

LOVE, LONELINESS, AND LOGIC¹

EDWARD JOSEPH SHOBE, JR.

Teachers College, Columbia University

It is probable that prefaces are remarkably unread documents. Reminiscent of unworked mines, they may contain little gold, but they may be the source of nuggets of genuine worth. One such nugget may be found in the preface to Clark Hull's *Principles of Behavior*:

This book . . . has been written on the assumption that all behavior, individual and social, moral and immoral, normal and psychopathic, is generated from the same primary laws . . . Consequently the present work may be regarded as a general introduction to the theory of all the behavioral (social) sciences (17, p. v).

This statement can fairly be taken as representative of the aims of most serious and creative psychological theorists until very recently. Yet against this grand objective, it is startling to find that most psychological research based on comprehensive theories has been centered in infrahuman organisms and that neither the research nor the theories have contributed materially to an enlarged understanding of human conduct or a firmer basis for these psychological services which a needful world demands in increasing quantity. Even in the work of Dollard and Miller (8), where issues in human behavior are dealt with in terms of Hullian principles derived from experiments with rats, the treatment is highly abstract and imprecise; and the psychotherapeutic operations described by these writers are indistinguishable from those prescribed in the psychoanalytic manuals. The impact of systematic psychological theory is small indeed.

One suspects that the gulf between formal theory and both the human relevance of specific research problems and the kinds of applications so optimistically implied in Hull's preface is partly a function of the traditional logic of modern psychology as a discipline.

THE LOGIC OF PSYCHOLOGY

As psychology divorced itself from philosophy and grew self-conscious about itself as a science, it levied heavily on other sciences for models to follow in developing its own formal structure. Similarly, it borrowed heavily from logical positivism in evolving a theory of meaning against which to test its concepts. The basic assumptions

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here appear to be two. First, the strategy for attacking ignorance is universal over the sciences, and a new enterprise like psychology can, consequently, profitably take over the patterns of older disciplines like physics or biology. Second, logical positivism, which represents essentially a description of the logical processes involved in natural science, serves as a prescription for the development of scientific knowledge.

There is a sense in which this twofold case is thoroughly defensible. Its validity is questionable, however, in the light of the disappointing range of generalization attained by psychological theory in the twentieth century. Further, it may involve a peculiar contradiction. The assumption of the structure and even the concepts of another field is essentially an analogical process, and analogies are usually ill regarded in positivistic circles. Thus, a logical as well as a pragmatic factor justifies a certain suspicion here.

There is still another hazard in this type of borrowing. As Cohen (7) has pointed out, a time lag usually occurs before an idea which seems fruitful in one sphere of inquiry is adopted into another. By the time of adoption, the notion may have withered at its source. The mechanistic conception of mind so fashionable in the nineteenth century is an easy illustration. But the concern goes deeper. The borrowing science is not only destined to show a kind of historical retardation; it is likely to be misled in its basic principles. Applying a concept from physics or chemistry to behavior hardly insures behavior's conforming to the laws of physical science. Appropriate laws must be discovered from an examination of behavior itself. Conceivably, the process of examination may be better facilitated by other approaches—natural history observation, the critical appraisal of common sense against reported experience, introspection, or other methods—than by applying possibly Procrustean analogies from other disciplines.

With respect to logical positivism, psychology seized quickly—and, to a degree, advantageously—on the doctrine that the intelligibility of any concept rests on the extent to which reduction sentences may pin it to the data of observation through the specification of public "operations." Relatedly, the utility of any proposition is dependent upon its direct susceptibility to public test. The employment of concepts or the making of assertions under any other conditions constitutes technical "nonsense."

The virtue of such a position, of course, lies in its focus on experi-

mentation as the way to sure knowledge and its virtual elimination of the speculative and the metaphysical. The acceptance of such a stance helped to establish psychology in the domain of natural science and was therefore strategically useful. More important, many of psychology's very real accomplishments may be attributed more or less directly, to the influence of this kind of logical emphasis.

But the advantages have not been without their price. Looking to other sciences for its structure and to positivism for its theory of meaning, psychology has neglected a wide range of significant and recurrent human problems. The sources of aesthetic and interpersonal pleasure, the discrimination of values and their relation to behavior, and the nature of such universal human experiences as volition and responsibility, curiosity and awareness, dignity and humiliation, and love and loneliness are but a few examples. The persistence of such matters in human history suggests that the questions that they perennially pose may be more difficult than technically "nonsensical." In any event, a failure to become engaged with them seems to be one of the weaknesses of psychological theory at the present moment.

SIGNS OF CHANGE

Signs of change, however, are in the air. Positivism itself has seemed to undergo a liberalizing process. One has only to note the differences in the thought of such an influential figure as Carnap (5 and 6) to perceive a radical shift of position. From its emphasis on direct verifiability, logical empiricism has moved to a concept of *confirmability* as a meaningful criterion. Any statement, consequently, may be regarded as meaningful if it lends itself to partial or indirect test within the context of its nomological net or pattern of postulates and empirical statements. Similarly, concepts themselves may be taken as at least potentially valid if their use results in relatively reliable judgments among observers. No decrement in rigor is permitted by these changes in positivistic logic. But the change encourages consideration of some of the recurrent human problems that have so far escaped the net of the behavioral sciences, and measurement is restored to its proper status as a tool of inquiry rather than a primary determiner of the content of study.

And as a response to this invitation to boldness, or merely as a concurrent expression of a more favorable *Zeitgeist*, there have been substantive trends that may amount to a quiet revolution. Nearly all of them challenge the institutionalized model of the organism—spec-

ially the human organism—as one whose conduct follows (with only parametric variations) the hunger paradigm. While it may be a trifle unjust to oversimplify the scheme in this manner, it is nevertheless appropriate for present purposes to present the dominant assumptions in the traditional view of behavior essentially as follows: A tissue need outside the nervous system stimulates end organs; this stimulation evokes variable activity until some consummatory response terminates the need state; and the reduction in drive facilitates learning, which is the process of transforming variable behavior into smoothly functioning sequences of acts. In general, the intensity of response is roughly correlated with the strength of drive; and “secondary,” “social,” or “learned” motives are those derived from conditions contiguous with the onset or termination of “primary” or “biological” need states, which are conceived in both psychoanalytic theory and the comparative psychology of learning as viscerogenic in character.

White (31) has recently reviewed a mass of literature from psychoanalysis, developmental psychology, neurophysiology, and laboratory studies of motivation and learning, all raising serious questions about the utility and accuracy of this well-established point of view. Freud (9), for example, conceived of the instincts as the ultimate causes of *all* behavior, arising as innate “somatic demands upon the mental life” which it was the function of the nervous system “to master.” But this statement of the Nirvana principle, which sounds so much like the concept of drive reduction in the principle of reinforcement, has fared badly at the hands of psychoanalytic theorists since Hartmann (15) raised his epoch-making questions about the development of the ego. In Kardiner’s (19) work on traumatic war neuroses, psychoanalytic theory is virtually stood on its head. Here it is not frustration, the inevitable battle between the imperious instincts and a nay-saying world, that has the educative effect of leading to the reality principle. Rather, the capacity for a controlled and self-interested delay of gratification comes about through such events as the discovery of connections between movement sequences and the sensations to which they give rise in the young child, and from the successful mastery of action systems which permit a “triumphant feeling of making an organ obedient to the will of the ego.” Such themes as mastery, self-discovery, and pleasure in the functioning of capacities represent two noteworthy novelties in psychoanalysis. One is a sharp criticism of the basic theory of the instincts as the energizers of *all* human actions. The other is the turning of attention to some neglected and crucial facets of man’s complex behavior.

In much the same way, White's (31) review of studies in motivation and learning makes it clear that exploratory behavior, the response to novel stimuli, and much behavior which seems to have no goal or instrumental function and is often described as "playful" or exuberant resist explanation via the usual reinforcement conceptions. A surprising amount of work with animals yields results which are at least consistent with Hebb's (16) persuasive arguments that many human enterprises—reading adventure literature, gambling, climbing mountains, continuing a career beyond the age of retirement—strongly suggest needs to increase stimulation rather than to diminish it, a possibility long familiar to common sense and expressed in such phrases as "wanting excitement." It seems at least probable that common sense has in this respect received laboratory confirmation. The evidence argues that solving problems, running certain kinds of risks, and seeking stimulating novelties are, under a wide range of conditions, inherently reinforcing. Rather than the Nirvana principle or some variant of it, some principle of *optimum stimulation* may exercise a prominent influence over the behavior of all organisms, especially those of the flexible and self-examining human species.

It becomes relevant, then, to ask what happens when a state of optimal stimulation is violated in the direction of deprivation. If the essential objective of behavior is to eliminate stimuli, to achieve Nirvana or maximum drive reduction, then conditions of isolation should in large measure be experienced as pleasant and have relatively small effects on behavior. If, on the other hand, it is inherently rewarding to exercise and cultivate potential functions, to seek out sources of stimulation, and to confront novelties and variations in one's experience, then isolation should prove disruptive and unpleasant, leading even to pathological forms of response.

Again, research confirms common sense. Protracted and severe restrictions on activity are rarely looked upon pleasurably, and boredom and isolation are almost universally mentioned by neurotic patients as both characteristic of themselves and as states to be feared. In the rich anecdotal literature by lost or shipwrecked travelers, disaster victims, or men who have spent long periods in isolation either in prison or under frontier conditions like Admiral Byrd (4) in the Antarctic, it is evident that enforced inactivity, monotony, and aloneness are rigorous and upsetting conditions, productive of anxiety, an acute sense of futility, and frequent pathological personality changes. Wheaton (30) similarly points out that the common psychotic epi-

sodes in elderly people who undergo surgery for cataracts may be functions of stimulus deprivation. Postoperative care in such cases entails placing a sandbag or wrapped brick on each side of the head to prevent movement, and the patient is instructed to lie quietly and not to move. An acute psychotic state, including hallucinations, is common. Recovery requires careful and constant nursing care to supply reassurance and a reasonably steady source of stimulation, both social and physical, apparently to restore a sense of meaningful interaction with the world.

The implications of these anecdotal and clinical observations are well borne out by systematic research on isolation effects and stimulus deprivation. Wheaton (30) points out that the consequences of extreme restriction from the environment form a definite syndrome, affected in some degree by concomitant circumstances and the personality of the individual involved. The syndrome develops over the period of isolation, beginning with an asymptomatic stage that gives way to somnolence and an inability to think either long or clearly. As the demand for stimulation remains unsatisfied, irritability, restlessness, and hostility begin to emerge, and there is a conscious attempt to use fantasy as a way of gratifying the mounting need for external contact with the world. At this point, the individual begins to show a childlike kind of emotional lability and certain regressive forms of behavior. Shortly thereafter, hallucinatory phenomena occur, becoming vivid and repetitive and often affecting visual, auditory, and kinesthetic modes of sensation. Following the termination of exposure, there is a period during which the person who has undergone this sequence experiences pronounced flatness of affect, difficulty in focusing his attention, some residual hallucinatory material, and frequent embarrassment because of the intrusion of personal fantasy into his speech.

Thus, from a variety of lines of inquiry—psychoanalytic theory, laboratory investigations of motivation and learning, and recent research on stimulus deprivation—there is a strong tendency to challenge the traditional model of man as a Nirvana seeker, an organism whose acts are primarily devoted to minimizing stimuli, especially those which arise from his viscera, the biological loci of *all* his fundamental drives. Instead, there is considerable warrant to think of man (and other organisms) as motivated by a curious and zestful interest in his surroundings and in the cultivation of his own potentialities for response.

This conception has been well systematized in Woodworth's recent *Dynamics of Behavior* (32). His principal argument is that "all behavior is directed primarily toward dealing with the environment," that "this direction of receptive and motor activity toward the environment is the fundamental tendency of animal and human behavior," and that it is "the all-pervasive primary motivation of behavior." Viscerogenic drives may shape this directionality at times, giving momentary primacy to the attaining of food or an escape from fear. But even these physiologically grounded goals cannot be achieved without effective interactions with the organism's world, and the tendency toward such interactions is for Woodworth "the primary drive in behavior."

A CONCEPTION OF LOVE

From this hasty review, it is apparent that it is at least respectable to reason from three basic tenets, none of them popular under the older logical models that have guided psychology: First, a great deal of behavior seems motivated primarily by an inherent tendency for organisms to enter into commerce with their environments rather than by organic tissue needs and their derivatives. Second, there seem to be a number of drive states which are fulfilled by enhancing stimuli and by maintaining contact between the organism and the stimulus rather than by reducing the stimulus dynamism. Finally, behavior may be reinforced at times by increments in these "positive" drives rather than by motivational decrements.

At the human level, the effective environment is primarily interpersonal. Transactions with the world must, therefore, be essentially social in character. This point holds true especially in infancy and childhood, when the growing youngster is dependent on adults for his comfort, for his survival, and, as studies of feral man have pointed out (27), for his very humanity. As Adler put it, "The high degree of cooperation and social culture which man needs for his very existence demands spontaneous social effort . . . Social interest . . . is an innate potentiality which has to be consciously developed" (1, p. 134).

Just as curiosity seems to provide a kind of cognitive motivational base for relating to the environment, so there seems to be a positive affective drive that is generally and typically present in children. Lois Murphy (22) found a diffuse affection, warmth, and sympathy toward people common among preschool youngsters, comparable to their widespread and interested responsiveness toward things. With age,

this generalized social feeling appears to undergo various vicissitudes. It may gain or lose in strength itself, or it may seem to dissipate as it acquires specific objects as in friendships with other children or increased affectional attachments to parents or other adults.

Yet the potentiality for sympathetic warmth of a widespread kind seems strong. Adler (1) and Sullivan (28), for example, both made much of the process of attitude-communication by empathy. When a mothering figure responds tenderly to a crying, hungry, or apathetic baby, the child reacts as if he was saying, "It is pleasurable to be held tenderly." Out of such experiences, such qualities as trust and security are presumably learned. But being held is a reciprocal kind of experience; the child is participant as well as recipient. If, as psychologists seem to agree, the boundaries between the self and the outside world are fuzzy in infancy, then the baby is at least as likely to interpret the process of being cuddled as if he were saying, "It is pleasurable to pat, lie against, and nuzzle another person." In this case, the child perceives himself, however dimly, as the agent of his own pleasure, and his own affectional actions in relation to another person become the sources of positive feelings. Is it not possible that there is as significant a contribution to a developing need *to* love here as to a need *for* love? Certainly, the experience of tenderness is universal in human beings who survive infancy; and even affectionally starved children, like those studied by Goldfarb (12, 13), seem greatly involved in interpersonal relationships, and quite capable of forming positive attachments of considerable intensity, even though these attachments are marred by insecurity, transience, and a demanding quality that readily evokes annoyance and impatience from others.

Developmentally, it has been noted that there is a change in the second or third year from a fundamental emphasis on proximity and contact on the part of the child in relation to his parents or other positively regarded figures, to a desire to benefit them (2). He gives little presents, learns and uses words of endearment, and caresses the people of whom he is fond. While these behaviors may be learned, of course, as sheer techniques of interpersonal control, they are typical of the age grade, and it is quite improbable that they are *always* acquired as a purely manipulative device. Just as curiosity must be cultivated if it is to develop into ripened understanding, so affection must be cultivated if it is to develop into mature love. This mature behavioral elaboration of the love impulse has been characterized by Fromm (10) under the headings of care, responsibility, respect, and knowledge.

By care, Fromm means something similar to behavior which benefits another person, an active concern for the life and growth of another. It is manifest in a parent's feeding, bathing, and comforting a child; in the favors one friend does for another; and in the mutualities of happily married couples. This facilitation of another's comfort and development is of the essence of love in all its forms. Similarly, responsibility refers not so much to externally imposed duty but simply to responsiveness to the needs of another, including needs for protective discipline as well as permitted indolence. But care and responsibility could readily degenerate into domination and possessiveness if it were not for respect. Taking an etymological point of departure, Fromm defines respect (from *respicere*, to look at) as the ability to "see a person as he is, to be aware of his unique individuality." Here he is in agreement with Scheler, who felt that love, contrary to cynical belief, does not entail the attribution of illusory assets to the beloved:

Such illusions do of course occur, but they are certainly not occasioned by love for the object, being brought about by the very opposite of this, namely the inability to free oneself from partiality to one's *own* ideas, feelings, and interests (24).

Obviously, the concept of respect shades into that of knowledge as Fromm uses these terms, and if he becomes somewhat mystic in his discussion of the latter, the point is yet made: Loving another requires an informed understanding of another's needs, moods, and potentialities, buttressed by a caring responsiveness to them.

Clearly, the occurrence of behavior of this kind is less than universal. Yet Goode (14) has demonstrated that love between the sexes—essentially in the sense dealt with here rather than in that of sheer copulatory relationships—is a "universal psychological potential" which, because it is a basis for and prelude to marriage, may exercise highly disruptive effects on social stratification and lineage patterns. Consequently, more or less formal social controls are institutionalized in virtually all the world's societies to prevent or to harness love. Child marriage, the definition of eligible spouses by stringent kinship rules, the segregation of unmarried men and women from each other, close supervision by close relatives, and peer judgments of acceptability represent these patterns of control. It is well worth underscoring the point that it is not sex pairings that are primarily under restriction here; rather, it is the tendency of people to form interpersonal relationships of high intimacy and mutuality with at least the intention of duration if not permanence.

If this observation is taken along with a reminder that potentialities may be inherent but require development to find ready and full expression in behavior, the fact that mature love may be a relatively scarce commodity presents no challenge to the thesis that love is a complex ego function, part of every human's inherent equipment for dealing with his interpersonal environment.

LONELINESS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY

Adler argued in 1929 that the basic task of the psychotherapist is: to give the patient the experience of contact with a fellow man, and then enable him to transfer this awakened social interest to others . . . Other schools of psychiatry have their successes . . . but . . . they do so less by their methods than when they happen to give the patient a good human relationship (1, p. 341).

Ian Suttie made a very similar point in insisting that the effectiveness of psychoanalytic treatment depends not at all on its associated theory but on the amount and consistency of the love provided by the analyst:

I consider that . . . the patient's need for love is met in numerous and devious ways . . . (by) imperturbability and perfect tolerance on the part of the analyst, his inexhaustible patience and unflinching interest, . . . a ready memory and responsiveness . . . that makes the patient feel at one with the therapist and valued by him (29).

Similarly, Bordin, working within a research context, has identified "warmth" as a crucial therapeutic variable made up of three basic components:

First . . . the degree to which (the therapist) seems willing and devoted to lend himself and his resources as substitutes for those which the patient lacks or is momentarily unable to use. This we are calling the therapist's degree of commitment. The second . . . is the therapist's effort to understand how the patient experiences himself and the world around him. The final attribute . . . (is) "spontaneity," which . . . refer(s) to the degree to which the therapist appears free of reservations which enforce checks on his communications and his feelings as he goes about relating to the patient (3).

It has become a commonplace to speak of the therapeutic relationship as one of the prime agencies through which therapeutic goals are achieved. Adler's, Suttie's and Bordin's descriptions of this relationship certainly come close to meeting Fromm's characterization of mature love. The possibility of counter-conditioning, the transformation of anxiety into security responses, as one mechanism by which therapeutic love does its work, has been dealt with elsewhere (25, 26). Here a different but compatible hypothesis seems relevant.

As Kapit (18) has shown, patients in psychotherapy tend to perceive their therapists very favorably, rating them as very different

from themselves and their parents but as very similar to their best friends *and their own ideal selves*. This finding is consistent with Rosenthal's (23) demonstration that successful cases in psychotherapy tend to alter their moral values to correspond more with those of their therapists, even when moral issues were not an explicit part of the therapeutic content. These studies lend themselves to the interpretation that the therapist serves as a model for the patient and that much of the work of psychotherapy is accomplished through the process of identification. In the lore of psychodynamics, love is expected to facilitate imitation, and this process has been provocatively analyzed by Mowrer (20) along very similar lines.

The present hypothesis suggests that the patient's experience of being loved leads him to imitate the loving behavior of the therapist. Following the model of the therapist, he becomes a more loving person and more richly fulfills the potentialities for love inherent in his native equipment for coping with the interpersonal world.

And this step is a therapeutic one because one of the hallmarks of the neurotic is his deficiency in loving. In the course of therapeutic confidences, such patients may often claim to love (or to have loved) somebody; but whatever they may mean by the experience they refer to, it rarely or never has a sustaining, consoling, or encouraging quality as a significant part of it. Neurotic love seems often to put a high premium on proximity but to involve little duration.² The acts done to benefit the loved one frequently seem to have the effect either of bolstering the neurotic's own shaky self-image or of becoming a basis for legitimizing demands. There is little of what has been described here as mature love about the relationship described, whether it be with parents, friends, or spouses. The result is loneliness—a loneliness born of an undeveloped capacity to enter fully into intimate, mutual, and knowledgeably respectful transactions with the interpersonal world.

In consequence, neurotics typically describe their experience in such terms as "isolation," "feeling on the outside," or recurrent and intense concerns about being liked. They worry agonizingly over whether they will be asked to social functions, or to go shopping with another person, or to serve on a committee or in some official capacity

²There is no necessary implication here of a defense of monogamy or any other culturally institutionalized form of love. One of the defining characteristics of love, however, is its durability over time. In this respect, as in others, it differs from the intense but short lived relationships, generally of a romantic sort and involving strong erotic elements, with which it is often confused.

with others. Yet they seldom report themselves as finding companionship, the pleasure of shared accomplishments or efforts, or the enjoyment of human warmth both given and received. Similarly, they indicate that they are puzzled by the discontent in their marriages, "although there is nothing seriously wrong" with them, and they often are remorseful and dissatisfied with compulsive sexual conquests and romantic involvements that are ultimately "empty" or "meaningless." Strive as they may, they can never quite find what they are searching for in their human relationships. Hence, the experience of loneliness—always a debilitating occurrence, in contrast to a sense of privacy or the state of being alone, both of which can at times be highly rewarding.

The hypothesis offered here is that loneliness is a function of an underdeveloped capacity for love. It is as much a symptom of one's lack of loving as it is one's lack of being loved. It is well known that curiosity may easily be inhibited and restricted through the influences with which it interacts over time. As Gardner Murphy says:

Babies are interested in virtually everything and only through burns, bumps, or dire consequences . . . give up some of their imperious demands upon the world . . . Many things lose their appeal . . . by regimentation and the removal of intrinsic satisfactions in favor of . . . extrinsic rewards . . . Watch children as they respond . . . to nature-study *before* they learn that it's sissified to be interested in birds and bugs. Or watch their interest in the world of creative activity, from making boats to making pictures, *until* they learn forms of social disapproval or the rules which define taboos on such activities, or a sense that these things belong to another kind of people that . . . are ego-alien . . . out of bounds to us (21).

In the same way, the capacity for love can be inhibited and restricted in its development by both a lack of reinforcement and a lack of appropriate models. For example, the Gluecks (11) found that delinquents came from homes which were more frequently broken and more marked by quarreling between the parents than did nondelinquents; similarly, the parents of delinquents were more overprotective, less warm, more indifferent, and more hostilely rejective in their attitudes toward their children than were the parents of nondelinquents. These data are at least consistent with the contention that delinquents, who distinctively feel unappreciated and unwanted, have had little reinforcement for their loving behavior and little in the way of loving models to emulate. Gang associations thus may become ways of combatting loneliness by providing outlets for poorly developed needs to love as well as vehicles for the expression of hostilities and resentments.

But it must be understood that these observations entail no merely sentimental implications. Because love involves caring, responsibility,

and an informed respect for others, it means that there are times when one will prevent a loved person from engaging in self-defeating behavior. Thus, if it follows that delinquents need to learn how to love more maturely from exposure to a suitable model, it does not follow that they need indulgence. Loving parents are likely to be quite unapologetic about discipline, conceiving it as part and parcel of the concerned responsibility their affection demands of them. Discipline in this sense is simply one of the ways by which loneliness may be avoided through strengthening the mature aspects of love.

Finally, this mention of discipline as part of love rather than as something alien to it, serves as a reminder that behavior can be sustained by achieving a higher level of love motivation rather than a reduction. One of the main reinforcements in a parent's denying his child a longed-for but dangerous object or a desired but unwholesome bit of food is the enhancement his behavior provides for his own affection and his own integrity as one who loves his child. Similarly, a wife can readily surrender her own convenience or assume additional responsibilities for the sake of her husband simply because her behaving in such a fashion appropriately underscores and expresses her love for him. Another way of making this point in a lighter but still important way is to remember that loving—being a parent or child, friend or spouse, under appropriate conditions—is like the exercise of curiosity, inherently reinforcing, pleasurable, and even fun!

CONCLUSION

Freed of some of the logical shackles that psychology has typically worn, and in the light of recent changes in psychoanalysis, the laboratory study of motivation and learning, and investigations of isolation and stimulus deprivation, it seems profitable to consider a class of drives that simply energize transactions with the environment. So far as the social world is concerned, one of these motives seems to be something that can meaningfully be called love. If this capacity is inhibited in its development, the resulting experience is that of loneliness. These possibilities seem to square reasonably well with a relatively wide range of empirical evidence and to suggest both research problems and implications for professional practice that bring psychology into closer commerce with the crucial issues that have repeatedly confronted man in his daily experience of himself and his fellows.

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