

# THE ONTOLOGY OF ADLERIAN PSYCHODYNAMICS

WILSON VAN DUSEN

*Mendocino State Hospital, Talmage, California*

And this secret spake life herself unto me. "Behold," said she, "I am that which must ever surpass itself."—NIETZSCHE.

In a recent paper (11) in this Journal I compared Adler's Individual Psychology to existential analysis. As part of this comparison it was said that the psychodynamic heart of Adler's system was basically ontological, but the ontology was embedded or hidden in his key concepts whereas the ontology of existential analysis is more out in the open. My purpose here is to uncover his ontology and to examine some consequences of it.

Ontology comes from two Greek roots *logy*, to speak or theorize about, and *onta*, that which exists. Ontology studies the nature, essential properties and relations of being or what exists. When applied in psychology it is the study of man's being or nature through which all of the rest of the world is known. As Tillich (10, p. 25) has indicated, we never deal with being in itself but rather we use subjective and objective experiences of man as pointers to his being. In this way ontology in psychology comes to the ground of what exists as man.

Why should one translate Adler's system into ontology? For me, I believe that if the historical changes that took place in Adler are examined, one would see that he was drifting towards an ontological view of man. Look for instance at the changes in his conception of man's goal from wanting to be a real man, to have power, self-esteem and security—to striving for perfection and completion. In the earlier formulation he was speaking of man as against other men. In the later, the goal had shifted toward something more universal and general. The earlier is speaking of man among men, the second could be speaking of the being of man. Similarly in the historical change of the prepotent force from aggression, to masculine protest, to a striving for a fictional goal, one sees a shift from an instinct in man to a goal that could transcend any particular situation. Modern European psychoanalysis is moving towards a consciousness of ontology. I believe Adler was moving in this direction too.

Moreover if one examines Adler in the light of ontology, a certain ambiguity in his system becomes clarified when Adler's self is seen as ontological being. To translate Adler, or any psychology, into on-

tology is to translate into the most basic language in philosophy. The ontological frame-of-reference here is in general that of Tillich (10), Heidegger (4), Marcel (7), and Watts (13). To translate into this ontology is to see man in his most basic terms and in the light of his ultimate concerns. It is conceivable that on this ground of ontology psychologies could find a common language and a common frame-of-reference. In any event this translation will partly unite Adler and existential analysis.

The use of an ontological language in psychology is a relatively recent innovation. One can point to few works which use this viewpoint (2, 10, 12). At first sight this language looks needlessly abstract. Yet, in using the general frame of reference of Tillich, Heidegger, Marcel and Watts one is using an ontology which is phenomenologically grounded and is the opposite of abstract. Each term in it points directly to palpable human experience, though not so much to the content of, or things in such experience. Rather it points to the ground of this experience, what supports it, what makes it experience as against just things.

#### AN EXAMPLE OF ONTOLOGICAL QUESTIONING

The call for an ontological language will become clearer if we go outside Adler and question the reality existing behind some of Freud's concepts. A parishioner comes to a minister with the anxious complaint that he fears he is becoming homosexual. He feels like looking at men, they excite and frighten him. Homosexual panic. The minister explores the content of the man's experience phenomenologically. Over a period of time it becomes clearer that the man is developing sensitivity in several directions all at once, to nuances of color, to sound, and to emotions in himself and in others. As the man discovers the breadth of what is emerging in him, it appears less homosexual in itself and more and more becomes a sensitivity in a broad sense. With this discovery and use of this sensitivity, the so-called homosexual panic vanishes. Now let us turn to the ontological question, the question of the nature of the reality of what was dealt with. Was this a latent homosexuality which was emerging and later turned into a successful sublimation with the help of the minister? Or was it sensitivity in itself which was emerging, to which the man reacted with fear of homosexuality because his culture had taught him to be suspicious of such feelings? Be clear in your own mind—the real nature of what was emerging is in question. Were they homo-

sexual tendencies, or tendencies towards a new sensitivity? Classical Freudians would smile and say it was homosexual; the minister was afraid of such tendencies himself, and so he dodged them in the patient. People with a more modern frame of reference would incline towards the second possibility (i.e., perhaps Horney would). Many people are a confused mixture of the two because they do not question the ultimate nature of their concepts. They juggle signs and never question exactly what they point to in human experience.

Look at the importance of the difference between the two answers. One says ultimately man is id, man is a collection of sexual or aggressive urges, polymorphous perverse (or perverted) as Freud said. Man is instinct that wants to bite, chew, suck, dominate by incorporating and expelling. Were it not for restraints of society man would eat, use and genitally dominate the world.

The other alternative to our case points in a very different direction. If you say it really was sensitivity which was emerging and which the man was at first inclined to misinterpret, one's world view is remarkably different. It says at least that there are some positive forces in man which also strive to reach the light of day. It says that sometimes our culture or our upbringing can lead us to misinterpret and combat these positive forces. This second position is not so clearly worked out as Freud's. It cannot fully specify what these positive forces are, especially since it has not reified man into parts or drives, such as sex and aggression.

To carry the ontological questioning further, I would wonder whether orality is in itself, in the unconscious, a need to take into the mouth, or is it instead a general complex of going into, going down, regressing, going back to origins, a return to primitive and basic modes of living. And is anality anal, or is it instead *symbolic* of a mode or aspect of life in which one controls, contains, and expresses or goes out only to express one's self? Is the genital in itself a wish to meet, dominate and control the other person in order to express one's self sexually? Or is it rather a way of symbolizing the aspect of life in which one meets and deals with life in any productive way? The further we have moved historically from Freudian orthodoxy, the further we have moved from the first kind of answer to the second. This is not to criticize Freud, for he came a long way for the first person to open a new territory. *In fact I could easily say Freud is absolutely right, except that what he said was biological, appears now to be symbolical of some of the major modes of our being-in-the-world.* On-

tological questioning uncovers issues such as these. *Ontology in psychology questions the ultimate nature of the reality which is man.*

#### SELF AND BEING

We can come directly to the ontology embedded in Adler's system by questioning the nature of the ultimate agent or doer in his system. In Freud man consists of three agents; id, ego, and superego—which helps one to lose sight of the man. For Adler there is one agent, the self. When one examines the self in relation to its acts, there emerges a rather provocative ambiguity in Adler. This ambiguity disappears when seen ontologically, precisely because, I believe, Adler was dealing with an ontological reality. Let us first look at the ambiguity, and then at the ontological translation and examination of it.

In Individual Psychology the individual and unique self is the agent of all acts (1, pp. 177-178). Yet Adler includes within the self both self as agent and the acts of this agent. These acts are the style of life. He likens the self to both the artist and the artist's creations. This is the beginning of the ambiguity—the artist and his art are not distinguished. Self is not distinguished from the style of life, though it would appear the latter is the manifestation of the former. Adler hinted at a separation when he referred to the creative power underlying the style of life as the central agent. The matter becomes a little darker when one considers that self as agent does not stand forth in consciousness. It is outside awareness (1, p. 286). Now this agent which lies behind or outside consciousness makes the critical choice of the fictional goal and the style of life to reach the goal. On this agent everything depends and yet the agent is unknown. How accountable is this agent-self in his choices? Though Adler describes several external conditions which make a pathological choice more likely (1, pp. 367-371), they actually only influence his choice. The choice ultimately lies in his hands regardless of circumstances (1, pp. 172ff., pp. 204 ff.)

The agent-self which lies outside of awareness is at fault when a false goal of personal superiority with insufficient social interest is chosen. In spite of these characteristics of self as agent, this self is loosely identified with the person himself. Out of this comes the note of blame Adler puts on pathological choices. This can be found in every pathology he describes (e.g., psychoneurosis and psychosis, 1, pp. 299ff.). The agent is not distinguished from his work which makes him guilty in pathology. This is true even though the agent is not a

conscious part of the person. In Adler, what is most centrally our self lies out of reach! It is as though what is most centrally our self is unaware and this unaware self is the pathology it creates.

For me, this strange situation in Adler's psychodynamics is cleared up when one discovers that Adler's agent-self has an ontological existence which is not quite the same as conscious existence! I submit that when one distinguishes self as agent from the acts of self (style of life) then the ontological reality of the self can stand forth. If his self is being in ontological terms, then Adler is correct in all respects except that one is not quite so guilty in a pathological choice. I have the impression that in his concept of self he was unerringly steering towards being, though he did not have the benefit of modern studies of the ontological nature of man's being. It appears he did not wish to separate self from its acts so as to avoid any seeming division of man into aspects. Yet self and acts of self can be distinguished without separating them. First let us examine being in ontology and then see the implications for Individual Psychology when self is seen as ontological being.

As used here and by key existential philosophers, this being is the unique existing of each individual. It is the ground or source of his experiencing **while** the data of his experience are the manifestation of its presence. It has been described as the knower which transcends any known (8, pp. 100f.; 9, pp. 128f.). That is, it is the subject (self) of any objective data of experience (style of life). Marcel (7, p. 5) describes it as withstanding an exhaustive analysis of the data of experience. It has variously been described as the ground of knowledge (13, p. 59), as truth (6, p. 29), presence (7, p. 22) and the will to create myself (6, p. 183). This being in itself is something of a mystery (7, p. 8) because it itself has no form, while all forms (images, thoughts, desires, etc.) in the psychic life are forms in it. Paul Landsberg says: At the root of all being there is an act, the *affirmation of self*. In each personality, aware of its uniqueness, we find the affirmation of this uniqueness, moving towards its realization, an affirmation which implies the tendency to surpass the limits of time . . . . Consciousness imitates the depth of being (5, pp. 23f.).

This makes the being of these philosophers remarkably similar to Adler's self.

When one examines how one can know being, one gets into some of the paradoxes that surround Adler's self. Since this being is the knower in the ground of knowledge it is presupposed in any questioning. But because it is not objective, it cannot be proven. It underlies the questioner, the question, and the proof.

Perhaps the clearest example of this self-evident quality of the phenomenologically present being is to be found in Alan Watts.

The infinite is the irreducible ground of all knowledge, and is known immediately, as distinct from objectively. As the ground of all beings it is as free from the limitations and determinations of beings as the knower from those of the things known. Since both proof and doubt can have reference only to known objects, the infinite is accessible to neither. As ultimate and infinite reality there is no external standpoint from which to doubt it or prove it. We are compelled then to take it as given (13, pp. 48f.).

The frame of reference is then holistic and phenomenological. It points to the basic agent of human experience. This agent-being cannot be circumscribed. Rather, it lies so immediately in the heart of all our experiences that it is difficult to understand. The philosophers such as Martin Heidegger are continuing to uncover this being and to discover its life.

Suppose Adler's self as agent is this ontological being. Immediate gains are that Adler can then be translated into existential philosophy, existential analysis, Tillich's theology, and into many central concepts in Eastern religions. The ambiguity in Adler referred to before can be cleared up. Though this being lives in all its acts, the nature of this being is essentially different from its acts. Its acts are objective while it itself is not objective and is the ground of the acts. In Adler's terms this means that self lives in the style of life but is of a nature more fundamental than the style of life. Exactly as Adler has described the situation, the manifestations of being point to its aims just as the style of life points to the goal of the self. Once this translation from self to being has been made, the two fields of Individual Psychology and existential philosophy can hold a mutually informative dialogue in which each checks its findings with the other. In the dialogue the apparent ambiguity in Adler disappears.

#### THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY AND EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY

Suppose Adler's self is this ontological being. As Adler has said, it would be the sole and ultimate agent in man. Just as he has described it, objective circumstances of heredity and environment would not determine this self-being. They would at most be influences answered by the creative power in the individual. This self-being would manifest in a style of life. This is what is meant by Heidegger's concept of being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world is the way this being shows up in an individual's world. Heidegger's being-in-the-world implies the same uniqueness as exists in Adler's style of life.

The world referred to is *not* the objective world of physics and normative psychology. It is the individual's world as he finds it, with just his people, his objects, his emphases in it. The phrase being-in-the-world implies a polarity of opposites—being and world. Where they meet is the individual's world or style of life.

Up to this point we have really just found Adler can be translated into ontology. Other than a translation, nothing has been gained. But look again. The translation would call for several shifts in Adler's position which would remove the apparent ambiguities referred to above. Being is not this world. My mode of being-in-the-world is only the way being manifests in my situation. If self is being, this would suggest that style of life is the manifestation of the living self but not of the same substance as the self. This would distinguish the artist and his art but would not tear the two apart. The self would be, as Alan Watts describes it (and the description comes from ancient Hindu texts), the knower, and the style of life the known or the objectified.

Another change would be suggested to Adler. It would no longer be correct to say this self is not in awareness. This is only true if you mean objectified, made an object in awareness. Rather, self seen in these terms cannot be out of awareness since it is the very being-awareness! But it cannot stand forth as an object. At best it can be symbolized in awareness. Carl Jung's studies of the symbols of the self are precisely of this nature—this being showing up as a symbol. With these little shifts (and they are not major changes) Adler is brought into a philosophical and religious tradition. But look further at some consequences of seeing Adler in this new light. By this translation one can find what Adler has discovered of the being of man. After that we can see to the matter of guilt in the *choice* of pathology.

*Striving for superiority and standing forth.* To Adler there is one basic striving in all individuals, which has been described as striving for superiority or perfection. He has been criticized for such a simple, one-way-of-operating system. There is not the collection of defense mechanisms which show the interaction of three parts of man as in late Freudian analyses. I believe Adler's system has this purity and singleness because it is ontological rather than mechanistic as was Freud's (note *mechanisms* of defense). Moreover, Adler has captured the most general characteristic of this self-being.

Self is the agent of all acts. Its inherent unity and consistency is manifested in the internally consistent style of life, which is the way

taken to the goal of the self regardless of the changing vicissitudes of external circumstances. Man has this internal consistency because he is a single agent. Adler and this ontology agree in taking a holistic and phenomenological approach to man. Adler appears to be describing the most central (and puzzling) aspect of man seen ontologically. He is a being which must stand forth, appear, manifest, move in the world. This is the meaning of existential—what manifests, exists. Adler's striving for superiority ultimately moves into the social world. *Adler's central dynamic is then that of being manifesting itself.* Ontologically this is the problem of the infinite (the transcending knower) becoming the finite, the here-present, the world as we know it (the known). *Adler is saying being must manifest.* This is something of a discovery. It hasn't been emphasized sufficiently by others.

More than this, Adler is pointing to the kind and direction of this manifesting of being. It is a striving to stand forth, to be above, to be in control, to be perfect. When being fails to stand forth, in dreams and folklore, it is represented broadly as going down, dissolving, as dying. To live or exist is to stand forth. To manifest is to stand forth, to take form. To say being must manifest is to say self must build a style of life in order to stand forth and exist in this sense. We cannot attack in this limited space why this is so. It is sufficient to say, this is what Adler's clinical observations point to when seen ontologically. This must of being or self to stand forth, Heidegger has called the insistent existence of being (4, pp. 344f.). Even when Adler speaks of suicide, the example *par excellence* of going down, he says one goes down to maintain some sort of superiority or individual integrity (1, pp. 323-324). The same is true of regression (1, p. 288).

*Fictional goal and aim of being.* Adler says the goal of this must of being to stand forth is fictional and is chosen by the individual early in life. Here fiction is a subjective guiding idea. It does not stand forth clearly in the light of consciousness. It is the aim of being and hence guides and rules its way of manifesting. It is the end of all man's acts. Since it does not stand forth in consciousness (unless the person has been analyzed and discovered the ruling fiction), it seems strange to say it is chosen by the individual. When, and in what way is it chosen so that he does not remember? Hans Vaihinger, from whom Adler borrowed the concept of fiction, comes close to seeing man's tendency toward the construction of fictions as more like the aim of being than like a simple ego choice. For in speaking of it



Vaihinger says, "But if we say: Conceptual forms and fictions are expedient psychological constructs, then these are closely related to 'cosmic agencies and constituents,' for it is they that call these expedient forms into existence in the organic being" (1, p. 78). If we apply this to Adler's concept of the goal, the guiding fiction, then the guiding fiction turns out to be the aim of being. Partaking of the nature of being itself it does not in itself stand forth as an object to be examined. All the behavior of the individual, his very style of moving and gesturing are its signs. To have such a pervasive and ruling effect it must be more like the ground of experience than it is like any sort of content. Adler is saying, then, that being must stand forth, and in so doing it shows it has a general aim. In the style of life Adler is saying that being is internally consistent in all the ways it manifests itself. From this one can genuinely suspect that if we could read gestures, movements, voice quality, and any of the phenomenological nuances of an individual accurately, *each nuance would point rather directly to the aim of being in the individual*. This is much to be hoped for. It says being stands forth in every instant. It would lend to everything a man does a fabulous meaningfulness and consistency.

*Destructive goal and partly hidden aim of being.* Up to this point Adler is quite accurately and significantly leading from clinical observations of man in the direction of the findings of the existential philosophers of being. In the question of pathology he tackles the most significant question of the life of being. What happens when it cannot stand forth fully—when it founders in the cramped circumstances of a man's world?

At this point I personally feel Adler's observations are pointing beyond what the existential philosophers of being have found. Adler says, in effect, that in pathology the will to superiority stands forth anyway. But here the will to superiority hides a lie, it cheats, and as a result is socially destructive rather than productive. There is the definite implication in Adler that the aim of being, when it fully manifests, is socially constructive in the world of men. When it is partly hidden, it becomes socially destructive.

Ontologically, Adler has made a significant discovery. Being must manifest, stand forth. When it cannot do so genuinely, fully and productively, it stands forth anyway. But in this case the standing forth is partial, false, partly revealing and partly concealing its own nature. One thinks, for example, of the woman whose phobias control her husband. Though Adler himself tends to take a fairly negative view

of the meaning of symptoms, when seen ontologically their positive meaning can be found. The woman who rules the home by her phobias has a dominance and strength in her which is showing in a limited way in the symptoms. She can and would control and direct. If this cannot manifest fully, then it does so partially and is less constructive. The degree of manifestation is directly related to the degree of social constructiveness. This says something critical of being or self. Ultimately it is socially constructive to the world of other people. Only when it is hidden or only partially manifest does it become destructive. This is the exact opposite of all those psychodynamic systems which say that since some men are bad there is evil in man. The difference is a temporal one. If one takes snapshots of man (man seen in this and that instant), some men look bad. One has to see man dynamically or developmentally over a long period of time to see what he was trying to do!

Adler's important finding for an ontology of man is that when being cannot fully realize its aims in the person's world, when it founders, it does what it must do. It stands forth anyway. But in this pathological existence it is partly in darkness, partly hidden from itself and hence unconstructive. One can put Adler and existential analysis together and say that to the degree one is self-estranged one fails to be socially constructive.

Let us turn back to the earlier example of the man who felt he was becoming homosexual. It was his being which attempted to stand forth and made him anxious as long as its aim was hidden. He was vaguely afraid of becoming weak and effeminate. As his being emerged more clearly, it appeared that a new, delicate and emotional sensitivity was arising in him. Was it really homosexual? Ontologically seen I would say not, unless one uses homosexuality as symbolic of the sensitivity. What was attempting to emerge was what was present when he was well, whole and socially constructive. At that point he wasn't homosexual, he was socially and artistically sensitive.

There are a number of implications in Adler's dynamics seen in this light. That being always stands forth (the goal of superiority) is consistent with what others think of being. It would have been a poor thing to say that in the healthy man being must manifest but in the sick man it must hide. One can see the insistent nature of the being of man from the fact that even in a cramped and constrictive set of worldly circumstances it must still stand forth. This lends much important hope that the style of life or even the phenomenological nuances of a man's ways all point to the aim of being (the guiding

fiction). The false or lie aspect of the neurotic's exaggerated uncooperative goal of personal superiority is the half hidden face of the unrealizable aim of being. Adler appears inclined to call the person to account for this lie. Ontologically, the choice of this lie is hidden in the same darkness as is the guiding fiction which rules but does not stand forth in consciousness. If one is present but unknown, so is the other. Calling a person to account for this lie is exactly like the minister berating a parishioner for a lack of faith. Rather than say a person chooses this fake way of getting on top, ontologically I would be inclined to say, being has manifested as well as it could. It is the job of the therapist to discover how being wishes to stand forth and to help it to do so. Adler's therapy is directed to this end. This shows in his sensitivity to the will to superiority of the other person and his help to maintain this will to superiority. By this he simply helps being to manifest.

*Narrowing of social interest and foundering.* There are many other ties between ontology and Adler. What he referred to as inferiority, is equivalent to existential foundering. In a foundering, one is smaller and inferior to what one could be. In the feeling of inferiority one feels trapped as one does when one founders in his being-in-the-world. Adler has pointed out some key circumstances which increase the likelihood of a later foundering, such as being pampered or neglected as a child (1, pp. 367ff.). Maslow's hierarchy of needs referred to by Ansbacher in connection with Adler (1, p. 124) represents levels of foundering. For example one could say that roughly the same goal of self is reflected in insistant sexual cravings as in repeated entanglements in love affairs, though the latter is a less profound foundering than sexual craving. The goal of self is more apparent in love entanglements than it is in sexual compulsions. Foundering means literally being caught in some segment of life and is in accord with Adler's description of the narrowing of social interest in pathology. There are many other ties between the two systems, but it is sufficient to say at this point that when Adler is translated into ontological terms, it becomes apparent that his clinical observations have much to add to and help affirm in an ontology of man.

This translation removes the ambiguity in Adler referred to above. When self is seen as ontological being, and style of life as the way being manifests, then it is not quite right to blame the man for a pathological choice. For one thing, what we usually think of as the man is the style of life—all the ways self manifests. This is the choice and not the choosing. Now one can blame self or being, but this is not the same

as blaming the man as we see and know him. Even here we cannot blame self, because all of Adler's clinical findings point to the fact that self manifests as well as it can in the individual. In this way the sick individual has done as well as he can.

But, you might say, when one does therapy with an individual, one eventually finds a guilt related to their choice of pathology. Quite so. But this guilt is ontological and has been described as such by Tillich (10). It does not say the individual cleverly got away with something. It says, something in him (self or being) is aware that he could reach higher. This will be most obscure for some. How can you separate self and the man? They are both parts of the same unity, except that one says what is agent, and the other says what the agent has accomplished in its meeting with his world. It is a bit paradoxical, but what Adler has said of the self as agent is perfectly correct in an ontological sense. Self has all the control, power and choice he implies since his self is ontological being. But because Adler has taken such an ontological view of the self, he has partly neglected how self has difficulty getting through in the individual's world.

Adler has pointed out several ways in which the world can promote a pathological foundering in individuals. But a really detailed phenomenological study of individuals such as Binswanger's (2) finds dozens of other ways in which being may founder. Then, because Adler took a central and ontological view of man, he tended to neglect ways in which being can founder in the world and he tended to find this ontological self guilty for foundering. It is paradoxical that ontologically man is capable of ultimate and great things but practically, in his world, he is up against grave obstacles. The gravest of all obstacles has been pointed out by Binswanger (3). It is the fact that what is attempting to manifest transcends every limitation of the world of things and even the world of thought. What is attempting to appear is far more than can appear.

#### AN ONTOLOGICAL COMPARISON OF ADLER TO OTHERS

Seen ontologically, Adler is not emphasizing just a single and simple aspect of man as many have said of his central will to perfection. He is very close to seeing man in terms of the most basic and pervasively important frame of reference possible. Compared to him, Freud, Jung and a host of others are dealing primarily with man seen analogically in symbols, while Adler is close to man as he is in himself. Compared to Sullivan and the neo-Freudians, Adler is dealing with more central and ruling aspects than they are. They

are defining man as he affects and is affected by others. Adler is closer to man in himself. For one who is basically a clinician and not a philosopher Adler came as close as he could to a view that is both clinically and philosophically adequate. The ontologies of Freud and Jung are hidden in symbolic constructs, the ontology of the neo-Freudians is even more hidden in social constructs. Adler's ontology stands forth as does his central concept of superiority. In this respect he is closest to the existential analysts, and in his concepts of pathology he sometimes surpasses them.

#### BACK TO THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL GROUND

In case all this seems abstract, it can be translated directly and easily into phenomenal experience. We are more than can be captured in words and gestures. We want to stand forth, be clear, conscious and perfection itself. I am struck by how much children easily and clearly express the need of being, to be seen and recognized. Listen to the young ones when mother is around. "Look mommy, look what I am doing!"

But we cannot always realize what we would have ourselves and others see and recognize. When being founders or there is an exaggerated goal of personal superiority, the individual himself cannot stand forth in a natural, relaxed and convincing manner. He evades your eyes, turns away, and holds a kind of desperate monologue with himself. Or if he stands forth, it is noisily, overruling the others present, and he is unaware of their needs. He sweeps the others aside and is a puffed-up actor.

Again, phenomenologically, there is a different aim of being (guiding fiction) expressed in these different styles. The one who evades the eyes of others, turns away and holds a desperate monologue with himself, is showing that he tends to lose himself with others and find himself away from the ruling of others. The puffed-up noisy actor is the natively more dominant, more controlling, and the one who tends to find himself with others. One could go on at considerable length showing these ideas in phenomenal situations. These ideas are not so removed from the world of man as it might seem, if they can be illustrated by the cry of a child, "Look mommy, look what I'm doing!"

#### SUMMARY

One can question psychodynamic systems ontologically and thereby discover more of their ultimate meaning to the concerns of

man. When so questioned, Adler's system is not symbolic as is Freud's and translates rather directly into ontology. His self as agent becomes the phenomenally present being of the existential philosophers. One sees that Adler is centrally concerned with the way the being of man manifests in man's experiences. Adler finds that being insists on standing forth (being superior) or existing. It stands forth in a particular style of living which points to its goal or the aim of being. In both normal and abnormal individuals it stands forth. In the abnormal it has foundered or has only partially manifested and can be less productive socially. A ruling implication in Adler's system is that being, when fully realized in experience, is constructive or socially ameliorating. Being is destructive only in so far as it is hidden or self-estranged in the individual's world. Such an examination of Individual Psychology would suggest a separation of self from style of life, its way of manifesting. It would also suggest that Adler tends to reify the negative aspects of the person (e.g., the neurotic hides a lie), while the negative is rather a sign that the positive has not stood forth fully. Because he is so close to an ontological orientation, Adler tends to overlook a number of the critical possibilities for foundering and self-estrangement in an individual's world. Both Adler's frame of reference and its ontological translation can be shown simply and easily in phenomenal experiences. An important implication of both is that the aim of being in the normal as well as in the abnormal individual is always phenomenologically present and can be discovered by the clinician.

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