler touched on "beyond psychology" in his doctrine of social

interest in which the largest context of meaning for man is in living and sharing together.

Jung's portrayal of the archetypal forces in the collective unconscious is seen as his step beyond the ordinary domain of psychology. In his *Self*, as the dark proto-image that guides all the development of the person, he went as far as he could in empirical psychology. But it is in Otto Rank that Progoff sees the peak of this development, in that Rank's last work clearly describes how psychology leads beyond itself.

The author relates and unites these great men into a single development: depth psychology which first attempted to explore the unconscious in man, in several ways discovered that the depth of man points beyond him. Each of the four found this: Freud by discovering limits to his own theory, Adler in a social interest that makes men interdependent, Jung in the *Self* which is a religious heart of man, and Rank in his exploration of the will to immortality. Progoff documents his point quite well and in some respects overcomes sectarian differences in these great thinkers.

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WILSON VAN DUSEN

A NOVELIST'S FAITH

MANES SPERBER. *The Achilles Heel*. Translated by Constantine FitzGibbon. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1960. Pp. 224. \$3.95.

Without sentimentality but never without pity, gifted with iron logic and a lucid style, Manes Sperber regards the problems of our modern world with the eyes of one who has experienced the most adverse facts of human life; and has survived them. He is the true existentialist: a man who has acted out his thoughts. This makes *The Achilles Heel* a book of intrinsic value, although as a collection of essays, it has not the cohesion or narrative grip of his three great novels.

Sperber was taught how to think and how to put his thoughts into acts from his early boyhood by no less a thinker than Alfred Adler. After ten years constant, almost daily intercourse, Sperber wrote in his early 20's a life of Adler. There is no doubt that through Individual Psychology Sperber grasped what he himself had to offer life and what life would offer him if he adapted himself to its emergencies. When he was forced to meet the full brunt of the Nazi persecution in Berlin in 1933, everything he possessed crashed about him. Even Adler, his chief support, parted company with him when Sperber, in his young impatience of despair, became for a time a Communist. Sperber soon learned, however, through bitter experience, to see the police state behind the mask of communism, and frankly repudiated it. The New World, for which he had mistaken communism, he never gave up. "Our truth," he said, meaning his faith in universal brotherhood, "shall finally cease to resemble a lie, if only we can manage to remain unconditionally faithful to it" (p. 17). And there is not one of these essays that does not in one way or another reflect this faith.

Perhaps Sperber and Adler would have once again parted company over Sperber's bitter denunciation of Christianity throughout the ages. And Sperber seems to overstress the situation itself, in his essay on Richard Aldington's life of

T. E. Lawrence. It is true that Lawrence was confronted with a most severe situation, since he was the illegitimate son of a most proud and virtuous mother; but it is never the situation that makes the child, but the child who can adjust himself to the situation and by adjusting change its consequences. This Sperber sees for himself when he quotes Adler against Freud's misconceptions:

The real question, according to Alfred Adler, is to know what human beings will become; what they will make of themselves and according to which pattern they will arrange their past, that raw material which conditions but does not determine their future. The cardinal significance that man ascribes to his past and all his secrets is summed up in the image which he makes of his future (p. 171).

London

PHYLLIS BOTTOME

ADLER UP TO 1914

H. CAMMAER. *Alfred Adler's Leer tot 1914: de Evolutie van zijn Theorie over het "Levensplan."* Louvain, Belgium: Catholic University, Institute for Applied Psychology and Education, 1958. Pp. 122. Paper, mimeographed.

Adler's development up to 1914 is presented here in remarkable detail, including extensive quotations, sometimes from quite inaccessible sources. The author distinguishes three phases of development according to emphasis on (a) the organic, (b) the psychic in relation to the organic, and (c) teleology and life plan. (It is only a number of years later that "life plan" was replaced by "life style.") A biography of Adler is also given. The book is a thesis written with Professor Joseph R. Nuttin of the University of Louvain as advisor.

The outstanding value of this book lies in its exhaustive bibliography which is divided into 5 sections. The first section lists 65 publications, beginning with 1898 and including 14 book reviews written by Adler. Section two, 39 entries, repeats those titles from the first section which were at some time reprinted, especially in *Heilen und Bilden* and in *Practice and Theory*. The 40 references in the third section are to writings about Adler, or closely related to Adlerian thinking. Section four consists of 23 references to reviews by others of publications by Adler. The last section presents in chronological order 36 entries on lectures by Adler (contained mostly already in the first section) and those ensuing discussions which could be located in the literature. The various items are provided with cross references to other items in the bibliography, where this is called for.

This study certainly can be considered the definitive bibliography of Adler up to 1914.

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HEINZ L. ANSBACHER

DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY—AN ADLERIAN VIEW

ALFRED FARAU AND HERBERT SCHAFFER. *La Psychologie des Profondeurs, des Origines a nos Jours.* Paris: Payot, 1960. Pp. 215. NF 13.00 paper.

This is a translation and revision with some additions of Farau's earlier work, *Der Einfluss der Oesterreichischen Tiefenpsychologie auf die Amerikanische Psychotherapie der Gegenwart* (reviewed in this Journal, 1956, 12, 92-93).

The book begins with an outline of the intellectual trends and traditions of the nineteenth century, against which Freud's historical place is shown. This is

followed by a resume of the three main systems of depth psychology, which is very clear and will be a useful introduction to students. Though Adler is stressed, Jung's theories are discussed with much sympathy. This is in accordance with the spiritual tendency of the book which is well epitomized by its very last sentence, "The human soul remains a mystery."

The last part of the book describes the position of psychotherapy today, pointing out the recognized and especially the unrecognized influence of Adler's theories. Here a new chapter on existential analysis shows that one may say this school uses Adler's ideas with a vocabulary borrowed from Husserl. Another new chapter, on behaviorism, however interesting, has apparently little to do with the matter, except that on its last page the introduction of the concept of intentionality with Tolman and Anokhin furnishes a point of contact with Adler. Dr. Schaffer has added an account of the modest French contribution to depth psychology, and a new bibliography of mainly French books.

New York, N. Y.

SOFIE LAZARFELD

MORE ABOUT THE FAMILY CONSTELLATION

EDITH G. NEISSER. *The Eldest Child*. New York: Harper, 1957. Pp. xiv + 174. \$3.50.

This book for the general reader is a most excellent and complete discussion of the situational factors of the first born, of the variety of individual reactions thereto, and of effective ways of understanding and modifying both the situation and behavior. It should be most helpful to students of child rearing through its clarity and wealth of specific suggestions as well as its generous supply of bibliographies. These refer to myth and customs; the eldest in fiction, drama, and biography; in contemporary children's literature; adoption; and readings for parents.

For those looking for what is typical of the eldest child, particularly those who have in mind Adler's characterization, it is interesting that Mrs. Neisser reports that the eldest tends to ally himself with adults; tends to be responsible, sober, conscientious, and conforming; that he is brought to child guidance clinics more than the general population; but that he is also more apt to achieve eminence.

The author's whole approach supports Adlerian theory and practice. She points out the necessity for "nourishing the tender shoots of friendliness" in the dethroned child; his capacity for loving his younger siblings; and his need for encouragement and guidance to build up his own strength for coping with difficulties as well as to build up his feeling that there is help to be had from friendly people in the world about him.

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ROWENA R. ANSBACHER

RITA VUYK. *Das Kind in der Zweikinderfamilie. Beih. Schweiz. Z. Psychol. Anwend.* No. 38. Bern: Huber, 1959. Pp. 102 paper.

A 30-page critical review of the literature on birth-order position is followed by the author's study of 85 boys and 40 girls from two-child families, based primarily on interviews with the parents. The main findings are that in the case of two brothers, the older corresponds to type in about half the cases, in being quiet,

timid, introvert. Likewise about half of the younger brothers correspond to type in being cheerful, extrovert, easy-going.

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ROWENA R. ANSBACHER

A NEW PLEA FOR DISCIPLINE

E. LAKIN PHILLIPS, DANIEL N. WIENER, AND NORRIS G. HARING. *Discipline, Achievement, and Mental Health: A Teacher's Guide to Wholesome Action*. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960. Pp. x + 198. \$3.75.

The message of this book is excellently taken and timely. In summary it is: Good discipline is necessary for learning self-discipline; self-discipline is necessary for learning to achieve; achievement is a necessary element in mental health. Good discipline sets goals and rules for the child, makes them clear, and then holds the child to them by firm expectation and by supporting positive and negative consequences of the child's behavior. In this way the child learns to differentiate between acceptable and unacceptable social conduct.

It is not necessary to seek for "first causes." In the authors' view, what we want to ask of an explanation is, how do we go about remedying the problem? We need not suspect an "emotional disturbance" *apart* from the child's behavior, for his attitudes and behavior *are* the disturbance. Emotions become causal factors of classroom difficulties "no less often as by-products of . . . poor achievement than as precipitants . . . Emotional difficulties mirror one's dissatisfactions with oneself . . . (One way) of coming to grips with such feelings consists of becoming more productive in daily living."

Parents as well as teachers often refrain from taking a firm position with a child because they size up his situation as more important and more serious than it is. But the authors point out that the simpler assumption, i.e., explaining difficulties on the basis of a lack of self-discipline, is much easier to test and often more supported by the available evidence. If the approach is not successful, one can still refer the case for therapy, and the attempt to help the child to take the proper actions and acquire skills is better than to have done nothing and let the situation worsen.

Such a thoroughly sound, economical position merits an equally economical presentation, and yet the book seems a bit drawn out and sometimes repetitious. The fact that it is addressed to teachers, principals, and guidance counselors may have something to do with this, as well as with the absence of any references and proper names. The reviewer, however, missed the latter—especially the mention of Dreikurs who has staunchly expounded so similar an approach in the classroom and elsewhere, and of the Beechers who have advocated it for parents.

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ROWENA R. ANSBACHER

AN OPEN-ENDED APPROACH TO ADOLESCENCE

DOROTHY R. DISHER (Ed.) *Workbook for Students of Adolescent Adjustment*. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Edwards Brothers, 1959. Pp. vi + 201. \$3.50 paper.

This pioneering workbook is greatly to be welcomed both for the promising new approach it brings to teaching and for the fruitful theoretical position it con-

veys. Dr. Disher has aimed to stimulate the student *to help himself* to understand the adolescent. Teaching, as everyone knows, but often forgets, is a leading-the-horse-to-water process. The editor leads so skillfully, heightens the thirst, and presents the water so enticingly, that one judges the student cannot help but drink.

Dr. Disher is associate professor of psychology at Adelphi College and a staff member of the Alfred Adler Institute for Individual Psychology. She makes her point of view known in seven essays placed modestly among the questions and exercises. The essays are thoughtful and original contributions to adolescent psychology in which the editor often presents problems still unanswered and vistas unexplored. For instance, she asks, if we accept developmental laws, how do these operate in the individual case? Can choice exist under the operation of the law? Dr. Disher encourages the student to formulate questions and seek the answers through the literature and his own thinking, and she reminds him that there may be several answers, or none, and that most will be tentative. The directives she gives are for viewing the adolescent as a moving, goal-directed, creative individual, to be studied in his habitat naturalistically. "At any point his total progress includes all aspects of him: as he feels, so he thinks and does; or as he does, so he thinks and feels." While encouraging the reader to know as much as possible about the factors which surround the adolescent, such as his family, his peer group, the demands of his culture, and the like, she stresses the importance of seeing his world as he sees it and as he creates it for himself.

Dr. Disher's chief technique for helping the student to this subjective understanding is the incomplete playlet, which was originated as a guidance method by Jerry Weiss and in which the student is asked to write the next act. The adolescent problems presented in these playlets, of which there are 28, have the ring of authenticity having been written by college students themselves who are still close to their own adolescence. The student of the workbook must resolve the drama in a way true to the protagonist's style of life, as Adler conceived it, his way of growing up and meeting his life problems—a real training in empathy.

There is no doubt that this kind of open-ended, idiographically directed material which engages the active, creative participation of the student, and leads to the insight of a phenomenological understanding, is a splendid accompaniment for the reading matter and lectures which usually constitute courses dealing with adjustment.

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RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX RELATIONS

ALBERT ELLIS. *The Art and Science of Love*. New York: Lyle Stuart, 1960. Pp. 400. \$7.95.

This is an admirably forthright, understandable, and practical guide to sexual relations, for intelligent lay adults of all ages. Its helpfulness is particularly enhanced because, as the author purposed, it is psychosexual rather than merely sexual; psychobiological rather than only psychological or biological. It commends itself especially to the reviewer since Ellis' Rational Psychology is thoroughly reasonable, common-sensible—and hence, also Adlerian.

The author's starting point is that no mode of sexuality seems to be instinctive or innate. "If anything comes naturally to man without any prior learning and

experience, it is *not* sexual intercourse." Ellis gives a clear account of the "thinking, emoting, and attitudinizing" which determine how the individual directs the sex urges which are only "to some extent inherited." The most basic essential for satisfactory relations seems to be self-confidence, the individual's feeling of his worth. Common obstacles are the fear of failure; perfectionistic goals; and the confusion of sexual competence with masculinity or femininity, and with one's essential value. Ellis emphasizes present attitudes such as these, rather than unconscious reasons or the vestiges of old attachments. He rejects the Freudian explanation of sexual deviation as a regression to an early "normal" stage of sexual development, seeing deviation rather as "a fixation upon a distinctly limited or disordered form of sexuality at *any* stage in the individual's life."

In spite of the author's specificity of detail, his is a holistic view. He points out that the same kind of rule applies in the sexual partnership as in all relations with close associates, and he suggests, as a measure for the prevention of sex deviation, that children above all be reared to become *generally*, as well as sexually, mature.

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BOOKS RECEIVED AND BOOKS NOTED

ACADEMY OF RELIGION AND MENTAL HEALTH. *Religion in the developing personality: proceedings of the second Academy symposium, 1959*. New York: N. Y. Univer. Press, 1960. Pp. xiii + 110. \$3.00.—Discussion leaders were E. A. Loomis, Jr., G. W. Allport, and Father W. C. Bier, with H. J. Tompkins as chairman. There were 24 participants in all. Allport pointed out the necessity to distinguish between the self-centered, extrinsic type of religious sentiment which is basically infantile and highly correlated with prejudice, and the outward-centered, extrinsic type which, it may turn out, alone achieves a fully positive mental health. He urged empirical investigation of the relationship of these two types to mental health.

ADLER, JOSHUA. *Philosophy of Judaism*. New York: Phil. Libr., 1960. Pp. 160. \$3.00.

ANONYMOUS. *Streetwalker*. New York: Viking Press, 1960. Pp. 178. \$3.50.—This book purports to be the autobiographical report of a London prostitute during ten months of professional activity. The author is obviously well-informed of the life and habits of this particular segment of London society. Unfortunately, the book adds little to our knowledge of the particular illness which leads women to embrace such a self-destructive profession.—HAROLD GREENWALD (*New York, N. Y.*).

BERKOWITZ, PEARL H., & ROTHMAN, ESTHER P. *The disturbed child: recognition and psychoeducational therapy in the classroom*. New York: N. Y. Univer. Press, 1960. Pp. 204. \$4.00.—The larger part of this volume describes and explains the behavior of disturbed children, in psychoanalytic terms. The rest, dealing with the relationship of the teacher and child, and specific psychoeducational techniques, is of greater interest and use, for a good therapeutic procedure may be successful regardless of theoretical orientation. E.g., although one may not agree with the authors that the use of primary colors in painting indicates an inability to regulate impulses and drives, one approves of the teacher who 33 times (!) encouraged the efforts of a child painting the identical sombre theme, before positive changes began to appear. Suggestions for teaching reading are noteworthy.