

The Psychologies of McDougall and Adler

A Comparison

MARGARET PEGRAM REEVES

Urbana, Illinois

INTRODUCTION

Any science which attempts to study living beings is peculiarly susceptible to change and modification. Especially is this true of psychology; but a great deal of the apparent difference of opinion among psychologists is not due so much to contradictory beliefs as to a difference in terminology, a difference of classification and expression. More important, there is a difference of emphasis and a difference of method of approaching a problem. Psychology is still in a formative stage: various phases of study, instead of being integrated into a whole, may be given an undue and exaggerated importance; what should be regarded as a *part* may be regarded as *the whole*.

True differences are of value and significance. But differences which are only apparent rather than real serve to retard the advance of psychology. Language factors are important in a comparison of this nature, since translation does not always render the exact shade of meaning implied in the original. A much greater obstacle to a neat and definitive comparison of two psychological systems is the fact that neither was brought forth in a complete and final form. Both Adler and McDougall constantly modified and revised their theories; the task becomes one of comparing two growing and evolving bodies of thought, not that of describing two static theories.

I. THE NATURE OF MIND

The nature of mind—its origin and functions, and particularly its relation to the body—has been a subject of great interest, and the subject of much discussion and dispute since men evolved to the state of being aware of being conscious. It is not possible here to discuss the many possible answers to this problem, nor to study their implications. McDougall has devoted a long and scholarly book to a single phase of the matter, the Mind-Body problem (*Body and Mind—A History and Defense of Animism*). The problem is one of fundamental importance

to the understanding of any philosophical or psychological system; the answers given to the questions arising from these problems to a great extent determine and limit the conclusions concerning all the rest of the problems in the field.

Adler and McDougall agree in their use of the term "soul." McDougall writes: ". . . those manifestations of life and mind which distinguish the living man from the corpse and from inorganic bodies are due to the operation within him of something which is of a nature different from that of the body, an animating principle generally, but not always conceived as an immaterial and individual being or soul." (6, p.viii).

Similarly, Adler says: "The building up of the psychical life out of mechanical, electrical, chemical or analagous stimuli is to such an extent incomprehensible that I prefer to fall back upon the hypothesis which assumes that in the nature and meaning of 'life,' there must be included a soul-organ whose function is not that of subordination but coordination and which, starting from small beginnings, develops ultimately to the final function of responding to these stimuli." (3, p.51).

According to McDougall, mind is a complex organization comprising a great number of functional units which mature spontaneously, just as muscles and glands and other tissues of the body mature. Mind for both is to be described in terms of experience and behavior; both insist on the primary importance of the *subject* who behaves and experiences as well as the *object* which acts.

It is clear that neither McDougall nor Adler finds materialistic mechanism an adequate foundation for psychology. Both assert the reality of mind. Whether mind is a distinct entity which interacts with the body (psycho-physical interactionism) or whether mind and matter are two phases of the same underlying reality (double-aspect theory) is a problem not finally answered by either man in his own writings. McDougall in his earlier writings inclined strongly towards a theory of psycho-physical interactionism; in his later works he seemed to come to favor more a double-aspect theory.

Adler's statement on the subject is quite similar to McDougall's: ". . . in Individual Psychology we are really confronted with the living interactions of mind and body. . . . The findings of Individual Psychology remove much of the tension from this problem. It no longer remains a plain 'either . . . or.' We see that mind and body are ex-

pressions of life: they are parts of the whole of life. And we are beginning to understand their reciprocal relations to the whole." (5, p.25).

There is an important difference between the two approaches to the evolutions of the mind. Adler on the one hand presents a theory closely allied to that of Bergson, in which mind and motion are correlated developments. The foreseeing of the directions of movement is the central principle of the mind; the power of variety of movements is in direct proportion to the level of intelligence.

McDougall also sees the source of the evolution of the mind in the need for control of our surroundings. But he makes it dependent to a large extent on our *effort* to control our environment. To him, the evolution of the animal world is primarily a process of differentiation and specialization of our instincts. And this differentiation is achieved racially through the experience of succeeding generations.

The problems relating to the structure of the mind, to its unity, to unity and disintegration, and to the relation of the conscious to the subconscious may better be discussed in a later section. Fundamentally there is agreement between McDougall and Adler as to the unitary, integrated nature of mind in both its conscious and its subconscious functions.

II. THE TELEOLOGICAL APPROACH

Teleology is a fundamental principle underlying the psychologies both of McDougall and Adler. McDougall states that behavior is always purposive action, or a series of purposive actions; it is because all actions which have the marks of behavior seem purposive, in however a vague and lowly degree, that we regard them as expressions of mind.

Adler expresses a similar view when he says, "We cannot think, feel, will, or act without the perception of some goal . . . every psychic phenomena, if it is to give us any understanding of a person, can only be understood if regarded as a preparation for some goal." (3, p.3).

The use of the term "goal" and the concept of striving for a goal is essentially similar in both psychologies. The nature of the goal and the source of the individual's motivation are matters on which there is some disagreement, as will be shown when the problem of native endowment is discussed.

Both Adler and McDougall find hedonism inadequate to account for behavior. McDougall holds that progress towards and attainment of a goal are pleasurable experiences, and thwarting and failures are

painful or disagreeable experiences. Adler refers to "the worthlessness of pleasure and pain as causes and justification for . . . behavior" and later, "In our investigations, we found the 'attainment of pleasure' to be a variable and in no way determining factor, adjusting itself completely to the orientation of the life plans." (3, p.101). It is agreed that the attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are not goals in themselves, but rather are feelings consequent to the degree of success in attaining the desired goal. This does not mean that the factors of pleasure and pain are not of importance; according to McDougall, pleasure tends to facilitate conation; and pain, while it does not eliminate motivation, may profoundly modify the course and direction of the strivings.

The main difference between McDougall and Adler on this point is that Adler seems to attribute a greater share to environmental factors in determining what the goal shall be, McDougall more to internal determinants. The difference is one of emphasis; both agree that the *source* of the motivation comes from within the individual himself. The question is to what extent the mode in which the goal is achieved is modified by the environment.

III. NATIVE ENDOWMENT

There are certain innate forces and characteristics which are underlying determinants of all behavior. Adler and McDougall both emphasize this fact, although they are not entirely in agreement as to what constitutes these basic inherent qualities.

McDougall proposes a list of propensities or instincts which he regards as fundamental sources of energy. (In his earlier works he called these sources of energy *instincts*, both when he was referring to human and to animal behavior. McDougall never meant to indicate a rigid, invariable, blindly unconscious type of behavior so often associated with the term *instinct*; and more in deference to popular understanding rather than to any radical change in his theory he later used the term *propensity* to refer to these innate sources of motivation and energy.)

Adler presents two main sources of behavior which are comparable to McDougall's propensities: the *will-to-power* and the *social feeling*.

In McDougall's theory, these innate tendencies are the bases from which character and will are developed under the guidance of the intellectual faculties. Emotion is regarded as the mode of experience

which accompanies the working within of instinctive impulse. Hence for each propensity which McDougall postulates, he lists an accompanying primary emotion. The more important among the conative dispositions or propensities that McDougall proposes are the food-seeking, disgust, sex, fear, anger, curiosity, protective or parental, gregarious, self-assertive, submissive, constructive, and acquisitive propensities. In keeping with McDougall's custom, I have used in this list the shorter and less accurate term for these propensities; in many cases the name given actually corresponds to the accompanying emotion, as for example, the emotion *fear* accompanies the "propensity to flee to cover in response to violent impressions that inflict or threaten injury."

Adler's treatment of the innate bases of behavior is more general in its approach, with much less of minute analysis than McDougall's. His two main sources of behavior, the will-to-power and the social feeling are expanded to cover the whole range of activity for which McDougall proposes a tentative list of approximately a score of motivational sources. Adler's approach is one of "Here's what we have"; McDougall's is one of "Here is what we started with, and this is the way we arrived at what we have." For the most part, there is no great conflict in the end result; the task is largely one of showing that Adler's major components when analysed break down into the components of McDougall's simpler units; and that McDougall in building up his units, the propensities, into sentiments arrives at a structure very much like the one Adler starts with.

There is fundamental agreement in the role of cognitive factors—intelligence, perception, imagination, imagery. The major difference is here again one largely of the degree to which they are analysed and systematized.

McDougall makes a distinction between the *primary emotions*, which accompany the functioning of a specific propensity, and *feelings*. The primary modes of feeling are pleasure and pain (used in the sense of displeasure, or frustration, rather than the physical sensation of pain). Various blends of feeling accompanying a primary emotion give rise to what McDougall calls *derived emotions of desire*, prospective or retrospective. A fuller discussion of McDougall's theory of emotions and of Adler's will-to-power and social feeling will be given in the section dealing with the organization of the mind.

Adler classifies emotions roughly in two groups—disjunctive and conjunctive emotional affects. Under the heading of conjunctive emo-

tions he lists joy and sympathy; under disjunctive, anger, sadness, disgust, and fear or anxiety. Modesty, which he describes in terms ordinarily used to define embarrassment, may be disjunctive and conjunctive at the same time.

Here we find that Adler treats under the same category a variety of subjects which McDougall separates into at least three different categories: the *primary emotions* of anger, fear, disgust; the secondary or *blended emotion* of modesty; and the *derived emotions*, or feelings, of joy, sadness, and anxiety. Sympathy would fall in still a different category in McDougall's terminology.

It is interesting to note that both McDougall and Adler regard the thwarting and impeding of conation towards any goal an anger-provoking situation; and that they both link disgust to the food-taking propensity.

Both McDougall and Adler insist on the inseparable relationship of the three phases of activity, the cognitive, the conative, and the affective—what we commonly speak of as thinking, doing, and feeling.

IV. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PSYCHICAL STRUCTURE

The foundation of McDougall's theory of development of personality is his theory of sentiment formation. The word *sentiment* is used by McDougall in a specialized and technical way. The theory of sentiments is a theory of the progressive organization of the propensities which become the main source of our activities; and which, when harmoniously organized in one comprehensive system, constitute what he calls *character*.

The sentiment differs from the emotion: the emotion is a mode of experience, a way of functioning, a fact of activity; the sentiment is a fact of structure, an organized system of disposition, which endures, in a more or less quiescent condition, between the occasions upon which it is brought into activity. Emotion is fleeting, sentiment is an enduring acquired disposition gradually built up through many emotional experiences and activities. *Sentiment* is in many ways comparable to the concept of *complex*; it is rather like a complex divorced from all connotation of normality. A sentiment may be either normal or abnormal.

An emotion in its pure and primary state rarely occurs in a human adult, since most adult emotions are composites of several emotions and are nearly always derived from a sentiment rather than from a primary

emotion. *Pure emotion* is a response to a stimulus from a *general type* or *class* of stimuli; a *sentiment* is always directed toward a *specific* and *individual object*. For instance, a child responds *instinctively* with the primary emotion of fear to *any* unexpected loud noise; he responds with a *sentiment* which may involve fear, assertion, and submission to a specific teacher in a specific class-room situation.

Sentiments of various kinds are developed; sentiments for things, for people, for collective objects, for abstract objects. In each individual there is, as a rule, a major dominating sentiment which helps to build all the sentiments into a coherent structure; one sentiment which is the primary integrating force of the personality. Ordinarily this sentiment is (and for the normal personality must be) the sentiment of self-regard.

There is a striking similarity between the way McDougall builds his sentiment of self-regard from the propensities of submission and assertion and the way Adler develops his concept of the life-goal of the individual through the functioning of the will-to-power.

Adler's will-to-power is much like McDougall's assertive propensity; the major difference is that McDougall considers the assertive propensity to be a *primary* motivational source, whereas Adler sees in it a need to compensate for feelings of inferiority. McDougall's propensity for submission is in most respects quite like Adler's feelings of inferiority. There seems to be a slight difference between the two in their views of the relationship of the two propensities: McDougall considers them to be closely allied, but distinct; one is not, as Adler sees, simply the absence or the negation of the other. The similarity is even more strongly emphasized by McDougall's use of the terms *positive self-feeling* as an opposite for the assertive propensity, and of *negative self-feeling* for the submissive propensity. The welding of the positive and negative self-feelings into a sentiment of self-regard is almost identical to the way in which the masculine and feminine elements of the Ego are fused in Adler's system.

The sentiment of self-regard combines the propensities of self-assertion and self-submission. Essential to the normal development of this sentiment is the comparable development of cognitive and conative factors which make possible an adequate comparison and evaluation of self in relationship to others. Self-consciousness arises from the development of the sentiment of self-regard.

Adler's theory of masculine and feminine elements plays similar roles in the formation of the individual ego. The masculine striving for power, aggressive, assailant impulses correspond to McDougall's assertive propensity with its accompanying positive self-feeling. The feminine, defensive, passive elements are related to McDougall's submissive propensity and its allied negative self-feeling.

In both theories, the fusing of these two elements of personality are vital factors in determining the individual's estimation of himself and the way in which he sets about achieving his goals.

The way in which McDougall's sentiment of self-regard determines the activity of the individual is quite parallel to the way in which Adler's life-plan guides the behavior of the individual. This life-plan is the outgrowth of the way in which the individual regards himself: ". . . more important than tendencies, objective experience, and milieu is the *subjective evaluation*, an evaluation which stands furthermore in a certain, often strange, relation to realities. Out of this evaluation however, which generally results in the development of a *permanent mood, of the nature of a feeling of inferiority*, there arises, depending upon the unconscious technique of our thought-apparatus, an imagined goal, an attempt at a planned *final compensation and a life-plan*." (3, p.6).

Both McDougall and Adler stress the basic unity of the personality, the necessity for considering it as a functioning whole. And for both, the integrating force is fundamentally the same: for McDougall, the self-regard sentiment, for Adler, the life-plan.

Adler makes organ inferiority a keynote of his theory of feeling of inferiority and of the goal of striving for superiority; but it is not the actual inadequacy of the organ *per se* which gives rise to the struggle for compensation, but the individual's *feeling* of inferiority, and his reaction to it. While there is no serious conflict between the two in their conclusions, McDougall lays far greater stress on innate individual differences and the role of constitutional factors on the determination of personality.

Three innate factors which McDougall considers constitutionally variable in their importance to the formation of personality are *disposition* (the relative strength of the various propensities), *temper* (the way in which these tendencies work towards their goals—their scale of urgency, persistency, and affectability), and *temperament* (degree of introversion-extraversion).

McDougall considers the factors of disposition and temperament to be related to the functioning of the thalamus; temperament is related to metabolism. Adler gives a much fuller discussion of temperament than does McDougall. While there is agreement concerning the physical basis of temperament, Adler postulates an additional psychological factor in its determination. He maintains that normal endocrine balance cannot *per se* insure a normal temperament.

Besides the three *constitutional* factors which account for personality differences, there are two other factors whose development is dependent upon the *experience* of the individual: character and intellect. Character is the system of directed conative tendencies. The units of character are sentiments and complexes. The native propensities are the raw material which becomes organized to form character. There are two stages in the process of character organization: the formation of sentiments, and the building of the sentiments into a harmoniously co-operating system. Such a system of sentiments McDougall calls character. The strength of character is dependent on the degree of harmony and integration attained by the system.

Adler describes character in this way: "The character of a human being . . . is the index of the attitude of this human being toward his environment, and of his relationship to the society in which he lives." (4, p.144).

Although McDougall makes a more detailed treatment of intellect, there is complete agreement between Adler and McDougall in their insistence that the cognitive process and the organization of the cognitive structure are inseparable parts of the whole psychical organization. Learning, the formation of habit, and memory are not isolated phenomena, but are purposive functions of the purposive whole.

V. MAN AND SOCIETY

Both McDougall and Adler recognize and emphasize the importance of the social nature of man. Adler makes the social feeling one of the two great sources of human behavior, and McDougall gives the gregarious propensity an important place in his list of propensities. Adler says: "The oldest striving of mankind is for man to join his fellow men. It is through our interest in our fellow men that all progress of our race has been made." (5, p.252).

Related to the gregarious propensity are what McDougall calls non-specific tendencies, or pseudo-instincts—sympathy, suggestion, and

imitation. These tendencies are not true instincts, because they may be called into play in the service of any of the propensities.

Adler uses the terms suggestion, sympathy, and empathy to cover the same functions; empathy as used by Adler seems to include elements both of sympathy and imitation as defined by McDougall. The only real difference in their interpretations is that Adler considers empathy to be related to the social feeling, while McDougall considers it to be a general function which may be related to the social propensity or to any of the other propensities.

McDougall and Adler present almost identical accounts of the evolution of the social feeling in the individual. The child's first experience with another human being is ordinarily with the mother. They both consider this early relationship to be of primary importance in influencing the child's later relationships with and attitudes toward other individuals. Both see that the development of strong social feelings for the smaller group (the family) lays a foundation for adequate adjustment to the larger group.

The development of group consciousness brings about a simultaneous need for some means of social control. Social control of the highest type *cannot* be achieved by coercion. Adler says: "Any authority whose recognition does not occur in and of itself, but must be forced upon us, is moral authority." (4, p.284).

Along the same line, McDougall writes:

There are, it seems to me, three distinct policies which may be deliberately pursued, for the securing of the predominance of public or social motives over egoistic motives. First, we may aim at building up group life on the foundation of a system of discipline which will result in more or less complete suppression of egoistic tendencies of individuals, the building up in them of habits of unquestioning obedience to authority. . . . Some group spirit no doubt will grow up. But, though wonderful results have been obtained in this way, the system has two great weaknesses. First, it seeks to repress and destroy more than half the powerful forces that move man to action—namely, the egoistic motives in general—instead of making use of them, directing them to social ends. Secondly, it crushes individuality and therefore all capacity of progress and further development . . . it is a rigidly conservative system. . . .

The second system is that which aims at developing in all members . . . a sentiment of devotion to the whole, while suppressing the growth of sentiments for minor groups within the whole. . . . I have already pointed out one great weakness of this plan—namely, that this sentiment for the all-inclusive group cannot be developed save by way of the develop-

ment of the minor group sentiments . . . the smaller group is apt to call out a man's energies more effectively because he can see and foresee more clearly the effects of his own actions on its behalf. . . .

Only the third policy can liberate and harmonize the energies of men to the fullest extent: namely, that which aims at developing in each individual a hierarchy of group sentiments in accordance with the natural course of development. (9, p.115 ff.)

Adler and McDougall agree in the importance of the greater capacity of men for learning in the formation of higher level and more varied adjustment to society. The role of language and play are stressed by both. Play is seen as significant by both, but with slightly different emphasis. Adler sees it as a training for future activity, but insists that it serves as well the need for asserting superiority and for creative expression. McDougall, after seeming in his earlier works to accept and synthesize various theories of play, in his later works tends more to eliminate all activity from the category of pure play except gambolling and sheer expression of excess energy.

Adler considers altruism to be a derivative of social feeling, making it, along with empathy and sympathy, a fundamental component of a well developed social feeling. It should be remembered that Adler makes social feeling broad in its scope, including in its sphere such other phenomena as tenderness, love of neighbors, friendship, and love.

McDougall, on the other hand, does not believe altruism to be an expression either of sympathy or of the gregarious propensity; he holds that it is rather a function of the tender or parental propensity. Since the parental or tender impulses seem to be included in Adler's *social feeling*, there is perhaps no real divergence of opinion.

In group life, altruistic motives may so strengthen group spirits that purely egoistic motives are overcome. In this way, the egoistic impulses may be sublimated, deprived of their selfish character, and turned to public service. "Hence it is that it is generally so difficult or impossible to analyze the motives of any public service or social activity and to display them either as purely egoistic or altruistic; for they are, as Herbert Spencer called them, ego-altruistic." (9, p.126).

VI. THE ABNORMAL

Adler and McDougall recognize the close relationship between the normal and the abnormal; the abnormal indicates a misdirection of the normal energies and abilities of the individual. McDougall classifies functional disorders under two groups, dissociative and repressive,

with a third, an intermediary group involving both repression and dissociation, that of perversion.

McDougall considers mania, hysteria, melancholia, and manic-depressive insanities to be types of dissociative disorders. In these cases he postulates an actual "splitting off" of parts of the conative, cognitive, and affective structures of the personality, so that there is (in contrast to the repressive disorders) no conflict once the schism has been effected. Symptoms vary in degree in proportion to the severity and extent of the cleavage, from simple automatisms to apparently independent co-personalities.

The dissociative disorders are quick in development, often due to sudden shock; the repressive disorders usually develop over long periods of conflict. Introvers are more subject to disorders of the repressive type, extrovers to those of the dissociative type. The repressive disorders involve constant conflict and friction, making great demands on the energy of the individual. Disorders of the repressive type include dementia praecox or schizophrenia, paranoia, and similar types of delusions and withdrawals.

Adler frequently uses terms referring to splitting of the personality or splitting of consciousness, but for the most part he seems to regard the terms as a convenient description of an *apparent* splitting. "Other types take refuge from anxiety and doubt in a compulsion and unceasingly continue their pursuit of success. They never attain to any harmony in their strivings, for the two-fold nature of their being, the apparent double-life of the neurotic ('double vie,' 'dissociation,' 'split personality' of many authors), is definitely grounded in the fact that the psyche partakes of both feminine and masculine traits. Both appear to strive for unity but purposely fail in their synthesis in order to rescue the personality from colliding with reality. It is at this point that Individual Psychology can intervene to some purpose, and by means of an intensified introspection and an extension of consciousness, can secure the domination of the intellect over the diversion and hitherto unconscious strivings." (3, p.21).

McDougall expresses the same thought in slightly different terminology when he speaks of personality disorders arising from the malformation or disintegration of the sentiment of self-regard, wherein the submissive and assertive propensities fail to coordinate.

There is fundamental similarity between Adler and McDougall in their theories of the subconscious and its function, of their theory of

dreams and their usefulness in understanding the personality; there is general agreement on the role of sex both in the normal and the abnormal personality functions, with one exception: McDougall is of the opinion that in some instances sexual perversion, particularly homosexuality, may have its foundation in congenital physical factors. Both believe that in some instances disorders not generally recognized as psychogenic are psychological in origin, particularly certain cases of epilepsy, migraine, asthma, and neuralgia. (Cf. modern preoccupation with psychosomatic complaints.)

There is only one major difference of opinion between Adler and McDougall on the method of treating disorders. Both agree on the necessity for uncovering the source of the disorder, catharsis through free-association, dream-analysis, removal of erroneous notions through frank discussion, and redirecting of the energies into socially useful and acceptable channels. They differ in that McDougall prefers the use of hypnosis as a preliminary method of exploration of the unconscious motivation, following that by techniques similar to those suggested by Adler.

CONCLUSION

Both McDougall and Adler are thoroughly teleological in approach. McDougall emphasizes the purposive nature of the propensities and characterizes his whole psychology as hormic. Adler postulates an early-formed goal of life and says that the mode of attaining the goal is limited and influenced by innate characteristics of the individual (organ inferiorities), but puts a greater stress on environmental factors than on innate ones. Neither considers a pleasure-pain theory an adequate explanation of behavior. Both Adler and McDougall tend toward a theory of psycho-physical interactionism, or toward a double aspect theory, as a possible solution for mind-body problem. Both assume the existence of mind or soul which is not necessarily restricted and governed by laws of the physical world as it is at present conceived. There is also agreement that there has been a gradual evolution of mind, and that mind, conscious and subconscious, is in varying degrees normally unitary and integrated.

There is a common assumption of basic innate motivating forces; McDougall gives a much more detailed theory of the propensities than does Adler, but with a little analysis it may be seen that there is much more similarity than might be supposed. Likewise, both maintain that

the conative, the cognitive, and the affective processes are distinguishable but inseparable aspects of the psychic whole. There are conflicting opinions on the inheritability of acquired characters; McDougall finding increasing evidence for such a belief, Adler rejecting it unequivocally.

Adler and McDougall recognize the fact that an account of innate springs of action does not cover the complexities of the behavior of civilized—or even primitive—men. Although Adler, in contrast to McDougall, gives very little attention to the building up of the cognitive structure or of sentiments, nevertheless he does have a theory of an integrating force in personality—one strikingly like McDougall's theory of the integrating role of the sentiment of self-regard—namely, the life-goal and its accompanying life-plan. From the sentiment of self-regard, self-consciousness and volition are developed; from the life-plan, ego-consciousness is derived. There is basic similarity in content, although not in the classification, of the emotions and the feelings. Adler places less importance on the physical and physiological conditions as determinants of personality than does McDougall.

Abnormality, according to Adler and to McDougall, is to be distinguished from normality only in degree. There is, for the most part, consistent agreement on the nature and the types of functional disorders. There is a difference of opinion on the matter of dissociative disorders; McDougall assumes an actual splitting-off or division of consciousness; Adler seems rather to doubt an *actual* splitting-off but insists that the division is only *apparent*. They attribute dissociative disorders to similar causes—conflict within the sentiment of self-regard, or between assertive and submissive tendencies in the will-to-power as it functions in the life-plan.

The role of sex in abnormal development is similar in both psychologies. There is a minor difference. Adler denies, McDougall postulates, the innate basis of some cases of inversion.

Both McDougall and Adler consider man's inherent social nature to be one of his most important attributes. Inner communication of man and man is made possible, according to McDougall, by sympathy, and empathy. There must be a development of a communal sentiment before there can be an adequate social relationship. Both McDougall and Adler believe such a development to be a gradual extension of the sentiment for the small family group to the larger social group. There is also agreement that social control is most effective if it allows a

normal freedom to the individual, if it is not coercive. Play and altruism are both important aspects of social relationship; but language is perhaps its most significant development.

The important place given the development of communal life by Adler and McDougall cannot be overemphasized. Social man is superior to natural man because of the richness of his social heritage of abstract concepts and sentiments, not because of his superior intelligence or innate capacities.

REFERENCES

1. ADLER, ALFRED, "Feelings and Emotions From the Standpoint of Individual Psychology," *Feelings and Emotions*, Wittenburg Symposium, (ed. Reymert), Clark University Press, 1928.
2. —, *The Neurotic Constitution*, tr. Bernard Glueck and John E. Lind, New York, Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1926.
3. —, *The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology*, tr. P. Radin, Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1924.
4. —, *Understanding Human Nature*, tr. W. B. Wolf, New York, Greenberg, 1927.
5. —, *What Life Should Mean To You*, ed. Alan Porter, Boston, Little, Brown, & Co., 1931.
6. McDUGALL, WM., *Body and Mind, a History and Defense of Animism*, (5th ed.) London, Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1920.
7. —, "Emotions and Feelings Distinguished," *Feelings and Emotions*, Wittenburg Symposium, Clark University Press, 1928.
8. —, *The Energies of Men*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933.
9. —, *The Group Mind*, (2nd. ed. rev.), New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1920.
10. —, *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923.