

## THE AUTHENTIC LIFESTYLE

At the crossroad between Existentialism and Individual Psychology

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There are almost as many phenomenologies and existentialisms as there are phenomenologists and existentialists. Mode of existence, analysis of the "world" of the individual human being, and life-style may be looked upon as comparable phenomenologic-hermeneutic constructs. A clarification of the concept of authenticity — is undertaken from the semantic, philosophical-ethical, and psychological-social frames of reference and its ontological as well as phenomenological aspects are pointed out. The author briefly reports on the use of the "amicogram" representing the structure and measure of one's relations to friends and other emotionally significant persons throughout one's life.

At the beginning of this century Edmund Husserl — "the father of phenomenology" — introduced into philosophy a highly elaborate phenomenological system in order to free philosophy from "psychologism".

It did not take long that some psychologists introduced philosophical thinking — particularly phenomenology, existentialism, ontology and their various combinations — into psychology and psychiatry. Even "depth psychology" is being said to have acquired a "new dimension" — that of depth philosophy.

Nowadays — especially in Europe, mostly in Germany — this new approach to psychological, psychosomatic, and psychopathological problems is called the "anthropological" approach consisting in "the study of man" (Anthropos) and specifically the study of essential and basic characteristics of man. ["Anthropological Philosophy" (van Kaam 1963); "Phenomenological Anthropology" (Binswanger 1947)].

The relation between Individual Psychology and philosophical thinking as well as the philosophical implications of Individual Psychology have been repeatedly pointed out but they were most explicitly expressed by Alfred Adler himself:

"If someone is only partially familiar with philosophy, will agree that Individual Psychology is philosophy. — However, if some from our own circles will give our opponents so much as a catch-word, we may be prepared to hear that our opponents will try to create the impression as if Individual Psychology would have nothing to do with philosophy". (Alfred Adler, 1932).

One could only add that for Adlerians philosophy has always had a double meaning; namely, love of wisdom as well as wisdom of love. This double meaning has since been included in many an existential system as existentially recognized structure of human Dasein.

Even if one does not agree with Lord Russell's definition of philosophy — namely, that it is the "branch of science which gives one the privilege to think fallaciously" — one has to be aware, conscious as well as cautious of and prepared to the many ambiguities, uncertainties, misinterpretabilities,

and often unsurmountable difficulties in conceptualization and communication of psychological entities in philosophical terms and *vice versa*.

It has very often been mentioned that much of the existentialist literature is difficult to understand, and that it is more confusing than illuminating. Above all, it is easily misinterpretable resulting in misunderstandings and false perspectives. "Such a misinterpretation is always possible and cannot be prevented by further words, by warnings and instructions; for they, too, can be misinterpreted". (Earle, 1955). Existentialism has been compared to the "Tower of Babel" (May, 1963) as well as to the United Nations (Wenkart, 1963) indicating the confusion such an undertaking creates; but, at the same time, the global, concerted striving for creating an understanding — even if not out of, but at least of — the confusion.

One of the terms most easily misunderstood and misinterpreted is the term "authenticity", or being "authentic", signifying a crucial existential attribute applied to a great number of psychological and existential constructs, such as, authentic existence, Dasein, will, freedom, choice, communication, etc.

In fact, the possibility of a new branch of psychology — ontopsychology — is being considered to deal with the psychology of the "fully evolved and authentic self and its ways of being". (May, 1961).

### Semantic Consideration of the term "Authenticity"

The term "authentic" has been derived from the old Greek word "authentēs" meaning "one who acts on his own authority, or a chief" (Partridge) and "one who does anything with his own hands, e.g., a murderer" (Webster). There is a certain distinction between "genuine" and "authentic". When we speak of a *genuine* book we mean that it was written by the person whose name it bears as its author. When we speak of an *authentic* book we mean that it relates matters of fact as they really happened but it might have been written by a ghost writer, or the writer might have been a plagiator. The confusion concerning the term of authenticity results mainly from this double ambiguity.

1) It is being used to designate a normative-ontological-existential structure of human existence, on the one hand, and a phenomenological-psychological manifestation on the other hand.

It implies some primarily "human" but at the same time essentially or implicitly a-rational mode of existence which demands a human being should realize this "being-human"-ness regardless or in spite of any rational considerations.

Clive asks whether any man can get away from himself to such an extent (as Aristotle's God) that his concept of human-ness could be accepted as absolutely true, unprejudiced, objective and authentic. Even if he could, his concept would be based on objective, rational, and logical grounds so that the concept of authenticity would become actually inauthentic because it would not include the essential aspect of authenticity namely the transcendental, experimental, spiritual aspects. (Clive, 1960).

3) Any authentic analysis has to recognize that something may be authentic as to its content and/or as to its origin. E.g. a patient may relate

his experience to the psychotherapist which may or may not be an accurate description as to the way how he experienced the actual happenings; and his perceptions may or may not be accurate recordings of the actual happenings.

4) Based on the thesis that “truth is historically contingent” Kwant states that what is authentic — i.e. in accordance with “truth” — must also be historically contingent. (Kwant, 1960).

5) The ambiguity and even paradoxity of the concept of authenticity have occasionally been pointed out by the more critical writers.

Existence is considered not a static structure or givenness but a process of becoming. Therefore, any concept of absolute structure underlying existence would imply that essence precedes existence. This would be a concept contrary to basic existentialist teaching. (Clive, 1960.)

Along different lines, Tymieniecka arrives at similar conclusions about the paradoxity of an “authentic self”. Based on Jaspers own writings, she writes: “If the drive and outbreak toward transcending originates from the unsatisfactory finitude of objectivity — Jaspers means by objectivity both objective cognition and objective human relations, i.e., Dasein communication”, which means life in common with others in social interrelations — the origin of the authentic self is consequently paradoxical: “What it is authentically, it is from itself, but not *only* from itself and with itself” (Jaspers, 1947) (Tymieniecka, 1962).

### The Concept of Authenticity

The basic principle underlying the construct of authenticity is that human being is structured so that he can realize the idea of “being-human”-ness. This “being-human”-ness characterizes the authentic human being and is the common denominator of all the various “being” references, be it, being-in-the-world, being-at-the-world, being-to-the-world, being-beyond-the-world, being-oneself, being-for-oneself, being-toward-death, being-with, being-wholly-himself, etc. This authenticity, at the same time, implies the freedom of choice between following or evading this ideal of “being-human”.

Authenticity is an ontological-existential-structural meaning actually represents a normative-regulative idea, as it were, an “ontologization of ethical constructs” (Allers, 1961).

1) According to *Kierkegaard* “authentic existence is the modality in which a man assumes the responsibility of his own existence”. “Inauthentic existence is the modality of the man who live under the tyranny of the plebs (the crowd, i.e. the anonymous collectivity”). (May, 1958). Authentic existence implies the “categorical imperative” to live in such a way to be prepared to die at any moment in such a way that one’s life was not meaningless (Reinhardt, 1960).

2) Another philosophical approach—which by a “creative misinterpretation” had originally been responsible for application of existential thinking to psychiatry — was that of Heidegger. To speak in typical Heideggerian language: Dasein is always mine. It has always decided as the way how to be always mine. Thus, Dasein “in its Being” is its own possibility.

Therefore, Dasein *can* choose, win and lose itself. . . because in its essence it is the possibility of being authentic (“eigentliches”) — that means, of being “of its own” (“sich zueigen”) — or inauthentic (“uneigentlich”). (Heidegger, 1962).

3) According to Jaspers — the psychiatrist turned into a “gliding philosopher” — authentic man remains free for all possibilities uninfluenced by external pressure and he makes his own choice based on “unconditional imperative” (that is the inner imperative unconditional of external pressure and of own self-concern).

“Authentic life takes risks. It is high-level life, accepting the unconditional claims made on it, and the greater dangers implied in them. Exposed to extreme situations Existence has to prove its worth in making decisions between alternatives which take the form of an *either-or*. Faced by them it must either find its fulfilment or fall into the abyss.” On the other hand, “unauthentic existence (“das sich versagende Lebern”) wants to have the security of finiteness, wants to boast with possession and stability” . . . (Jaspers, 1947).

What Jaspers calls a “high-level life” may be compared to what Rogers described as the “good life” (Rogers, 1961).

4) According to Medard Boss man is to “accept all his life possibilities of relating toward the world, he is to appropriate and assemble them into the wholeness of an authentic free selfhood in order to avoid being caught in a narrowed down mentality of an anonymous inauthentic everybody” (Boss, 1963).

5) According to van Dusen: “In authentic existence man resolves to be himself in the face of a world which is alien to him; . . . his being-in-the-world will be a full realization of his potentiality” (Van Dusen, 1959).

6) The idea of a transcendental teleology in Tymieniecka’s formulation, namely, that we may find “genuine source of experience in which — beneath the mechanized and distorted responses of contemporary men — an authentic intercourse between man and nature can be re-established and man’s natural roots regenerated” . . . “culminating in the spiritual (existential) encounter which must be met with unreserved, uncompromising sincerity since the other man is a point of reference for one’s accomplishments”. (Tymieniecka, 1962).

### Psycho-Social Implications

Only a few of the many important points which deserve serious dialectic treatment can be mentioned here:

1) Most existential concepts of an ontological authenticity of human Dasein actually represents, as it were, a declaration of spiritual independence of the individual from (contemporary) society. This attitude can be traced back as far as one is willing to study the history of civilization. Already Horace sang “Odi profanum vulgus et arceo . . .” (I hate the profane crowd and I avoid it) . . .

According to Langan, Jaspers puts the question very bluntly thus: “the spiritual situation of our time is: we can accede to and work for the planetary domination of technic, or we can withdraw to the hills to shepherd

Being” — meaning by the first choice the inauthentic choice; and by the second choice the authentic choice, or the choice of the “sacrificing hero”. (1959)

A conformist [a “salaud”, a “stinker” (Sartre)] is considered inauthentic, but “withdrawal from life’s firing line” would not make one “authentic”.

However, “inquiry into all levels of men’s socio-creative being would reveal that social institutions are not externally imposed but are expressions of the deepest nature of individual.” It is not even necessary, Tymieniacka agrees “for man to oppose the prevalent social forms in order to defend one’s rights for a chosen type of realization, for the form of society takes its very meaning from types of individual human realization”. (Tymieniacka, 1962).

2) It has frequently been stated that the origin, meaning, and purpose of existentialism as twofold. It represents a revolt against modern technocracy with its super-materialism, super-rationalism, super-intellectualism and “false” values as prevailing in contemporary social structure, science, including the behavioral sciences. It also aims at restoring “authentic” human values arising from the authentic structure of Dasein. (Bollnow, 1955).

Arendt goes even further when she states that “this last stage of modern philosophy is perhaps best described as the rebellion of the philosophers against philosophy, a rebellion which, beginning with Kierkegaard and ending in existentialism, appears at first glance to emphasize action as against contemplation”. “The most consistent result of this rebellion is a return to religious values which, however, have no root any longer in authentic religious experiences of faith, but are like all modern spiritual values, exchange values, obtained in this case for the discarded values of despair” (Arendt, 1959).

However, looking upon existentialism from a phenomenological frame of reference it appears that it is the modern materialistic, technocratic society which is an expression of revolt against the preceding idealistic-subjectivistic and romantic-aristocratic “Zeitgeist”. Thus, existentialism could be compared to a spiritual counter-revolutionary movement expressing the historically recurring difficulties in behavioral adjustment often found in the transition from one historical period to another; in this case, from the previous idealistic romantic era to the new materialistic-technical era. (This dialectic consideration is far from being a purely semantic quibbling).

3) Referring to the existing confusion in and among the various phenomenological and existentialist schools of thought it has been stated that there are as many phenomenologies and existentialisms as there are phenomenologists and existentialists. One gains the impression as if each of them “saw himself — if one may say so — as the representative of human being in general and as if he considers his own experience as paradigmatic” (Allers, 1961). These — apparently exaggerated — criticisms apply especially to the concept of authenticity which has been declared as a product of “circular thinking”. (Luijpen, 1960).

By circular thinking is meant a way of thinking which starts out with a presumption that something is such and such (for instance intentional,

good, open, meaningful, caring, etc. etc.); the presumption is followed by stating the observable facts about this something; and ending the circle in the final judgement of these observations by returning to the frame of reference at the starting point declaring the concurring phenomena as authentic (if they are in accordance with the original presumptions) or inauthentic (if they do not concur with the original presumptions). (Luijpen, 1960).

From a phenomenological-psychological frame of reference authenticity would be referred to without presumptions, but with accurate and unbiased description of phenomena as manifested by the total unique Dasein and with or without application of hermeneutic principles.

Such a phenomenological-psychological frame of reference appears to be more closely related to the concept of "life-style", while an ontological-regulative frame of reference — as discussed below — would bring it into a conceptual relationship with "social interest". Spiegelberg stated that Sartre's concept of the "fundamental choice consists in the adoption of a certain mode or style of being-in-the-world" (1960). Because no absolute human values are recognized — Closterman concluded — authentic human behavior is left without being guided by firmly grounded norms and it becomes adapted to the actual state of affairs depending on situations and positions. (Closterman, 1963).

The phenomenological-psychological frame of reference points to a subjective individual, idio-syncratic authenticity (genuineness) reflecting one's unique total personality one's "as-he-is-in-the-world-ness" rather than to a hypothetical ontological structure having general validity, as it were, an absolute "authentic fundamental projection" (Heidegger, 1963).

In such a context, inauthentic behavior would mean a person's intentionally planned conduct to hide his "as-he-is-in-the-world" possibly to achieve some predetermined aims. Such impostor-like acting in order to appear something else than one is, as it were, the playing of an actor in a show-in-real-life, was described as "Le Bovarism". (A. Huxley)

According to Sartre; personality should *not* be judged by one's conduct because existence is characterized by the *aim* toward which one's conduct is directed. (Tymieniecka, 1962) Such a Sartrean view appears to differ from the concept of life-style which is assumed to be manifested by one's behavior and at the same time to represent one's personality. By dialectic synthesis one may conclude that the intentional masking of one's life-style may — and often does — constitute an important aspect of the life-style.

5) As to the psychological significance of authentic mode of living, the opinions differ. Allers, Jaspers, Boss and others ascribe definite psycho-therapeutic and psychoprophylactic value. In fact, inauthenticity in the same sense of conformity has been referred to not only as "Das Man," mass-man, public ego, decay, stinker, but also as "neurosis without symptoms." Allers considers conformity as "flight into unauthenticity" a sort of "flight into disease." He believes that these "neuroses without symptoms" may develop into a neurosis with fully manifest symptoms.

Allers also stated that methods of encouragement, self-enhancement, and reassurance etc. as psychotherapeutic methods may even more induce

people to seek conformity and thus lead to neurosis. The goal of psychotherapy should not be the “normal” person but a “human” person in the sense of “individually realized authenticity” (Allers, 1961).

Boss stated that psychotherapeutic goals cannot be achieved in inauthentic persons. (Boss, 1963).

Pathogenicity of inauthenticity has also been mentioned: “. . . the difficulties in realizing oneself in authentic being the experience of one’s limitations, of being reduced to one’s vital and social functions and nothing “beyond” them . . . can be considered as the fundamental cause of psychological and pathological depressions and despair which lead to diseases”. (Tymieniecka, 1961).

The pathogenicity of the lack of intersubjective “existential communication” clearly refers to Jaspers whose concept of Dasein differs from that of Heidegger. To Heidegger Dasein and Existence are synonymous, while to Jaspers’ Dasein means the empirical, objective being including the biological psychological, and empirical-objective social aspects (or “strata”) of human living. Dasein becomes Existence when it transcends itself into the spiritual strata of human co-existence. The authentic, healthy “Existential communication” is dominated by this spiritual idea, while “Daseinscommunication” — still implying loneliness — is dominated by biological, psychological and social objectivities. (Cf. “Existentialism as transcendence of psychology” Closterman, 1963).

Referring to this difference between Jaspers and Heidegger, Wahl called Heidegger’s transcendence intramundan — therefore, semantically not strict — transcendence while Jaspers’ concept of transcendence a real, extramundan transcendence. (Wahl, 1949).

Binswanger’s idea of “being-beyond-the-world” seems also to be in contradistinction to Heidegger’s “being-in-the-world” because — according to Binswanger — the former refers to “being-for-the-sake-of-ourselves” while the latter to “being-for-the-sake-of myself”.

6) Considering the importance of socio-ethical considerations in modern psychology the absence of any explicit ethical consideration in Heidegger’s fundamental work is conspicuous. Langan states that “Heidegger is repeatedly at pains to point out that he is passing no moral judgement and that he does not wish to suggest that the one is in anyway preferable to the other”. (Langan 1959).

“. . . the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any ‘less’ Being or any lower degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity — when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment” (Being and Time p. 68).

Heidegger’s own life furnished an apparently illustrative example of the inauthentic, conforming “Mass — man” — in his own terminology: “das Man” — when he as rector of the University of Freiburg publicly aligned himself with the National-socialist mass-ideology. (The significance and meaning of this act(ion) — and of his consequent behavior — has been the object of various interpretations).

Although Sartre himself never presented a major formal system of eth-

ics based on his own philosophy (as promised in the last chapter of his "Being and Nothingness"), Simone de Beauvoir's "Ethics of Ambiguity" is mainly based on Sartre's philosophy. (Beauvoir, 1962)

### Authentic Existence and Social Commitment

Although the philosophical implications constituted the primary significance and intention of the early existential thinkers, it was the psychological, sociological, and ethical implications which helped to spread the new gospel. (This is especially true of the U.S.). The interrelation of the psychological, social, and ethical implications are especially important for Adlerians. In fact, it is these aspects in which — despite a number of divergent attitudes, concepts, and conclusions (sometimes more apparent than real) — the two modes of thinking most concur in general terms. Some similarities, complementarities, and overlappings — but also some of the differences — have already been pointed out by several authors (May, Barret, van Kaam, van Dusen, Stern, Lions, Radl, Ansbacher, Spiel, etc.)

It has been reported that the use of Individual-psychological questionnaire (attributed to Nowotny) proved very helpful in working along existential lines. (Closterman, 1963)

An attempt has been made to translate Adlerian concepts into existential terminology and thus pointing out their affinity and the similarities as well as the differences. (van Dusen, 1959).

It might also be of interest to try to translate some existential concepts into Adlerian language while being fully aware of the necessary adjustments to be made in order to clarify what is common, similar, and different in both approaches and attitudes and thus make the "dialogue" (van Dusen, 1959) beneficial and constructive for both.

Authentic existence could be expressed as life style integrated by social concern and social commitment. Inauthentic existence could be expressed as a life style integrated by one's private, idio-syncratic logic lacking adequate social concern and still less social commitment.

Here, only few of those considerations which merit our attention should be briefly touched upon:

1) The routinely used terms "conformity" and "interest" are conspicuously absent from both formulations because extensive discourse would be needed to completely eliminate their ambiguity.

2) The word life style has repeatedly appeared in existentialist literature as the phenomenological correlate to the ontological "self", Dasein, and Existence.

Boss repeatedly speaks of "Daseinsmelodie" (Boss, 1955). Binswanger declared that the "symptom" (e.g., of flight of ideas, of psychomotor inhibition, neologism, stereotypy, etc.) proves to be the expression of a spreading change of soul, a change of the total form of existence and the total style of life". (Binswanger, 1947.) One could add that the "change in the total style of life" phenomenologically occurs in accordance with the life-style reflecting the life attitude, life goals as well as the pattern of dealing with life problems (action pattern) as integral parts of the total life style.

3) As the role of the future in the 'here and now' of Dasein — as process of becoming — is an important characteristic of existentialists thinking, so the psychodynamic role of the purpose-force imminent in the concept of life-goal implies great psychodynamic momentum.

4) The authentic search for "meaning of existence" was shown in experimental work to be very close to — if not overlapping with the concept of life-goal. (Ackerknecht 1963).

5) There seems to be a basic controversy between many explicit formulations of authenticity and the general meaning of social feeling. It appears that "social-self" is being considered inauthentic implying that being immersed in societal activity does not permit realization of the qualities of being human. "Heidegger regards the social-self as the inauthentic part of human being". (Tiryakian 1962).

Tiryakian concludes that according to existentialist thinking "the authentic self is never really 'at home' in the outside world" (Tiryakian, 1962).

Adlerians assume that an individual who does not feel "at home" in the human community has no adequately developed social interest. Although social interest does not imply actual compliance with the dominant trend in one's environment, it does not exclude productive or even successful social living in a contemporary society. It still less implies violent force against or complete withdrawal from present day society.

6) It has been suggested that social interest actually means "a sense of fellowship in the human community" (Adler, 1946). "Social concern", or "social commitment" would be more in line with existential writings, but they still do not explicitly stress that they do not imply devotion or loyalty to any historical form of society, culture, ideology, etc. but to a society "sub specie aeternitatis", i.e., a society which could be considered ideal for all mankind for all times (if at all possible).

7) According to Alfred Adler, social feeling is not an innate, ready-made characteristic or inherited tool of human beings ready to be used or to be ignored in one's conduct but an inherent possibility which has to be developed, formed, and perfected. According to Heidegger, authenticity represents an inherent ontological structure of Dasein which man is free to chose or lose. Dasein in its Being is its own possibility. Sartre, on the other hand, theorizes that possibilities and potentialities cannot constitute existence. Therefore, by existence is meant only those potentialities which actually became reality, or in other words what a human being made of himself by developing his potentialities.

Social interest can be looked upon as a useful, creative (if you will "authentic") compensatory dynamism initiated and perpetuated by the human awareness of imperfection in persons to whose life style Alfred Adler referred as the healthy, "struggling", and "overcoming" life style.

Human beings, however, become aware not only of their own imperfections but also of the imperfections of the field of their existence. In other words, man strives for perfection not only of his own "being" but also of the "world", i.e., of the field without which this "being" could not exist.

Social feeling implicitly presupposes the imperfections of one's environ-

ment, including society. If the world — including things, fellow human beings, society etc. — would be absolutely perfect, there would be no real need for social concern.

Useful striving toward perfection of the being, of the world, and of the being's "being-in-the-world" may be accompanied by a feeling of superiority, accomplishment or "self-realization" and reveal a style of life characterized by genuine social interest in action. — Its psychologic-religious aspect as the wish for self-perpetuation (immortality) represents an immanent "transcendental teleology" (Tymieniecka, 1962) expressed in the striving for preservation of human society (be it at a given time technocratic, romantic, dehumanizing or otherwise far from the "ideal") without which the preservation of Dasein of the individual human being would be unimaginable. In other words, there is no being for the "being-in-the-world" without the world. Ontology of self-preservation may be seen in the striving for self-perpetuation by biologically and/or socially productive creativity for the sake of preservation of society as the indispensable field of human existence. (Neufeld, 1954).

The various references to the authenticity of such concepts as encounter, communication, presence, humanity, interpersonal relation, intercourse between man and nature, will to authentic reality, nature of human relations are, in last instance, more or less related to the basic concept of social interest. "Gemeinschaftsgefühl" also constitutes a characteristic component of Maslow's concept of "self-actualization". (Maslow, 1954).

8) One can understand why Dürkheim would not consider modern materialistic-egotistic society a suitable environment for realization of an ideal, authentic mode of individual existence. (Tiryakian, 1962).

One can also understand why for millions of people "making a living" all but precludes living one's life; why the "Others" become targets; why men produce highly effective — while themselves become unreliable — computers; why the *homo sapiens* becomes a friendless creature; why the psycho-social significance of the individual's realization of his "I-Thou" relations is explicitly or implicitly distinguishable in many existentialists. Even Heidegger considers language, speech, and hearing as ontological expressions of man's basic potentiality for interpersonal understanding.

"Listening to . . . is Dasein's existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for ownmost potentiality-for-Being — as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it. Dasein hears, because it understands." (Heidegger, 1963).

In this respect an existential phrase attributed to St. Augustin should be mentioned: "Nil Homini amicum sine homine amico" (Luijpen, 1960). (Nothing appears friendly to a human being without a human friend.)

One's available social feeling may be determined from the social, sexual and work aspects of life. The importance of the social aspects of one's functioning may be seen in some experimental research that found significantly greater stress tolerance in persons with high overall social accomplishment than in persons with high intellectual, economic, sexual, occupational etc. achievements.

Quantitative determination of social feeling has to overcome many in-

herent difficulties. A quantitative evaluation of social interest in group therapy setting has been offered by Dr. Gottesman. (1962). I found a very valuable help in dealing with various types of patients to make a concentrated effort to set-up what I have called his "Amicogram". (Because of the hybrid nature of this word to some the pure Greek *epitideoqram* might appear more appropriate.)

Its detailed exposition exceeds the scope of this paper. Briefly, an amicogram represents a survey of the patient's friendships whom he ever had (acquired, won, maintained, and lost including his childhood friendships). It includes persons whom he — rightly or wrongly — considered friends; who considered him — rightly or wrongly — a friend; relations he considered friendships in his sex life and work life; potential, not fully developed, and wrecked friendships; the many major and minor disappointments; non-reciprocated, unrealized, hoped-for friendships, etc. The purpose of such amicogram is to determine a person's ability to develop a feeling "at home" with people, a feeling of "being-with-friends". Such an ability may furnish an index of his realized social interest in action.

The external friendship-inducing and rewarding "positive" circumstances as well as the friendship-inhibited, trying "negative" experiences have to be considered from a bifocal viewpoint; from the patient's own evaluative and teleologically influenced viewpoint; and from a phenomenologically "unbiased" essential viewpoint (which should not be identified with the therapist's own "biased" perspective).

The semantic difficulties about the meaning of the words "friend" and "friendship" (esp. as compared to "friendly relations") will often come up but can almost always be cleared away.

A survey of his hostile relations to all persons whom he can recollect as having felt as hostile or who might have considered him as hostile or an "enemy" will greatly help understanding his "amicogram."

Needless to say that such a survey cannot be accomplished in a simple history taking manner. The data have to be collected through a number of interviews with additions and corrections.

9) The concept of "unconditional imperative" as postulated by Jaspers represents the highest ethical construct translated into ontological language (Cf. "ontologization of ethical constructs", Allers, 1961) and seem to be a combination of Kant's categorical imperative and social commitment.

The unconditional is not determined by one's goals but according to Jaspers "it precedes every aim, it is that which determines all aims". His examples of the "unconditional imperative", represent "the men who know how to die" (e.g. Thomas Moore, Seneca, Bruno, Boethius) and indicate uncompromizing life attitude choosing death rather than compromising one's convictions. If convictions are put into action only on the condition that the action does no harm or does not cost too much, the imperative becomes "conditional imperative" or "perversion".

The unconditional imperative comes as the command of the authentic self. The "unconditional" implies goodness and authenticity because it is grounded in the "foundation of love" which is identical with the "will to authentic reality".

Another important and criticized characteristic of the concept of the unconditional imperative is that it does not clearly manifest itself in every-day life but only in the so-called “Grenz-situations” (translated variously as “limit situations”, “border situations”, “crises” etc.). In fact, a “demonstrated unconditional is merely a “powerful force, a fanaticism, a frenzy, or a madness” but not a manifestation of the “authentic self” (Jaspers, 1960).

According to Adlerian concepts, the life-style — although more or less manifest in every life situation — becomes most easily detectable in acute stress or shock-situations in which the unconditional demand for a decisive and sometimes a superhuman degree of social interest becomes imperative. From this frame of reference life-conflicts are characterized, created and solved by the ratio between the demanded and the available social interest.

Moreover, not only the degree of available social commitment will be more manifest in conflict situation, but also the person’s idiosyncratic “private logic” which he engages in lieu of the demanded social feeling. An individual whose imperative will be found in his private logic will seek a sexual object instead of a sexual partner; social status instead of social usefulness; and easy wealth instead of productive work.

The importance of the life-style in life’s most difficult as well as in non-critical life situations withstands Bollnow’s criticism as applied to authenticity, existential situations, unconditional imperative, etc.

Bollnow asks whether Dasein is not as important in the everyday chronic state as it is in crises. He observes that significant areas of Dasein are misunderstood if judged only in critical situations. Between crises life may run an uneventful and quiet course — without the necessity of a fateful and potentially dangerous decision — and life in an existential philosophical sense still does not become inauthentic, that is, less true and less essential”. (Bollnow, 1955).

10) Possibly due to the previously mentioned easy misinterpretability of existentialist writings, existentialism has been accused of “overemphasis on individuality” (Bollnow, 1955) and “rugged individualism” (Tiryakian 1962). Tiryakian asserted that the idea of authentic participation in a collectivity, in social reality is “antipodal to existentialism”. (Tiryakian, 1962). Simone de Beauvoir admits that other “ethics of ambiguity” — the ethics based on Sartre’s existentialism — is individualistic though “not solipsistic, since the individual is defined only by his relationship to the world and to other individuals; he exists only by transcending himself, and his freedom can be achieved only through the freedom of others”. (de Beauvoir, 1962).

Despite all such and similar dialectic conclusions, Bollnow observed that in most existentialists one can sense a genuine and deep ethical concern.

On the other hand, Individual Psychology is unmistakably socially oriented but still fully recognizes the unique, holistic but imperfect individual with his — sometimes misdirected — goals and responsibility-laden “freedom”.

If authenticity was referred to as the “ontologization of ethical constructs” (Allers, 1961), then social interest may be referred to as the “psy-

chologization of ethical constructs". If existentialism stressed the role of philosophy (van Kaam, 1963, Closterman, 1963) in psychology; so Individual Psychology also stresses the role of social anthropology in psychology. If existentialism assumes that measure of everything is Man; so Individual Psychology assumes that measure of everything is mankind. Yet, all these comparisons do not represent contradictions but thoughts for constructive dialectic creativity.

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